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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the lecturers and authors are presented for the professional education of its readers. Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers. Reproduction of articles or lectures in the *Review* requires the specific approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review* and the respective author or lecturer. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

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PRESIDENT'S NOTES

Most military officers like to refer to themselves and to their occupation in terms of "professionalism." They like to consider themselves experts in a field that, according to one definition of professional, demands "advanced study in a specialized field." Indeed, the *raison d'etre* of the Naval War College is the professional development of officers. This is, as any true professional will recognize, far too narrow a definition—although advanced and *continuing* study throughout one's career is essential to professionalism.

In the broadest sense, professionalism requires a high degree of skill and competence, but, more than that, professionalism is a state of mind which demands of those who would be called professionals the highest ethical standards and morally responsible pattern of conduct.

In the history of the Navy, professionalism has been manifested in many different ways—none, however, more unique or ennobling than the performance of our prisoners of war in North Vietnam.

One of the best expressions of how an organization can be enriched by the efforts of a few is to be found in the conduct of Comdr. Robert Naughton during his 6-year confinement in enemy hands. His was an extraordinarily professional response in a perilous situation—a response that came largely from within, but one that was also influenced by his sense of responsibility to the organization of which he was a part. Commander Naughton and his fellow prisoners have, in this issue of the *Review*, given us an example of which we can all be proud.

If we are to refer to ourselves as professionals, we must, each and every one of us, perform to a high professional standard in this larger definition of the word. These ideas of competence and personal commitment are certainly not new. Professor Gibbs' fine paper—also in this *Review*—reflects Clausewitz's understanding of these ideas. Today, however, they take on special significance. The American people no longer take for granted the performance of any of the professions, including the military. The responsibility of professionals to their organization in this context is crystal clear.

Julien J. LeBourgeois

JULIEN J. LEBOURGEOIS
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
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Throughout the years of political dissonance created by the Vietnam war, the one element that could command almost universal support in the United States was concern for our prisoners of war. Through an unswerving loyalty to themselves, their fellow prisoners, and to the Nation as a whole, these men, confined, tortured, and used for political propaganda, were able to return home with an honor and dignity often lost by men in similar circumstances. (This article represents an abridged version of an extensive research effort conducted by the author.)

MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS OF AMERICAN PRISIONERS OF WAR HELD BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

An article prepared
by
Commander Robert J. Naughton, U.S. Navy

Introduction. January 1973 witnessed the end of the longest continual armed conflict in the 200-year history of the United States. Sixty days after the signing of the Paris agreement, the longest recorded incarceration of American prisoners of war (POW's) ended for more than 500 men, over 450 of whom had been held in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Several of these men had endured more than 8 years as prisoners of the DRV, while one POW held by the Vietcong was detained over 9 years.

The POW's received a warm and tumultuous welcome from the people of the United States. This served to create a unanimity among Americans which had been lacking during the long years of the Vietnam conflict. The Nation's public display of pride and relief was a genuine show of interest and concern for "their" POW's.

The Vietnam POW's, however, were not the first prisoners of war who had received publicity. Those American men who had been held prisoners in all recent wars have been the subject of public examination, and their return to the United States has provided a great deal of human interest news copy.

The post-Korean period was the most lucid example of such investigation. Eugene Kinkead's widely read book, *In Every War But One*, based on

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The source material for this article is drawn from the author's 6 years of imprisonment in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam —his experience and observations plus the narratives and reflections of 118 other prisoners with whom he, at various times, shared a cell.

psychological factors that influenced the prisoners, emphasized the poor conduct of American POW's in Korea. Similar works combined with the conclusions reached in the *Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee POW Report* prompted the issuance of the Executive Order Code of Conduct. The perceived necessity for an executive order delineating the expected standard of conduct for POW's was a *de facto* condemnation of Korean POW's. For the many U.S. servicemen who served honorably as POW's in Korea, it is unfortunate that the books defending their conduct, such as *March to Calumny*, received less notoriety than those which condemned, but the intent here is not to debate the guilt stigma of Korean POW's nor to exonerate the innocent. Instead, it will be enough to note that such writings do exist.

Now there exists another group of subjects, the Vietnam prisoners, whose experiences might substantiate, repudiate, or expand upon the findings of the studies of prisoners held in previous wars. A military examination of the Code of Conduct's influence on Vietnam's POW's and its further applications, a psychological investigation into the personality effects of from 6 to 9 years of foreign detention, and the sociological problems involved in living 5 years with the same man under adverse stress conditions should be of intense interest for research. Indeed, the findings would be of value not only to military leaders and behavioral scientists but to any human beings who have more than a casual curiosity toward their fellow man.

No amount of descriptive words can completely peel back the skin of the POW and reveal his inner self. But perhaps an acquaintance with the confined environment in which a POW must survive and some insight into the methods by which a man copes with this situation will help the reader better understand his actions.

A prisoner's world is subject to a variety of influences, both internal and external, influences that can cause a man's perceptions to expand and contract as the situation changes. Hence, conscious acts, willful choices, and resistance motivations have shifting roots within a prisoner. For example, the rationale of a new captive differs from that of a man hardened by years of prison life; a consuming injury can alter one's outlook, and resistance with group support is not the same as standing alone. The expansion of individual experiences to general behavioral axioms by which motives are assigned to all POW's is inherently dangerous, but some factors of resistance behavior are universal. Such general propositions observed to be true are examined in this paper.

Capture and Interrogation. Consider, if you will, a pilot in the relative safety of a smooth flying jet aircraft with the comforts of a CVA "ready room" fresh in his mind. Suddenly he finds himself huddling in a flooded rice paddy still shaken by the combined effects of his aircraft being hit, abrupt ejection, and an unwanted parachute descent to earth—"skivvie-clad" and tightly bound amidst a crowd of angry, club-waving Vietnamese peasants, screaming in a language unintelligible to him. He is now a prisoner of war!

When such events occur in staccato fashion within 15 to 20 minutes, they represent an abrupt, disconcerting change. The most dominant emotion is a sense of *bewildering fear* at the alien surroundings and *uncertainty* of one's ultimate fate. Things held dear—friends, home, and family—take on greater importance when they are no longer accessible. Embodied in this sense of loss is the uncertainty of time. How long? Ever?

Throughout captivity, this or some other form of fear is a prisoner's constant companion, always capable of

influencing his behavior. It is more accurate to say that in the years ahead the POW will learn to control his fear rather than conquer it.

Behavior at such a time is patterned largely by instinct—one acts as a programed individual and military man. Such programing is attributable to information bits acquired through age, cultural experiences, and training. That one's actions are instinctive means that resistance efforts draw on learning and values formulated earlier in life. For example, past survival school training and the ingrained knowledge that the Code of Conduct is the order of the day embody the spirit of resistance and give a man an instinctive *modus operandi* from the outset of captivity.

The POW soon comes to realize that this patterned, instinctive reaction to events is his only guide on what to do next. *He is alone,* a helpless object vulnerable to the enemy's wrath. One manifestation of the subconscious loneliness is the relief one feels when an American aircraft passes overhead. This nostalgia and sense of kinship with other pilots was experienced by U.S. POW's in Hanoi during every bombing raid from May 1967 to April 1968, a brief respite from the gnawing loneliness inside each prisoner of war.

The impact of this loneliness is further intensified as the POW comes to realize that his programed, instinctive reactions will not cover every situation. He understands that at some point he must consciously deal with the question of how to relieve the constant pain of the binding ropes—without giving the inquisitors any information.

Resolving the dilemma of resistance and survival is exacerbated by the strict rules that prevail in the captor-captive relationship. It is unlikely that an American prisoner has previously been involved in a contest in which the stakes have been so high and the regulations so invariable. A man's life in the United States is a series of second chances, getting a break, or receiving a helping hand. But in a Hanoi interrogation cell, such relief does not occur. Here there is no chance that someone will enter the sweat-stained room with bumpy walls designed to muffle screams and say, "We will let you go this time, but don't do it again."

Some would attribute the captive's resistance to loyalty or devotion to duty; and, in later periods of POW life, devotion to duty and patriotism may be an accurate description of resistance motivation. However, in the early days of captivity, *pride* is a more correct motivational assessment. Pride is a driving desire to prove yourself to yourself and to those whose opinion you respect, and so strong is this desire for self-respect that many have endured torture to the point of crippling pain. The combination of pride and obligation seems to motivate men, time and time again, to resist to the limit of their endurance—despite the knowledge that the prisoner will probably be forced to conform in the long run.

It is important to note that physical well-being as well as mental resolve influence a prisoner's conduct. Strong physiological needs are always present for a POW. Some men crave water even before their parachutes deliver them to earth, and several sweltering days without washing, plus involuntary immersion in rice paddy water with a human excrement additive, produce an almost maniacal desire for a bath. For many men, maimed in the course of capture, physiological priorities center on injuries and a struggle to stay alive. Still, men with twisted legs, shattered arms, crushed faces, and flame-charred bodies do resist from the outset rather than seek aid by compromising their principles. But such action is beyond the ordinary and cannot be expected from all. It is a strong motivation that induces a physically disabled man to select the arduous course of action because of what he knows is expected of him.

It has been stated that initial behavior is instinctive. Instinct is used here in the classical sense[1] in that the newness of the environment dictates "trial and error" or "best guess" behavior based on innate feelings. However, as the years of prison transform new captives into oldtimers, and the bitter lessons are learned, a man is better able to determine proper courses of action. His actions are still instinctive in the sense that behavior is limited by the goals perceived as attainable.[2] This prison maturity replaces earlier guesswork, thereby enabling a POW to recognize the frequent fluctuations in the captor's attitude and take advantage of these changes for his own benefit.

Living Alone. The new captive is first thrust into another completely new and unnatural environment, that of living in solitary confinement. Few people have ever lived for any length of time without any form of human companionship. Both U.S. penal institutions and the 1949 Geneva Conventions on Prisoner of War Treatment set 30 days of solitary as maximum punishment. A poll of U.S. POW's captured in the DRV before 1969 reveals that 90 percent of the men endured solitary living conditions for periods ranging from a few days to more than 4 years, and an equal percentage had been subjected to physical torture. Men of varied personalities are affected by "solo" living in different ways. The combination of emotional stresses and physical hardships prompts hallucinations within some new prisoners. Some memories of the first days in Hanoi are confused and dotted with haunting recollections of irrational outbursts and disturbing dreams.

The physical condition of the cells within what became known as the "Hanoi Hilton" contributes to the depressive state of a new POW. An 8-foot by 8-foot concrete room, bare board bunks, a heavy, iron-braced door with a shuttered peephole, and a small barred window looking onto a wall crowned with broken bottles comprise the appointments of his new home. The daily schedule is quickly learned, and the two meals do not fill the endless hours of a prisoner's day. To a "solo" prisoner, the daily fare of two meals has more value as a relief from boredom than as nourishment. Even the sporadic bathing schedule provides a welcome respite from the oppressing heat of one's cell if little else. A POW's bath entails dipping cold water from a tank resembling a horse trough and spreading it over one's body by means of a cup.

The sound of the turnkey opening doors usually announces the time to eat or bathe, but the rattle of keys at an unscheduled time often means he will be called to a quiz.* Quizzes usually mean being called upon to do something against one's will, and there is a feeling of relief when the jingle of keys fades into the distance or when another's door is opened.

It ought not to be surprising that in this isolated existence a POW seeks some contact with familiarity wherever he can find it. Something so innocuous as smoking a cigarette provides a feeling of security in that the act of smoking is a familiar experience, and, to one who has tried a Vietnamese cigarette, it is obvious that an ulterior motive is required to enjoy it.

The pleasure derived from such familiar associations indicates the POW's desire to conquer his alien environment and to gain control of his emotions. Since knowledge is the armor by which we arm ourselves against adversity, a prisoner constantly strives to learn about his surroundings. Thus, the physical camp layout, the guard change schedule, and the turnkey's idiosyn-

*The term "quiz" was coined by POW's to denote prisoner meetings with some Vietnamese representative of the camp organization. Quizzes could entail interrogation, propaganda, discipline, torture, or indoctrination.

crasies are all objects of study. A person knows he operates better in familiar surroundings or when he possesses the "home court" advantage. The POW subconsciously realizes that action under extreme emotional stress provides a poor basis for rational behavior. He is motivated to establish a better platform from which to act.

A universal activity of solo POW's is to peer through cracks, under doors, or through the bars in the hope of seeing another POW. Despite Vietnamese efforts to avoid even sight contact between Americans, a fleeting glimpse is occasionally available as a Yank shuffles from his cell to a quiz or to pick up his chow. Eventually the day comes when an "old head" is able to communicate with the "new" man. By means of a few well chosen words, spoken or written, the new man is given the tap code used for clandestine communication among POW's, advice on prison pitfalls, words of encouragement, and the senior officer's policy of resistance, called BACK-US.* This information is passed at great risk to the transmitter, for the camp maintains strict regulations against communication enforced by guards roaming the halls of the Hanoi Hilton who report even suspected violations to camp officers. To be caught means severe torture, as many prisoners would learn during the communication purges.

A man named Ho Chi Minh once said, "Communication is the lifeblood of resistance." The impact of communicating is precisely that for the POW. For some POW's, covert communication is their sole contact with others over a period of months and years. Any device capable of making noise may be used to transmit information from the highest priority to idle chatter to pass the time and combat loneliness.

A man in solitary with only rats for roommates also spends a great deal of time involved in introspection. His attitude is a poignant mixture of feeling sorry for himself and as one with a duty to perform. Thoughts center on assessing one's situation, prospects, and the dilemma of how to exist, a dilemma which prevails for years. Reflections on the war are subject to the constant Vietnamese propaganda which the camp authorities provide through a crude wooden encased radio speaker in the window. Fortunately for the POW, the broadcasts are very naive and intended for someone with no more than a seventh grade education or the right psychological set.

The POW's attempt to evaluate his situation prompts a circular reasoning that meanders through the present, past, back to the present, and ultimately to the future. When one accurately assesses the war, as he knew it prior to being shot down, certain questions begin cropping up: Who really cares about POW's? How often does anybody think of one who is a POW? What reasons are there to expect the war to end in 1, 2, 3 . . . years?

The biggest question a POW poses to himself is, "How would I live my life if I were to live it over again?" To answer such a question, a man recalls many events and decisions of his past life and how alternate decisions might have altered his present circumstances. A mental playback of the events leading to his capture provides hours of speculative thought as to what went wrong. Pondering the decisions made earlier in life raises a fantasy of foregone occupations. The life of a schoolteacher, a business-

*BACK-US was an acronym which contained the essence of the senior officer's resistance policy in the Little Vegas area of the Hanoi Hilton in 1967. Each letter represented the following:

B—don't Bow when in front of cameras.
A—stay off the Air, i.e., don't read on camp radio.
C—you are not a Criminal.
K—don't Kiss the Vietnamese goodby by making good statements when we leave.
US—Unity before Self.

man, or an airline pilot now seems to have greater appeal; and when one dwells on his past, thoughts linger on pleasant memories reconstructed in fine detail. Ultimately the question, "Why was that particular event enjoyable or important?" causes one to evaluate himself and ask, "What is important? What do I value?"

The surfacing of values, the examining of past goals, and the facing of the reality of a prisoner of war situation lead most POW's to consider the dilemma of the present, the guilt felt by each man who has been forced to act against his will during initial interrogations. Before talking to other POW's, each man perceives himself to be the only one who has given information. But every man knows he cannot endure the Vietnamese rope torture indefinitely without giving some information. The natural outcome of this thought process is to form a workable plan for the future, namely, a motivational force to resist, to honorably survive the trials that lie ahead.

The early solitary period of captivity is marked by a high frequency of quizzes, intended largely to determine what type of prisoner a new man might become. Thus, there is ample opportunity for the prisoner to employ his newly devised plan of intended action. One is always, on these occasions, taken from his cell to a designated room to be quizzed alone, with only his convictions for support. One might say the general POW attitude at quiz, knowing one can be forced to comply is never to give "something for nothing." It is a point of pride that no information is given as long as the prisoner is capable of resistance.

Each prisoner formed his own judgment of tactics employed by the interrogators during quizzes, but several generalities seem to be widely held. The Vietnamese interrogator needed to feel that he was in control. Therefore, a direct challenge to his authority could not go unanswered. It was not necessary for the POW to yield control of himself to the interrogator but merely to convey the impression of such. For example, there were many instances when an uncooperative POW was told by the interrogator, "You know I can force you to answer, don't you?" When the POW acknowledged, "Yes, you most likely can," the question or demand was often dropped.

It is also generally agreed that the interrogator had some preconceived answers to the questions he asked concerning military matters and covert POW activities. If the POW perceived these desired answers to be erroneous, he responded to reinforce this error. However, when the Vietnamese had a correct answer in mind, an attempt to create doubt in the interrogator's mind was usually a better tactic than a flat denial of fact. Of course, these deceptive methods were not perfect, and, when unsuccessful, the POW ended up in ropes, on his knees holding up the wall, sitting on the stool, or in some other form of punishment.

Perhaps the peak experience of this phase of a POW's life occurs when he makes a truly maximum effort to physically resist torture.*[3] It may be the first time in his life that he musters every ounce of physical strength, mental courage, and determination. The feeling of being totally consumed by this effort is truly unique; and even when this maximum effort, with nothing held back, proves to be not enough, one at least feels pure and satisfied for having done his absolute best. Such an experience usually leaves a POW broken and physically disabled, but is nonetheless of great psychological value to him.

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*Maslow referred to the peak experience as "... a self-validating self-justifying moment which carries its own intrinsic value with it."

Living in Groups. Life in an 8 by 8-foot cell with one, two, or three other men is nearly as unique as living alone. However, the absence of loneliness makes it considerably easier to cope with the difficulties associated with small group living. The axiom "misery loves company" holds true. Close conditions, where four men eat, sleep, and perform hygienic functions in the same room, require some adjustment and concession by all concerned. Individual physical traits of snoring or body odor, combined with personality idiosyncrasies of vulgar speech, braggadocio, and loquaciousness, can cause strained relations among roommates. However, with few exceptions, U.S. officers interned in North Vietnam came to appreciate the need for compromise and self-sacrifice for the good of the group.

Accommodation becomes a way of life, and various means are employed to make existence tolerable. One such means is to routinize the events of the day and to rigidly maintain that routine. Planning such common events as exercising, sweeping the floor, cleaning the cell, telling stories, and the time of communication with other cells serves a twofold purpose. It gives an element of order to life and permits some control of one's action. Otherwise a prisoner must perform the most common daily acts of eating, bathing, rising, and going to bed at a time designated by the prison guards, and the schedule is subject to frequent unannounced changes. The value of order and self-control is best appreciated in the light of the prisoner uncertainties and required compliances.

Routine also permits a POW the opportunity to vary his activity from time to time in order to relieve boredom. An example would be to not exercise on the Fourth of July or to let another empty the "honey bucket" because it is the duty man's birthday. Thus, to deviate from the routine becomes a form of celebration.

Another practice that may seem humorous is the method by which some POW groups parceled out food. The best method of handling the potential trouble of unequal food portions is to raffle off the meals and to rely on the "luck of the draw" method for distribution. Such procedures ultimately become a source of entertainment as homemade dice are cast to determine which bowl of soup each man receives.

An important element of harmony is a sense of humor in the *illegitimae non carborundum* sense. The ability to laugh in the face of adversity is a valuable asset. It is difficult to express how great it feels to laugh after months of crying. The man who finally has a roommate following months of solitary living is ready to laugh at anything, and the slightest provocation prompts uncontrollable hysterics. There can always be found an element of "sick prison humor" in the most dire situations. One could find a bit of humorous irony in being tortured to write a statement that he is being treated well. Since the situation appears humorous even today, perhaps the sickness still prevails.

Living together in a small prison cell means constant association and interaction for 24 hours a day, not the mere 8 hours a day at work or at home that most people equate with "knowing a person." In that respect, when a POW has the same roommate for 2, 3, 4, and 5 years, it is safe to conclude they know each other better than they know their wives.

The exchange of ideas that takes place among men in a common predicament and the knowledge they gain from each other can greatly broaden one's perspectives. There is no need to hide one's feelings on a subject for image purposes because one has no image. Roommates know each other in their true colors; and within the sanctity of one's small cell, the familiarity among POW's prompts an open expression of opinions on many subjects

that are not usually discussed at cocktail parties or in rap sessions.

This atmosphere of frankness and the commonality of the situation make resistance behavior, its methods, limits, and consequences, a popular subject for examination. Decisions on the subject usually represent a consensus view rather than the dictates of the senior member of the group. The ultimate authority rests with the senior man, but "having one's say" removes the resentment associated with an authoritarian environment and more firmly commits members of the group to a program they have helped to formulate. However, perhaps because a man's proud belief that his above-the-norm capability demands higher standards, group decisions tend to require less stringent courses of action than those individually formed.

Even small group membership enables a man to project his thinking beyond concerns for his own survival. Resistance may now be viewed as a contribution to the war effort as well as individual responsibility. The adverse effects of his compliance with the enemy become more vivid when shared and discussed with roommates in the same predicament. Thus, as a man lives in closer union with his fellow POW's, his motives are more likely to become less selfish.

Consensus decisions, common problems, and close quarters generate unity and *esprit* among members of the small group, a necessity if a group is to be effective. An indication that POW's possess these qualities and care for one another is evidenced by the prevalent atmosphere of gloom when a cellmate is at quiz. Genuine concern promulgates itself through unselfish acts of sharing, cheering up each other, or communicating at great risk with a solo man purely for his psychological needs.

Communication provides a sense of group accomplishment for it demands group effort. This function often requires two men to visually clear the area by watching for approaching guards while the other two men "communicate." Each message successfully passed produces a euphoric satisfaction within the group. This reaction may appear overstated, but to a group whose purpose is primarily negative, that is, not doing something, to accomplish anything in a positive manner is significant.

To dispel the notion that U.S. POW's held in the DRV were a group of superhumans, it seems appropriate to make some subjective observations of isolated individual behavior within the context of living together. Before October of 1969, when the treatment of POW's improved, torture abounded, solitary confinement was common, and very few men engaged in correspondence with the outside world. During this period the most significant improvement in POW treatment was that torture stopped. The POW's were then assembled in large numbers, and this change in confinement prompted a change of attitude in some POW's. In this sanctuary from physical abuse, some men discovered a boldness within themselves and felt compelled to exhibit ultimate resistance.

This could be called the "irons theory" in that POW's challenged the camp authorities to put them in leg irons and handcuffs again. Its advocates considered minor camp restrictions to be harassment that should be resisted, forgetting that for years prisoners were humiliated by the requirement to bow in the presence of a Vietnamese. Now in the atmosphere of relaxed camp discipline, the "iron men" found it personally elevating to curse and ridicule a guard in a language that guards could barely understand, if at all. It may not be surprising that these hard-line beliefs did not surface until prisoners lived in large communities where the visibility of toughness had a larger audience. It is worth noting that these men were not those of senior rank with whom the

final authority and responsibility rested. In fact, this antagonistic behavior conflicted with the "live and let live" policy issued by the senior officers during periods of relative calm.

There might have been an element of sincerity involved, or these men might have been motivated by the belief that prisoners should push for as much as they could get. The possibility also exists that an element of "one-upmanship" or a desire to atone for less stiff resistance in the early years of captivity might have been present. Whatever the motivation of these men, it was obvious that a strong desire for self-esteem existed among them.

Other men also followed rules for personal conduct that was not a group characteristic—POW's motivated to conduct themselves in a manner they believed would best represent the United States to the North Vietnamese because they felt the POW's were the only Americans with whom most North Vietnamese had contact. Although prison guards were by no means the elite of North Vietnamese society, they would eventually return to their villages and answer the inevitable question: "What were those Americans who bombed our country really like?" In other words, was the Vietnamese minister of propaganda really telling the truth that U.S. pilots were bloodthirsty, arrogant, insensitive criminals?

These POW's believed that an attitude of aloofness, support of the U.S. Government, and resisting propaganda efforts in a professional manner were what would ultimately gain respect for a POW as a man. Puerile actions such as belittling the DRV and its citizens merely supported the Communist claims that American POW's were the "blackest criminals in the DRV."

By November of 1970, most of the U.S. POW's were concentrated in one camp as a result of the U.S. commando raid on the Son Tay POW camp. Communal living, with 20 to 50 men in a single cell, marked the final experience for the veteran POW who endured the gamut of living conditions within the DRV.

It was rather exciting to meet men whose names and background had been memorized but whose faces were heretofore unseen. New friendships were born; common acquaintances and experiences were discovered; and time was passed listening to new stories and biographies. It was a time of high emotion compared to an earlier drab existence, but as one man candidly remarked, "It is a bit depressing to hear so many tell their stories and not hear one happy ending."

The organization of the POW's within this larger camp was immediately structured in military fashion. Each cell had a senior ranking officer (SRO) with a staff of flight leaders. Every man was assigned to a flight with the flights alternating the menial housekeeping tasks of cleaning, distributing food, washing dishes, and clearing for communications.

Never did the Vietnamese permit contact between prisoners in different cells, and the senior officers were located in a rather remote section of the camp. The establishment and protection of communication channels became vital to the organization. Those responsible for the transmission of information within the camp deserve a great deal of credit for a job well done. To some men the communication process occupied so much of their time that it became a way of life, a truly professional operation.

Through their efforts, a close link was established between the leaders and the rest of the POW's, and a rather elaborate set of goals was promulgated to all POW's from the senior officer and his staff.

These goals were embodied in what was known as the "plums." The plums covered many areas of duty in detail and identified our common goal. The compendium of those plums follows: to

support the Code of Conduct by doing and saying nothing harmful to the U.S. interests, to actively resist propaganda efforts of the Vietnamese, and to work together in order to go home with honor. These concepts were not new to the U.S. captives and had been implied by individual SRO's previously. However, the assurance that everyone would be presenting a united front to the enemy greatly increased the group's cohesiveness.

The organization of POW's was essentially involved with the Vietnamese in a struggle for control. The Vietnamese appeared to have an innate fear of an organized group of Americans, and, therefore, they rejected the terms of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Americans held in North Vietnam were never granted POW status but were continually referred to as "criminals" by the Vietnamese. By attributing any good treatment to their own benevolence rather than to the just right of prisoners, a sense of authority was maintained in the minds of the Vietnamese.

When security precautions dictated the POW's be concentrated in one camp, the camp authorities (as they always referred to themselves, thereby implying control) were especially wary. The Vietnamese never recognized military rank among POW's and attempted to exert internal control by placing a junior officer in charge, thus reducing the structure and organization established by the POW's in that room. This rather puerile effort was eroded through universal resistance, and internal control remained with the SRO ostensibly as well as in fact.

The idea of control is further typified by the manner in which the Vietnamese resisted any suggestion for camp improvement if it came from a POW, whether or not the suggestion would be mutually beneficial. Thus, the POW's indirectly approached their captors to gain improved conditions rather than directly confronting them in a forthright manner.

The rescinding of the early regulation that a POW bow before any Vietnamese indicated tacit admission by the Vietnamese that control of another's body did not constitute control of his will. With this admission, quizzes and attempts at political indoctrination, humorously naive and ineffective as they might have been, ceased altogether and propaganda efforts lessened toward resisting POW's.

There is a distinct difference between propaganda for the purpose of indoctrinating prisoners and propaganda released to the world in order to sway public opinion. Indoctrination efforts caused little concern to the POW's and were often a source of entertainment or a source for tidbits of news from the outside world. However, the propaganda directed toward world opinions could not be predicted and therefore was a primary target of a POW's resistance efforts. The Hanoi parade of POW's in 1966, the circulation of grotesque pictures of pilots taken immediately after capture, the coercing of POW's by torture to meet with foreign visitors to Hanoi, the torturing of POW's to write good-treatment statements, or the circulation of deceptive photographs suggesting universal good treatment of prisoners were examples of such propaganda. The POW's realized the harmful public effects these tactics could have, both on the U.S. war effort and on its allies, and were motivated to resist participation in these events to the same degree that they resisted providing the DRV military information. Thus, when torture for such devious reasons ceased in the later years, the POW felt some sense of relief. No longer was one forced to do these things against his will. An understanding of this perceived exploitation and the reasons for torture explains the bitterness of some returnees against the DRV.

Returning to the notion of control within the camp, it should be noted that

the prisoners had their own ideas of control and influence. When it was felt that the mail situation was intolerable, a letter writing moratorium was enacted for a period of 9 months in order to create the impression that POW's were no longer allowed to correspond with their families. This would dispel any possible misconception that the treatment of POW's was good, and it was hoped subsequent pressure on the DRV would prompt the Vietnamese to distribute more mail.

On another occasion, prisoners were forbidden to hold religious services, to form a choir, or to have any POW speak in front of the group. This restriction against religious services was met with a unified POW demonstration in which 350 POW's throughout the camp started to yell and sing in unison. The reaction of the Vietnamese was greater than had been anticipated—they actually thought a revolt was in progress. Several senior POW officers were taken out of the camp, and the camp discipline was tightened. For several days the atmosphere within the camp was tense, but eventually the right to hold church services was won. Similar struggles for camp control, however, continued until the POW's were released.

Even though a man is dedicated to group goals, he remains very much an individual. Manifestations of this individuality come in many forms such as the power need of those who controlled the communications[4] or those who were prestige motivated and thus voluntarily filled the thankless roles of education officer, entertainment officer, cigarette control officer, doctor, or chaplain when their rank did not warrant a role of leadership.[5]

A few within the group could not resign themselves to accept camp improvement for fear such acceptance would compromise resistance. Therefore, if a prisoner accepted any form of improved treatment, such as writing a Christmas card home or the use of a pencil and paper, he would not be performing his duty.

Perhaps reluctance to accept camp improvements in the DRV prisons could be explained by Maslow's metagrumble theory[6] where such qualms could be present only in a truly self-actualizing man as he strove for perfection and thus rejected any compromise. A more likely explanation would be that the POW's possessed a basic distrust of the Vietnamese and their motives—an attitude not without foundation. The North Vietnamese made propaganda a way of life and used religious services, medical treatment, and POW mail as bribes or exploitation. Small wonder that a popular expression among POW's was, "Beware of Gooks bearing gifts."

To a degree, attitudes within the formal POW organization—a source for POW motivation—changed during the final years. Motivation continued to become more altruistic or patriotic than egoistic within the POW organization, situationally enhanced by large group living. The managing and protection of a united organization provided an atmosphere that enabled thinking to be more long range and altruistic. A certain security was felt and a better opportunity was provided to perform as honorable men, as outlined in the organizational objectives. Could it be that the decision to support and participate in the activities of the large POW group was derived from agreement with its goals, or was it a desire to gain the personal protection afforded by group membership? There did exist the moral obligation to fulfill one's contract as a military officer. Perhaps a man was motivated by pure love of his country, or was it a hatred of a philosophy so alien and detrimental to his survival? Was the POW's philosophy pragmatic or idealistic?

It appeared that the POW was duty motivated and tended to be more altruistic as he became more actively a part of the larger POW organization.

The ego-centered pride motivation of initial captive days expanded to include consideration of other POW's and ideals. However, embodied within that duty were as many factors as there are caveats in the label of patriotism.

It has been stated before that POW's resisted making statements harmful to the United States and its allies. But that is not to say the POW's agreed 100 percent with all aspects of the war in Vietnam and the way in which it was conducted. The group of U.S. POW's in North Vietnam represented both liberal and conservative political philosophies, but there was universal agreement that the POW camp was not the place from which to air those views to the world. A POW had an obligation—yes, duty—to conduct himself in the manner expected of a POW as embodied in the spirit of the Code of Conduct.

It was also the duty of a POW to remain a POW until released through government channels. Such reasoning supports a finding that a near universal rejection of the early releases by the DRV of a few officer POW's* from 1968 to 1972 was a cohesive factor. The criticism of those accepting parole ranged from vocal condemnation to charitable doubt, but there was no one who defended the acceptance of early release as honorable behavior for an officer. The determination to avoid such stigma was a binding influence among resisting prisoners.

One last observation is important. POW's in general felt that they had invested a long time serving as POW's in the war. Most of these men did not want their position undercut through the U.S. Government conceding defeat or its inability to win. Hence, the men clung to their position of resistance to the last day. Some might call this irrational or just plain stubborn. But many POW's have said, after having spent more than 6 years in prison, they were willing to spend another year if it meant the difference between walking out of Vietnam or crawling out. They meant it!

The comparison of POW communal life to standard group behavior theories is enormous. No doubt many aspects of prisoner existence will fill books of the future. Since these men will be collectively evaluated, as were the Korean POW's, it does seem appropriate to conduct an examination of the Vietnam POW organizational effectiveness. An appropriate criteria by which to measure the effectiveness of any group is contained in the Field Theory of Lewin, The Interaction Process Analysis of Bales, and The Human Group Theory.[7] These men have designated many factors that influence an organization's productivity, but some are more germane to this discussion than others.

A common factor for a successful group in the theories of Bales and Homan is the requirement of positive interaction. The interaction among people who had lived in confined quarters had been present whether desired or not. A characteristic of American POW's in the DRV had been their willingness to promulgate to all fellow captives personally tragic or triumphant prison experiences. Accounts of torture sessions, quizzes, or personal thoughts were related regardless of whether a man's participation had been a point of pride or shame. Such revelations had helped others to learn vicariously and represented nearly perfect interaction. Events that occurred throughout the camp were transmitted to everyone. Sometimes listening to a POW sweep the hall or the camp courtyard with the tapcode rhythm was slightly reminiscent of listening to the evening news events of the day.

*Of the POW's who were released early, only one man went home with the permission of the senior American officer in camp. No stigma was attached to this seaman's release by any POW. His resistance had been exemplary from capture to release.

Another standard of groups is contained in the writings of Lewin[8] who held cohesion to be the key element of a successful group and tied it directly to the productivity of the body. The satisfactions, the degree of closeness, the amount of pride, the ability to meet crises, and the willingness to be frank and honest in expressing ideas among members of the group were some criteria needed for cohesiveness. Lewin's concept of cohesiveness, lacking among Korean POW's, provided an apt description of the Vietnam war POW's. The common goals, united actions, and other instances previously cited support this contention.

The most comprehensive set of standards for a successful group was stated by Shepherd.[9] He listed five features by which to measure group effectiveness:

- Objectives: Is its purpose the same as that of its members?
- Role Differentiation: Does each member know what is required of him?
- Values and Norms: Is that which is desired and that which is expected clear?
- Membership: Is the membership clear-cut and heterogeneous?
- Communication: No one withholds relevant information.

All of these features as they apply to the U.S. prisoner organization in Vietnam have been examined within this paper. It is left to the reader to pass judgment on the organized group's effectiveness.

For my part, I would like to stress again that the high standards of behavior the U.S. POW's demanded of themselves were largely due to the personal integrity of these men. From one who has spent considerable time in their midst, I have nothing but the highest regard for them as military officers. America is fortunate to have been represented by such a select group under the most trying of circumstances.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Comdr. Robert J. Naughton, U.S. Navy, earned his bachelor's degree in mathematics at Loras College, Dubuque, Iowa, where he had also engaged in 3 years of Catholic seminary studies. He completed naval flight training in 1962 and subsequently served in VU-1 and VA-113; he was a POW in North Vietnam from 1967 to 1973. Commander Naughton is a graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff and is currently engaged in graduate work at the University of North Florida in Jacksonville.

NOTES

1. Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 88.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
3. Abraham H. Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1968), p. 79.
4. David A. Kolb, et al., *Organizational Psychology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 125.
5. Clovis R. Shepherd, *Small Groups* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 25.
6. Abraham H. Maslow, *Eupsychian Management, a Journal* (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin and Dorsey, 1965), p. 238.
7. Shepherd, pp. 23-41.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

Ψ

Clausewitz's dictum that "war is an extension of policy by other means" has become an article of faith for the military professional. While this concept provides a much needed theoretical framework for understanding and dealing with the phenomenon, his discussion on the moral (psychological) forces provides an equally illuminating insight into the dynamics of war.

CLAUSEWITZ ON THE MORAL FORCES IN WAR

An article prepared

by

Dr. Norman H. Gibbs

Clausewitz was deeply concerned with why men fight, what it is that makes wars emerge and develop as they do, and what general factors contribute to victory and defeat. However, the writing and discussion about Clausewitz's book *On War* which have taken place during the past 30 years or so have concentrated largely on his argument that "war is an extension of policy by other means." It is undoubtedly an argument basic to his whole concept of the nature of wars that actually occur as distinct from any theoretical concept of war; or, to use his own words, it is an argument which helps explain the contrast between real war on the one hand and absolute or ideal war on the other. But the view of war as an extension of policy was no discovery of Clausewitz, as I think he would have been the first to admit. We do him an injustice by stopping at that point. I believe that he has something equally significant to say about the importance of the moral forces in war.

This is one of those points at which Clausewitz goes in a new direction in which he is concerned with the importance of the concept of ideology in war. But first a proviso. I think we have a tendency to be overly narrow in our use of the word "ideology" and, therefore, reduce its usefulness for our purpose. Ideologies are not just political creeds. To be of full value in the analysis of warfare, or indeed any other part of social analysis, ideology should be seen as something more comprehensive than simply political doctrine; something which, operating in the hearts and minds of men, moves them and inspires them to action. Of course, it is true that "something" can often be identified with political doctrine and that such

An adaptation of a lecture delivered at the Naval War College.

doctrine can be a contributory cause of war. Nonetheless, as I have already said, I think it would be wrong for us to limit the meaning of the word "ideology" to political doctrine, and I would argue that Clausewitz himself adopts a looser interpretation when dealing with warfare in general and the period of war between 1792 and 1815 in particular. In discussing these issues of ideology he uses the phrase "moral forces" though I think we would now delete "moral" and substitute "psychological."

To Clausewitz and to many of his contemporaries, warfare had in their own time become revolutionary in two senses; not only had it stemmed, politically, from the Revolution in France, but it was also conducted, militarily, in a new and sometimes startling way. In their view warfare in the 18th century had settled down into a static condition which limited its political utility. Even the major countries of continental Europe operated with relatively small armies compared to those commanded by Napoleon. These small armies moved about as single, often cumbersome, units, accepting without serious question severe restrictions upon their mobility. For example, although a good deal of road and canal improvement was going on in some countries of Western Europe during the 18th century, military leaders failed to take advantage of the opportunities they presented. Generals tended to restrict their operations to fixed lines determined by prepared depots, to generally slow movement, and, by limiting methods, to limited results. In other words, the wars of the 18th century were limited both in the employment of facilities and resources and in their political purposes. On more than one occasion Clausewitz wrote contemptuously of the attitudes and beliefs which produced such a state of affairs.

However, despite all this, changes in thinking were going on in the generation before 1789, and new ideas about warfare were most apparent in France. There, theorists and professional soldiers were advancing technical changes such as improvements in artillery and organizational improvements in the adoption of the division as a smaller tactical unit. The division composed of all arms made possible both greater concentration of firepower and greater mobility and flexibility in the use of armies. Others went beyond considerations of this kind and, by applying the new ideas about government and society—exemplified in Rousseau's *Social Contract*—to the business of making war, argued that if political and social structures could be radically changed, then so could man's ability to use organized force for political purposes. The best known of these writers was a French nobleman, the Comte de Guibert, who produced a substantial work in the 1770's called *A General Essay on Tactics.*

> "What," Guibert wrote,
> can be the result today of our wars? The States have neither treasures nor superfluous population. Their expenditure, even in peace, is in excess of their revenues. Nonetheless they declare war. They take the field with armies which they can neither recruit nor pay. Victors and vanquished are alike exhausted. The mass of the national debts increase. Credit falls. Money grows scarce. Fleets are at a loss for sailors and armies for soldiers. The ministers on both sides feel that it is time to negotiate. Peace is made. A few colonies or provinces change masters. Often the source of the quarrels is not dried up, and each side sits on its shattered remains while it tries to pay its debts and to sharpen its weapons.
>
> But suppose there should arise in Europe a people endowed with energy, with genius, with resources, with government; a

people which combined the virtues of austerity with a national militia and which added to them a fixed plan of aggrandizement; which never lost sight of this system; which, as it would know how to make war at small cost and subsist on its victories, would not be compelled by calculations of finance to lay down its arms. We should see that people subdue its neighbours, and upset our feeble constitutions as the north wind bends the slender reeds.

These were the ideas which the French increasingly put into practice with the outbreak of war in 1792 and which the other nations of Europe-Prussia among them—subsequently learned from the French. And you will notice that Guibert is just as much concerned with the spirit or attitude of mind in the military as with their weapons and logistic systems.

The French Revolution broke out in 1789, and it soon became clear that the monarchy and the whole social and economic order in France were threatened. In 1792 Prussian and Austrian Armies invaded France to stop the Revolution and restore the monarchy to its former position. In response, the Terror and the rule of the Committee of Public Safety developed in France in 1793 in an attempt to weed out traitors and strengthen the resolve of French citizens. Then, faced with the need for ever-increasing numbers of troops, the revolutionary government issued its most important statement of military policy and belief the decree announcing conscription. The French Army had faced disruption in the first 2 or 3 years after the Revolution, partly because of the emigration of aristocrat officers and partly because of the lack of discipline in the absence of effective central authority. This plus the danger from external enemies, forced the creation of a great national army to fight for the nation's survival. And so the revolutionary government, through the *levée en masse*, announced that political liberty and military duty were to go hand-in-hand. Thus was proclaimed the concept of the "nation in arms." The people would fight because they were fighting for themselves, not for a king or an aristocracy. They now had a stake in their own country and a corresponding duty to protect it. On 23 August 1793 it was announced that:

> From this moment until that in which every enemy shall have been driven out of the territories of the Republic, every Frenchman is permanently under requisition for service with the armies. The young men will go out and fight; the married men will manufacture weapons and transport stores. The women will make tents and clothing and nurse in the hospitals; the children will scrape lint from old linen. The aged will betake themselves to the public squares, there to raise the courage of the warriors and to preach hatred against kings and in favour of the unity of the Republic. The levee will be a general levee. Unmarried citizens and childless widowers between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five will be the first to march. The battalions we raise in each District will be gathered round a banner bearing this inscription: "This, the French Nation Has Risen Against Tyrants."

Inspired by their beliefs the new armies of France swept across Europe. It is difficult for us to understand, given modern means of transport and communication, quite what a phenomenon the armies led by the generals of the Revolution, and then by Napoleon, were. To those who welcomed them they were the bearers of a new gospel. To those who feared them they were a scourge. These were larger armies than Europe had ever seen, and they traveled

much faster. Whereas generals previously had fought with armies of 60 to 70 thousand men, Napoleon often commanded armies of a quarter of a million. Moreover, he depended for success on surprise combined with accurate timing and was prepared to go right across Europe to get the battlefield he wanted. In 1805, for example, Napoleon led his army from Boulogne to Ulm on the Danube in 10 days, arriving at the right place at the right time. This was lightning, blitzkrieg warfare of a kind modern Europe had never previously experienced. As Clausewitz himself put it, those who had expected the traditional kind of warfare in 1792-3 were taken completely by surprise,

> . . . such a force as no one had any conception of made its appearance. War had again suddenly become an affair of the people, and that of a people numbering thirty millions, every one of whom regarded himself as a citizen of the State. . . By this participation of the people in the War instead of a Cabinet and an Army, a whole nation with its natural weight came into the scale. . . . After all this was perfected by the hand of Buonaparte, this military power, based on the strength of the whole nation, marched over Europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly, that where it only encountered the old-fashioned Armies, the result was not doubtful for a moment.

You will notice that Clausewitz is not concerned with inequalities arising from an arms race. In stressing the commitment of the whole nation to war, he is concerned—as so much of his work demonstrates—with moral or psychological forces. Of all the campaigns Napoleon fought and of all the peace treaties he imposed, by far the most successful campaign and by far the harshest treaty were those against Prussia in the 1806 Battle of Jena and at the subsequent Treaty of Tilsit. Until the Prussians were handsomely defeated at the battles of Jena and Auerstedt, they considered themselves the foremost military nation in Europe and had behind them a tradition of military success going back to the Great Elector of the mid-17th century, culminating in the reign of Frederick the Great. The harsh terms of the Treaty of Tilsit drawn up in the summer of 1807 were simply imposed on Prussia by an alliance between France and Russia with the Prussian Government helpless in between. By the terms of that treaty, Prussia lost much of her most prosperous territory; her armies were reduced by four-fifths; and she was compelled to close all her ports to trade with England as part of the Continental System. This was total war and unconditional surrender, all happening within the space of a few months.

Clausewitz, in common with many other Prussians, was profoundly shocked by what had happened. Professional and patriotic pride were hurt. Shock, however, spawned a determination to find how and why matters had gone so wrong and to search for a remedy; and it was this search which led to the period of political, social and economic, and military reform in Prussia from 1808 guided by Stein and Scharnhorst.

The reformers' explanation of what had happened and their suggested remedies were roughly as follows. The old Prussian Army reflected Prussian society and government. Only aristocrats could be officers. The rank and file were recruited from the streets and the fields and, although then highly trained, were treated like the scum their officers believed them to be. How could such men—without rights, without dignity, without education or possessions—be expected to fight for a government in which they played no part and for policies which they did not understand

and perhaps would not have agreed with even had they understood them? In France, on the other hand, the Revolution had given Frenchmen a voice in their own government (or so it seemed), a belief in their leaders, and a sense of fighting to defend what properly belonged to them. The reasons for their victory were to a great extent psychological, or moral, ones. Therefore, if Prussian Armies were to wipe out the disgrace of defeat, the Prussian Government and society had to be reformed as those in France had been. Liberty and responsibility would go hand-in-hand, and men would fight for what they believed in.

What happened was that Prussians began to expound the concept of the "nation in arms" even more explicitly than the French had done. There were political and social reforms and a corresponding degree of reform within the army as well. The result, as Clausewitz and others saw it, was that with the widespread reaction against Napoleon in 1813 "in Germany, Prussia rose up the first, made the War a National Cause, and without either money or credit and with a population reduced one-half, took the field with an Army twice as strong as that of 1806."

Against this background let us return to Clausewitz's general exposition of the place of moral or psychological forces in war. He saw the events of his own time—as most of us do—through tinted spectacles; sometimes biased and even sentimental. But, in effect, he was saying no more in relation to the events of his own time than the French writer George Sorel has said in general, i.e., that all great social movements find a driving force in a body of images or myths. It is the existence of the driving force which matters.

In Clausewitz's analysis, war as a concept—is identified with violence and violence naturally tends to extremes. In his own words, "war is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will" and is, in fact, "an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds." When viewed in such a theoretical way, it follows that the overthrow or even the extermination of the enemy must always be the aim of warfare. But these are logical propositions, not an accurate description of the real world.

"Reasoning in the abstract," writes Clausewitz,

> the mind cannot stop short of an extreme because it has to deal with an extreme, with a conflict of forces left to themsleves, and obeying no other but their own inner laws. If we should seek to deduce from the pure conception of war an absolute point for the aim which we shall propose and for the means which we shall apply, this constant progression to extremes would involve us in difficulties which would be nothing but a play of ideas produced by an almost invisible train of logical subtleties.
>
> If adhering closely to the absolute we try to avoid all difficulties by a stroke of the pen, and insist with logical strictness, that in every case the extreme must be the object and the utmost effort must be exerted in that direction, such a stroke of the pen would be a mere paper law, not by any means adapted to the real world. . . . But everything takes a different shape when we pass from abstraction to reality.

In Clausewitz's view there are two reasons why real wars, wars which actually take place, are different from—in the sense of being less extreme than—ideal or absolute war. The first is the political context or purpose of actual wars. Given this context, we are concerned not with a blind force risking uncontrolled to total destruction, but "a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations." Or, as

Clausewitz puts it in more detail:

> The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller, it may be expected, will be the means of resistance which he will employ; but the smaller his preparation, the smaller will ours require to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the less value we shall set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether. Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made.

This, as I suggested earlier, is the part of Clausewitz with which we are most familiar. But a few pages later he goes on to argue that a realistic theory of war "... must also take into account the human element; it must accord a place to courage, to boldness, even to rashness. The Act of War has to deal with living and with moral forces, the consequence of which is that it can never attain the absolute and positive."

In other words, those two factors, political and psychological, work—at least to a great extent—in the same direction. In that sense it is also reasonable to claim that Clausewitz's whole book is an argument about limited war. But, having said that, it is important to remember that these same two factors, within the overall limits of real war, also produce all the variations between a skirmish or border incident on the one hand and world war on the other. To quote Clausewitz again—

> The greater and the more powerful the Motives of a War, the more it affects the whole existence of a people. The more violent the excitement which precedes the War, by so much the nearer will the war approach to its abstract form, so much the more will it be directed to the destruction of the enemy. . . .

Moreover, Clausewitz was convinced that the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, because of the great political interests and deep-rooted psychological forces engaged in them, had approached nearer than ever before to the absolute or extreme. Or, in language more familiar today, that he and his contemporaries had in their time witnessed the nearest approach to total war. The basic cause of that phenomenon "was the participation of the people in this great affair of State."

Primarily in books I and VIII of his work *On War*, but repeated elsewhere, Clausewitz returns to his theme of war as a continuation of policy. And, equally frequently, he returns to the importance of the moral and psychological forces. For example, when in book I he writes of ends and means in war, Clausewitz lists as one of his basic considerations—i.e., in addition to destruction of armies and annexation of territory—the "gradual exhaustion of the physical powers and of the will by the long continuance of exertion." The willpower of combatants figures repeatedly. In the long chapters on defense and attack, the psychological aspects of both forms are ranked as highly as the purely physical or material ones. Defense is argued to be the stronger form of war partly because of the moral reassurance of beginning the fight on one's own chosen ground and partly because of the psychological exhilaration of being able to go over to attack from defense encouraged by the thought that the enemy has been held and one's own efforts have thus far succeeded.

"During the twelve hours' rest," Clausewitz writes,

> which usually succeeds a day's work, what a difference there is between the situation of the defender in his chosen, well-known, and prepared position, and that of the assailant occupying a bivouac into which—like a blind man—he

> has groped his way . . . when the defender is close to his fortresses and supplies, whilst the situation of the assailant, on the other hand, is like that of a bird on a tree.

Likewise, looked at from the other side, "The success of the attack is the result of a present superiority of force, it being understood that the moral as well as physical forces are included."

Again, in a long chapter entitled, "The Genius for War," Clausewitz is almost exclusively concerned with such qualities as presence of mind, strength of character, and the calculations of the trained intellect, arguing that as war progresses from the actions of half-civilized tribes to that of organized political communities, so the powers of understanding and the soul increasingly predominate. Early in book III, "Of Strategy in General," Clausewitz claims that:

> . . . the moral forces are amongst the most important subjects in War. They form the spirit which permeates the whole being of War. These forces fasten themselves and with the greatest affinity on to the Will which puts in motion and guides the whole mass of powers, uniting with it as it were in one stream because this is a moral force itself.

Then follows an analysis of what he considers the chief moral forces—boldness, perseverance, national feeling, the military virtue of an army, the talents of the commander. He also includes a chapter on "The Surprise" as an element of strategy on the ground that the surprise is "to be regarded as a substantive principle in itself on account of its moral effect."

The evidence I have pointed to is merely a selection of what could be produced to support my argument that Clausewitz is just as much concerned with the importance of the moral forces in war as he is with his more familiar argument that war is a continuation of policy by other means. My objective in this discussion is to suggest two conclusions. When contrasted with other writers who have written about the place of warfare in society, Clausewitz is sometimes described as a rationalist. It is true that, unlike many ancient and medieval writers, he pays no attention to cyclical theories of human behavior and human institutions, nor does he regard war as a natural phenomenon like an earthquake or a flood. His explanation of war as a political act with a political purpose certainly implies a rational approach. War is something which, broadly speaking, has cause and effect. However, he does not stop there. War, he repeatedly reminds us, is characterized by chance more so than other human activities. It cannot all be calculated to the last decimal point. It involves dynamic and reacting forces, the result of which is that anyone "seeking and striving after laws like those which may be developed out of the dead material world could not but lead to constant errors." Of all the factors in war which defy the making of laws, the most important are the moral or psychological ones. "They will escape from all book analysis," he tells us, "for they will neither be brought into numbers nor into classes, and require to be both seen and felt."

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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Secondly, Clausewitz is sometimes labeled as the prophet of the vast armies of the 20th century and the belief that more men, machines, and ammunition are bound to win. The late Sir Basil Liddell Hart, for example, called him the Mahdi of Mass. Clausewitz certainly did scoff at what he considered the fancy theories of some of his predecessors, and he also argued that "the first rule is therefore to enter the field with an Army as strong as possible." Would any general not do so? If you look at book III, you will find that he deals with numbers after moral forces; he then follows on with a chapter on "The Surprise," a factor which he argues is equally as important as numerical superiority. Surprise leads to confusion and broken courage, and out of these arise defeat even for the side which may possess more men and machines.

Finally, far from being a militant, Clausewitz had a clear understanding of the limits of war as an instrument of policy. If later generations of Germans thought and acted otherwise, and if Clausewitz was, in fact, their textbook, then the fault was theirs through mistakes in interpretation. In his own more critical view of the value of war for political purposes, Clausewitz's appreciation of the importance of moral forces in war played a vital part.

Ψ

In their studies of Woodrow Wilson and the First World War, most historians have assumed that the near-pacifist Wilson had little appreciation for the concept of force as an extension of diplomacy. On more careful investigation, however, it becomes apparent that Wilson not only developed realistic and clearly articulated war goals but that he was able to coordinate his larger diplomatic purpose with the use of force perhaps better than any war President before or since.

WOODROW WILSON AND THE RECONCILIATION OF FORCE AND DIPLOMACY: 1917-1918

A lecture given at the Naval War College

by

Professor D.F. Trask

The questions most frequently addressed by historians in their study of American foreign policy during World War I normally concern either why the United States entered the war or why she ultimately rejected the postwar settlement. These questions lead scholars primarily to the study of neutrality from August 1914 to April 1917 and to an examination of peacemaking from November 1918 to March 1920. Unfortunately, the period of actual combat has, until recently, been all but neglected.

One significant aspect of belligerency that has never been thoroughly examined is the process by which President Wilson sought to apply the military and naval power of the United States in the service of larger political purposes during 1917-1918. Indeed, most historians seem to have assumed that Wilson, specifically, and the U.S. Government, in general, paid scant attention to this question. It is certainly true that Wilson gave less time to day-to-day operations than perhaps any other wartime President; but if ever an American President put into practice the famous Clausewitzian dictum that warfare should be conducted to achieve fundamental political purposes, it was Woodrow Wilson. This notion of Wilson being a grand strategist par excellence is a direct contradiction to the generally held image of Wilson as a lofty and impractical idealist who knew little and cared less about the real world. Nevertheless, although the evidence supports the proposition that he was a profound idealist with high hopes for his country and for mankind, it also establishes Wilson as an example of the fact that realism and idealism often coexist in the

statecraft of national leaders. Another unsound dialectical proposition is that Wilson was either a nationalist or an internationalist. He was both, and those who ignore this circumstance do so at the risk of seriously distorting the historical facts.

Woodrow Wilson, during 1917-1918, calculated most carefully the disposition of American military and naval power in order to achieve his larger political objects, and he also succeeded not only in preserving the vital democratic principle of civilian control over the military but also in avoiding a serious civil-military rift within the U.S. Government.

In the development of this theme, it is first necessary to outline the general political objectives which Wilson hoped to attain through warfare by examining in broad terms the course of his diplomacy during American neutrality. The onset of war in Europe initially involved Wilson in the defense of neutral rights on the high seas. As the operations of the United States during this period are well known, it is sufficient here to note that as of May 1916, Wilson had been forced to threaten war against Germany if that country attempted a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare against neutral and noncombatant shipping. Since Germany did indeed launch such a campaign as of 1 February 1917, most historians have concluded that this decision accounts for the American intervention in April 1917.

This interpretation, however, fails to take sufficiently into account another less dramatic but even more significant diplomatic enterprise to which Wilson committed himself during the period of neutrality. When the war began, Wilson adopted a conventional version of strict neutrality, assuming that the struggle in Europe concerned only the interests of the Old World and that it would be a relatively short contest. Soon, however, it became apparent that the war was no ordinary affair—that it represented a truly imposing event in world history and that it would not be decided quickly. It had turned into an unprecedented bloodbath that threatened to alter not only the long-established European power relationships, but the balance between Eastern and Western Hemispheres might ultimately create dangers for the Republic. In these circumstances Wilson's thoughts turned to the question of how to bring the war to a close. This policy cohered with both the national interest and the dictates of humanity. The President quickly decided that the proper course would be to offer mediation—to use American influence without American power to arrange a negotiated peace. To further this purpose he sent Edward M. House to Europe on two occasions—early in 1915 and early in 1916—to sound the belligerents about their war aims and to discover a basis upon which the war might be ended through the exercise of America's good offices. House's private inquiries came to naught, but, undaunted, Wilson persisted as the war lengthened and as its potential consequences became more and more apparent. After his reelection, he launched in December 1916 another campaign to bring about a negotiated peace. Asking the belligerents to declare their war aims publicly, he gambled that in their responses he could discern a basis for negotiation. This initiative culminated in one of the President's most famous speeches—the so-called "peace without victory" address of 22 January 1917.

The gallant project failed abjectly. There was never any likelihood that mediation could succeed or even that serious negotiation would be undertaken so long as each coalition believed that it could force a decisive victory.

However, in the context of seeking mediation, Wilson was able to develop the broad outlines of a proper postwar settlement. His plan rested on two fundamental elements. One was a scheme to bring about a restabilization

of the European and world balance, but on a much more equitable foundation rooted in the democratic process of self-determination, government by consent. Wilson also recognized that mere adjustment in the balance of power could not guarantee both a just and lasting peace. He therefore came to the conclusion that the world needed international mechanisms capable of policing the balance–adjusting power relationships among nation-states to preclude the development of causes for war. In addition, such mechanisms could sponsor a gradual but general improvement in the lives and fortunes of all mankind, particularly among the less advanced peoples of the world.

Wilson announced this program in his speech of 22 January 1917. The term "peace without victory" served as Wilsonian shorthand for an equitable territorial settlement designed to reconstitute international stability, and the term "League for Peace" summarized his conception of an international organization dedicated to preserving the created stability. In this pronouncement Wilson made clear his profound antipathy to what he considered the principal diseases eating away at international peace and progress: Europe's inveterate proclivities for imperialism and for militarism.

Wilson's program reflected faithfully, if dramatically, both the self-interest of his own Nation and its historic tradition as an exemplar of peace and justice throughout the world. The President himself had become profoundly committed to his project and came to believe that anything short of it would fail to resolve the disequilibrium which had brought on the war and insure the future of peace.

Fatefully, Wilson learned only a week or so after his speech that no prospect remained for a negotiated peace along the lines he had urged, and on 1 February 1917, Germany began its unrestricted submarine campaign against world shipping. Hindenburg and Ludendorff assumed supreme command in Germany during 1916 and had soon concluded that, while Russia could be conquered, Germany could not hope to achieve a decision on land against France and Britain. Accordingly, they eventually fell in with a naval plan to achieve a decision at sea. The naval staff argued that an unrestricted submarine compaign would so disorganize the Allied economies that they would be forced to capitulate within 6 months. Civilian leaders, long opposed to a thoroughgoing *guerre de course* in the belief that it would lead to American intervention, were put off by the argument that the war would be decided at sea before the Americans could bring sufficient power to bear. The Kaiser, as usual, bowed to his warriors.

Wilson, after much hesitation, finally opted for war not because of the submarine decision, *per se*, but because he saw in intervention the only means by which he could insure that the world would find a just and lasting peace. From this perspective the submarine crisis becomes more an occasion for war than a cause. The President, philosophically committed to peaceful rather than violent resolution of political conflict, could not have overcome his abhorrence of war for any less imposing purpose than the one he embraced.

There is no room for real doubt as to what Woodrow Wilson hoped to accomplish when he intervened in April 1917. His war aims had been announced in general terms prior to the American entry, and during the intervention itself Wilson expanded on these guidelines to spell out the details of his plan. He had not only to maneuver during the war so that he could force acceptance of his program upon the Central Powers, but he also had to consider probable opposition from his partners in the Allied coalition. He knew well that the war aims of France, Britain, Italy, Russia, and Japan diverged markedly from

those he had in mind, to wage war so as to become *arbiter mundi.* Here, indeed, was a grand design—one of the most extraordinary ever undertaken in world history.

The United States, aside from a limited campaign of "preparedness" had adopted no real program of rearmament and indulged in no detailed planning prior to the intervention. Wilson had hoped desperately to avoid war; he made his decision only when it became clear that he could accomplish his grand design only through belligerency. Also, he did not want to take martial steps that might prejudice the mediation project. However, after making his decision to fight, he lost little time in working out a comprehensive political-military approach to intervention.

The first component of his political-military approach to belligerency was to avoid any further declaration of war aims until he could safely do so without prejudicing the unity of the Western coalition. He fully appreciated the crisis of 1917 and the exhaustion that had overtaken the Allies and consciously avoided political activity that might interfere with the immediate goal of Germany's defeat.

The second component was a decision to cooperate as fully as possible with the European Allies while at the same time avoiding political or military forms of cooperation that might lessen his freedom of action at war's end; that is, he would utilize his political and military influence in ways to further his own purposes and to protect the Republic against activities that served competitive interests—including those desires of the Allies he deemed incompatible with his own. To convey the limits of cooperation he referred to the United States not as an "allied power" but as an "associated power."

In order to implement this program, the United States first did what it could to confute the German assumption that the war would end before the Americans could contribute to its outcome. Wilson authorized immediate economic assistance and financial support to the Allies in generous measure. He also employed a significant portion of the only force then available to him, the U.S. Navy, as part of the Allied antisubmarine campaign. Toward this goal, Adm. William S. Sims was sent to London to direct the American naval effort in Europe.

In pursuit of the long-term objectives of his policy, Wilson decided to mobilize a great military effort by the formation of an expeditionary force and the expansion of the Navy. At home this released a remarkable surge of energy as the American people actively supported the growth of instruments of government to develop the speed and efficiency dictated by the requirements of war. Wilson went to these lengths because he recognized that nothing less would develop a preponderance sufficient to overwhelm the enemy. In addition to this military motive, the President also calculated the political consequences. If the American contribution meant the difference between victory and defeat, it would greatly enhance American prestige and thereby strengthen the President's bargaining position after the war. Moreover, a great army and navy in being at the end of the war and during the postwar negotiations would constitute an important influence on anyone who might challenge the President's wishes at a peace conference, especially if one assumes that at war's end both the enemy and Allied forces would be exhausted. American military and naval strength would reach its zenith just as European strength approached its nadir.

There remained to President Wilson and his advisers the important decisions concerning how the American Army and Navy were to be employed. A most crucial element was an American reinforcement of the Allies in certain critical theaters of war. Well before the war,

France and Britain had arrived at certain fundamental strategic commitments. Although they launched what were called "sideshows" in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, partially for imperial reasons, their primary objective had always been to achieve victory on land by holding the German forces on the western front in France and then achieving a decisive breakthrough. Their naval strategy centered on confining the German High Sea Fleet to its home bases, a task assigned to the British Grand Fleet, and on deploying a huge antisubmarine force to contain the U-boat offensive. The United States quickly accepted these central principles and never deviated from support of them. Furthermore the United States considered Germany the prime enemy. It showed an interest in the other Central Powers only incidentally—rarely unless in some way such attention became part of the way of destroying Germany's will to resist. If Germany collapsed, the Americans correctly assumed that the other Central Powers would also fall.

Even after the United States accepted the hold-and-breakthrough strategy in France and a containment strategy at sea, there were still difficult decisions to be made on the deployment of forces. Since the submarine campaign had not forced victory during 1917, Hindenburg and Ludendorff staked everything on a last desperate gamble in France—a series of end-the-war offensives timed to begin in March 1918. Facing an enormous German concentration of men and material along the western front, the Allies desperately tried to convince the United States to send its manpower across the Atlantic in small units to be integrated into the French and British Armies. This proposal became known as "amalgamation."

Despite the most intense pressure, especially as the crisis of 1918 materialized in France, Wilson never wavered from support of the Army's desire to mobilize, train, transport, and maneuver an independent American Army under its own commanders within its own sector of the western front. Wilson resisted the Allies on this most significant issue partially in response to public opinion at home, but more importantly, in deference to his military advisers who contended that the deployment of an independent force would in the long run make a more effective contribution. There also existed an important political consideration—an independent army which contributed importantly to victory would constitute a much more potent political support for American diplomacy during and after the war than a replacement army under European control. Despite profound irritation in London and Paris and predictions of impending doom, the American decision to fight an independent force did not lead to disaster, and its existence at war's end did, in fact, greatly strengthen Wilson's hand as *arbiter mundi*.

I turn now to the question of the American Navy. Given the extreme emergency stemming from the unrestricted submarine campaign of 1917, the Allies pressed the United States not to maneuver an independent battle fleet but to concentrate most of its naval energies on providing support for the antisubmarine campaign. This recommendation entailed use of destroyers, torpedo boats, and other small craft as part of antisubmarine operations against the U-boats. It also required use of cruisers, auxiliaries, and other vessels as escorts for convoys of merchant ships. Admiral Sims, reporting from Europe, strongly supported this concept and it was accepted in Washington.

President Wilson's acceptance of a subordinate and supportive rather than an independent role for the Navy was based primarily on the absolute necessity of responding quickly and forcefully to counteract the submarine campaign. Moreover, Wilson foresaw no

particularly dangerous political consequences—especially any that might unduly prejudice his postwar aspirations. Ships, unlike individual soldiers, were still easily recognizable elements of the U.S. Government distinct from the foreign fleets with which they operated. The desperate situation at sea required immediate and effective response, and Wilson did not hesitate to act. Had he not done so, the Allies might not have been able to sustain their civilian populations and armies in the field, and the United States might not have been able to transport a huge army to Europe in 1918.

Almost all the fundamental components of America's political-military approach to belligerency were established during the earliest months of the intervention. Their application helped achieve the desired decision over the Central Powers, and it produced no serious disputation between the civilian and military sectors of the American Government. Rarely in the national experience of war has the exercise of force and the objects of diplomacy been so consistently coordinated and so broadly accepted within the armed services.

Wilson's approach to the war had far-reaching and largely successful results. Despite continuing anxiety, the Allies contained, although they did not defeat, the submarine campaign by the use of the convoy system. In London, Sims quickly decided to support the convoy solution, and in this initiative he gradually gained wholehearted support from the President and the Navy Department. Once Germany opted for unrestricted submarine warfare, its High Sea Fleet abandoned the idea of important fleet actions in the North Sea and served thereafter as support for the submarine campaign, holding the British Fleet in the North Sea so that it could not be used for operations elsewhere against the U-boats. If at Jutland in May 1916 the German Fleet had achieved some tactical success against the British Fleet, the outcome of that confused combat also demonstrated rather conclusively that the British would probably defeat the Germans in a full-scale engagement at sea. This realization, indeed, was part of the rationale for recourse to unrestricted submarine warfare. The American decision to concentrate its naval effort on antisubmarine activity made important contributions to the victory at sea, and the outcome confirmed the overall expediency of President Wilson's naval policy.

On land the Allies during 1917 suffered through bitter frustration and even defeat. Offensive operations along the western front failed to achieve a breakthrough. Then the Italians suffered a catastrophic defeat at Caporetto in October 1917. Most important, the eastern front disintegrated, and after the Bolshevik takeover in Russia during November 1917, Lenin and Trotsky removed the Russians from the war. The only victories came in a peripheral theater—the Middle East.

As intelligence had revealed the outlines of the German end-the-war offensive of 1918, the Allies made their response. It is instructive to analyze the American reactions to various Allied projects since they illumine the wartime workings of Wilson's overall plan.

Prime Minister David Lloyd George and other European leaders accurately attributed a great part of their frustration in France to the lack of sufficient inter-Allied cooperation. During the crisis that developed late in 1917, Lloyd George finally moved to establish numerous organs of inter-Allied cooperation—all of which were to be directed by an Inter-Allied Supreme War Council charged with planning and coordinating both political and military initiatives. Wilson, for his part, reacted favorably to the military planning concept but bitterly opposed any large political role for the Supreme War Council. It might take steps during the

war incompatible with his grand design. His reasoning was perfectly consistent with his larger conception of postwar objectives. The President was prepared to abet practical projects to encompass the defeat of Germany, but he was unalterably opposed to any institutional arrangements which might lessen his freedom of action at war's end.

This pattern appeared again when, just after the beginning of the German offensive in France in March 1918, the Allies finally decided to establish unity of command on the western front. Wilson strongly supported the elevation of General Foch to the supreme command. He saw in this a necessary and proper command arrangement which promised to assist in defeating the Germans but which entailed no great political risk.

Other plans also received the required scrutiny. Given the difficulties they faced in France, various Allied leaders—and none more actively than Lloyd George—entertained thoughts of concentrating an offensive not against the Germans but against their tottering junior partners—the Austrians and the Turks. Wilson disagreed. In his mind the prime enemy was Germany, and the quickest and best way to victory was to concentrate in France against the German Army. He showed no inclination to support campaigns in the Mediterranean or Middle Eastern theaters which would delay the ultimate decision and which, he suspected, were related more to European imperial interests than to the immediate object of defeating the Central Powers. During World War II President Roosevelt sought less successfully to pursue a similar course.

No American policy, however, was more revealing of Wilson's motivations than his response to sustained pressure from London and Paris to participate in armed intervention against Bolshevik Russia. Ostensibly, the purpose of such incursions was to reconstitute some part of the eastern front in order to minimize German reinforcement of depleted formations in France. There was also, of course, a covert political motive—the embarrassment and even the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime which had taken Russia out of the war. Yet Wilson stubbornly refused to authorize any extensive intervention in Russia. In July 1918 Wilson agreed only to very small expeditions designed principally to protect military stores at Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok and to expedite the withdrawal of Czech prisoners of war. Indeed he became a party to this venture more to exercise some restraint on the British, French, and Japanese than to further either of the objectives entertained by the Allies. The later expansion of these expeditions came about not because of, but in spite of, American views, and the United States wavered from this course only temporarily during 1919 when it briefly condoned support for the abortive Siberian campaign of Admiral Kolchak.

President Wilson did not resist an incursion into Russia because he in any sense approved of bolshevism. Like practically all bourgeois political leaders, he recognized in the Russian revolution a truly dangerous movement. His solution to it, however, was predicated on a belief that the extremism of the Bolshevik movement related directly to the exhausting effect of the war on civilian populations. If the great conflict could be quickly ended by a success in the west, Wilson hoped that the healing effects of a recovered peace would facilitate the eventual collapse of the Bolshevik revolution.

Wilson had a number of other reasons for opposing massive Allied intervention in Russia. First, it would require a great military and naval effort to achieve success. As such it would divert resources from the theater where the United States wished to concentrate—namely the western front—resources that simply could not be spared. But perhaps more important, Wilson did not

fail to consider a critical political question. Armed intervention in Russia aimed at the Bolshevik regime would violate the prime political concept underlying the postwar territorial arrangements that the President wished to sponsor, namely, the principle of self-determination. To condone an obvious violation of this principle might seriously undermine the President's moral authority when he entered into postwar peace negotiations. Why compromise so important a principle for, at best, dubious prospects of military success, particularly when another solution to the Bolshevik menace seemed much more viable as well as morally defensible? Therefore, bearing in mind both political and military considerations of great moment, Wilson took his stand in the face of the most desperate appeals of the European Allies. It is unfortunate that some historians persist in attributing to the United States a desire to destroy bolshevism by force, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

During 1918 the Allies held the line sufficiently in France to preclude a German breakthrough. From March to July, Hindenburg and Ludendorff threw their men futilely against the British, French, Belgian, and American forces ranged against them. Once the German reserve had been eaten up, Foch correctly turned to the offensive. During the emergency the United States had temporarily modified its demand for an independent army under its own commanders in its own sector to the extent of taking over quiet sectors of the front and allowing the French and British to move veteran divisions to active sectors. Nevertheless, General Pershing never faltered in his determination to fight an independent campaign. This policy found limited expression at least in two distinctive operations—the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient in September 1918 and the difficult advance in the Meuse-Argonne sector.

The combination of German exhaustion and growing Allied strength—through American reinforcement—finally forced a decision in western Europe. As the German army began to disintegrate and domestic unrest approached crisis proportions, Ludendorff informed the Kaiser that Germany must seek an armistice. By doing so, he stimulated an irreversible process leading to peace. He may have intended simply to gain some time in order to recoup, as he later claimed, but, whatever his purposes, the decision to inaugurate negotiations for a cessation of hostilities led inexorably to final defeat.

Early in October, Germany approached President Wilson with a proposal to end the war. Wilson then engaged in a brilliant bilateral exchange with Germany—one of the most competent examples of this species of diplomacy in our national experience—which culminated in a German agreement to negotiate along the lines of Wilson's grand design. This outcome infuriated the European Allies, who were systematically excluded from the discussions. Germany agreed to the American conditions because, although they contained much that was unpalatable, they offered a program relatively far more lenient than any put forward by the Allies. Once Wilson had obtained German agreement, which implied the consent of all the other Central Powers, he sent Colonel House to Paris for further negotiations with the Allies themselves.

After the United States entered the war, Wilson had refrained both from negotiations and comments concerning war aims, which might have threatened inter-Allied unity. However, by early 1918 it was clear to both Wilson and the Allies that the events of 1917 had placed Allied destinies in American hands. The result was Wilson's pronouncement of the Fourteen Points in January 1918. Making explicit his commitment to certain general principles—open covenants openly arrived at, absolute freedom of the seas, equal conditions of international trade, disarmament, and equitable adjustment of colonial claims—Wilson

then outlined his conception of the territorial settlement based on the principle of self-determination and concluded with his recommendation that the powers establish a league of nations. Wilson simply announced this program unilaterally and did not discuss it with the Allies. Later, in February, July, and September, Wilson made public an additional 13 points which emended and clarified the original 14. While these points were general in nature and susceptible of diverse interpretation, they constituted by far the most specific and detailed program of war aims announced by any belligerent.

By late October and early November, House had persuaded his European associates to accept a postwar negotiation based on Wilson's peace plans. He made only two important concessions. Britain successfully reserved acceptance of the American version of freedom of the seas, and France guaranteed the right of the victors to exact postwar reparations. In all other respects, however, Wilson's program received the grudging but unavoidable seal of Allied approval before the Armistice of 11 November. Britain, France, and Italy had therefore accepted a peace program which precluded them from achieving many of the war aims for which they had fought so long and so desperately. They had no choice. In order to compel their acquiescence, House had only to suggest delicately that their failure to do so would result in an American withdrawal from the war. Any such step by the United States would have given Germany an opportunity to continue fighting. Moreover, it would have deprived the Allies of American aid and comfort after the conflict, something that all Europe knew had to be forthcoming, at least for some period of time. American support was essential to the Allies not only to facilitate their own recovery but to frustrate any postwar revolutions, following the Russian precedent, that might occur.

Thus, by November 1918 Wilson had attained the supreme object for which he had gone to war in 1917. He had indeed made himself *arbiter mundi*, and he had done so because he made a remarkably accurate calculation of what was necessary to accomplish this purpose, because he developed a cogent political program, because he controlled the American war effort so that it supported his diplomacy, and because he possessed the iron will essential to the execution of a grand design.

Historians who believe that Wilson, at heart a pacifist or near-pacifist, lacked an appreciation of how to reconcile force and diplomacy or who think that Wilson was either ignorant of or uninterested in problems of grand strategy must examine more carefully the strategic program outlined and followed by the President during the war. The search for the historical Wilson as against the mythic Wilson of past imagining will no doubt lead scholars of the future to abandon certain basic assumptions they have long propagated about the man and award to him the accolade of a great captain.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Professor David F. Trask did his undergraduate work at Wesleyan University and was awarded both his master's and doctorate degrees from Harvard University. He has served on the faculties of Boston University, Wesleyan University, University of Nebraska, State University of New York at Stony Brook and is currently a visiting professor at the Naval War College in the Department of Strategy and Policy. Professor Trask has published numerous articles and books, his most recent books being *Victory Without Peace: American Foreign Relations During the Twentieth Century* (New York: Wiley, 1968), *World War I at Home: Readings on Life in America, 1914-1920* (New York: Wiley, 1970), and *Captains and Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917-1918* (Columbus: University of Missouri Press, 1972).

Soviet policy in the Middle East—complicated, expensive, and often frustrating—met perhaps its greatest setback on 18 July 1972 when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat announced the termination of the mission of the Soviet military advisers and experts in Egypt. Undaunted however, Kremlin planners continued to pursue their goal of an "anti-imperialist" Arab union dependent on Russian arms and amenable to Russian influence. The Yom Kippur war of 1973 apparently rewarded their efforts with success, but the long-sought prize of Arab sympathy was taken, if only temporarily, by their archival, the United States, via the diplomatic efforts of Henry Kissinger.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST FROM THE EXODUS OF 1972 TO THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

An article prepared
by
Dr. Robert O. Freedman

Introduction. Since their 1955 arms deal with Egypt, Soviet policymakers have sought to establish the Soviet Union as the dominant power in the Middle East. The main thrust of this strategy has been simply to replace the Western Powers in their former positions of political, military, and economic influence within the region. The Soviet leaders have engaged in massive economic aid projects such as the Aswan and Euphrates Dams; they have contributed large amounts of sophisticated military equipment to many of the states of the region; and more recently they have sought to consolidate their influence through long-term "Friendship and Assistance" treaties such as the ones signed with Egypt in 1971 and Iraq in 1972.

Yet, as the expulsion of the Soviet military forces from Egypt in 1972 indicated, with or without treaties, Kremlin influence in the highly volatile Middle East remains quite limited. Soviet efforts have been plagued by the numerous interstate and intrastate conflicts common to Arab politics, by the incessant competition for leadership within the Arab bloc of nations—Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia—and by the problem of defining a proper role for the Communist Parties of the Middle East. Illegal in a number of Arab countries and viewed with suspicion in all of them, the Communist Parties have embarrassed the Russians on a number of occasions. Most recently, Russian support for the Sudanese Communist Party in the abortive coup attempt against Sudanese President Ja'afar Nimeri in July 1971—an attempt which resulted in the decimation of the Sudanese Communist Party's leadership—all but ended Soviet-Sudanese relations.

Finally, the Russians have had to cope with competition from the United States and Communist China which

actively oppose Soviet efforts to secure dominant influence over the Middle East. Capitalizing on the Soviet debacle in the Sudan, both the United States and China moved quickly to improve relations with the once strongly pro-Russian Nimeri regime. Similarly, as Soviet policy began to clearly "tilt" toward Iraq during its struggle with Iran, both the United States and China utilized the opportunity to consolidate their relations with the Shah and weaken Soviet influence. But, for the Russians, the most serious arena of Soviet-American competition for influence in the Middle East has been in Egypt, the most populous and militarily powerful of the Arab States in the region.

The Soviet Exodus from Egypt. After assuming power in October 1970, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat clashed with the Soviet Union on a number of foreign and domestic policy issues, the most important being the Soviet Union's failure to provide Egypt with sufficient support in its confrontation with Israel.[1] By the spring of 1972, Sadat faced a rising tide of criticism in Egypt. The prolonged "no war-no peace" situation led to increasing frustration as Israel, which was receiving a continual flow of American military assistance, seemed ever more entrenched in the Sinai Peninsula which it occupied in the 1967 war. This, combined with the friction between Soviet advisers and Egyptian officers and the fact that Egypt's position of leadership in the Arab world, once paramount under Nasser, was slipping away, led Sadat to decide on a dramatic action which would at once electrify his country and end the malaise which had been deepening in Egypt. Following the failure of a final arms shopping trip by Egyptian Premier Aziz Sidky to Moscow on 14 July, Sadat announced on 18 July 1972 the "termination of all military bases in Egypt under Egyptian control, and the call for a Soviet-Egyptian meeting to work out a new relationship between the two countries."[2]

Sadat's reasoning in expelling the Russians seemed to have been that since the Soviet Union had been unable to get Israel to withdraw from Sinai by diplomatic means and was unwilling to expel her by force, Egypt would turn to the United States and Western Europe for assistance. The Egyptians had not forgotten that it was primarily American pressure which had forced the Israelis to withdraw from the Sinai in 1957, and high-ranking American officials such as Henry Kissinger and President Nixon had made no secret of their desire to get the Russians out of Egypt and thereby weaken the entire Soviet position in the eastern Mediterranean. The weakening of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean was also of benefit to Western Europe, and Sadat may have hoped that the Europeans might reciprocate by bringing pressure on Israel by withholding Common Market tariff concessions then under negotiation as well as by selling Egypt advanced weaponry.[3]

While the Russians' position in the Middle East worsened, the position of their chief rival for influence in the area, the United States, was strengthened. In addition to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Yemen and Sudan, the United States also improved relations with Algeria. The American Federal Power Commission approved plans for the El Paso Gas Company to import a billion dollars worth of natural gas from Algeria and the Algerian Government promptly returned both the aircraft and the million dollars in ransom which a group of Black Panthers had hijacked to Algeria. Even the militant Iraqi Government recognized some benefit to be gained from an American Government presence in Baghdad, and an American Interest Section was subsequently opened in the Belgian Embassy in the Iraqi capital.

Thus, by the late summer of 1972, it

appeared as if the Soviet position in the Middle East was rapidly eroding, and the Soviet leadership was hard put to reverse the trend. The main Soviet loss was to its position in Egypt, and while the initial Soviet reaction to Sadat's expulsion decision was relatively mild, as time went on and as Soviet-Egyptian relations continued to deteriorate, the Russian and pro-Russian commentators became more explicit in their criticism of Egyptian policy.

Pravda itself warned on 23 July 1972 (the day after an Egyptian Government press conference in which Egypt's nonalignment was stressed) that in a number of countries, including Egypt, "right-wing reactionary forces" were trying to undermine Soviet-Arab friendship.[4]

Soviet-Egyptian relations worsened further following Sadat's rejection of the "language, contents and type" of a note from Brezhnev to Sadat requesting a high-level meeting.[5] Indeed, on 13 August 1972 Egyptian Information Minister Mohammed el-Zayyat had stated that "there were many things to be settled before a Soviet-Egyptian summit meeting could settle future relations."[6] The Egyptian President further stated that the Soviet Union's refusal to supply the requested arms "aimed to drive us to desperation and the brink of surrender," but that Egypt would, God willing, obtain the needed arms elsewhere.[7] Two days later in an interview in *Le Figaro*, Sadat began his search for arms by stating that the Western Europeans now owed Egypt a response to the "initiative" he had taken to help them.[8]

It is clear that the Soviet position was much weakened in the Arab world, and there is no telling how much further this process would have gone but for a group of Palestinian terrorists who killed 11 Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich.

The immediate effect of the terrorist acts in Munich was to strike a major blow at Sadat's diplomatic initiative in the West. Hardest hit were Egypt's relations with West Germany where the terrorists' acts took place. Willy Brandt, whose government had painstakingly negotiated the resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt less than 3 months earlier (after a 7-year break following West Germany's establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1965), criticized Egypt's lethargy in his efforts to negotiate a settlement with the terrorists. Egypt responded with the accusation that West Germany was trying to evade responsibility by making false charges against Egypt and other Arab nations. The deterioration of Egypt's relations with her second leading trade partner (after the U.S.S.R.) reached the point in mid-September that Egypt's new Foreign Minister, Hassan el-Zayyat, cancelled a scheduled visit to West Germany which was part of a planned tour of West European capitals in search of support against Israel.

Zayyat did make a trip to England, but here again terrorist activities hampered Egyptian diplomacy. Just as Zayyat arrived in London, the Israeli agricultural attaché, Dr. Ami Shachori, was killed by a letter bomb mailed to the Israeli Embassy—an action that inflamed English public opinion against the Arabs.[9]

The United States voiced its opinion when the American Ambassador to the United Nations, George Bush, exercised a rare U.S. veto when a Security Council resolution condemning Israel for its reprisal raids against Palestinian guerrilla bases in Syria and Lebanon, following the Munich killings, did not also condemn the terrorist acts which provoked the reprisal raids.

The events at Munich, with their repurcussions on Egypt's relations with Western nations, probably hastened the pace of the proposed Egyptian-Libyan union as Sadat became more dependent on Libyan support. On 18 September, Sadat and Kaddafi reached an

agreement which proclaimed Cairo as the capital of the union and provided for a single government, a single political party, and a single president elected by popular vote.[10] The process of union may also have been speeded by increased Egyptian fears of an Israeli attack following the Munich massacre, fears which the Russians did everything possible to encourage.

The Israeli Government, whose athletes were murdered at Munich, was under great domestic pressure to avenge them and did not hesitate long. Having suffered a similar terroristic attack at Lod airport near Tel Aviv which resulted in the death of 26 people only 3 months before, the Israelis apparently decided to attempt to strike a telling blow against the guerrillas by launching a series of airstrikes followed by an armored assault deep into Lebanon and Syria against suspected terrorist bases.

The Soviet Union seized the opportunity presented by the Israeli attacks to launch a special airlift of weapons to Damascus to reinforce the Syrian defenses. This airlift, which generated front-page headlines both in the Arab and Western press, underscored the Soviet argument that the Arabs could only turn to the U.S.S.R. in their time of need. Thus a *New Times* editorial stated:

> Public opinion in the Arab countries is drawing the inference from Israel's provocative actions which the imperialists are encouraging. What if not encouragement is the US veto in the Security Council on a resolution condemning Tel Aviv's barbarous acts? All of it is helping the Arabs to realize how illusory are hopes that the imperialists are prepared to help curb the Israeli expansionists and eliminate the consequences of their aggression. And the danger of such illusion is greater than ever now. For Tel Aviv is using them not only to hold on to the occupied territories but to make new aggressive moves against the Arab states.[11]

The Russians also began to propagate the old myth about Israel's alleged desire to expand her borders "from the Nile to the Euphrates." Writing in *New Times* at the end of September, V. Rumyanstev claimed that the Israelis " . . . are seeking not only to induce the Arabs to accept the annexation of the territories seized in 1967, but to accustom them to the Zionist idea of creating a 'Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates.'"[12]

The Russians also utilized the Israeli attacks on the Palestinian guerrilla camps to dramatize their position as supporters of the Palestinians and thus to win more influence in the Palestinian resistance movement. While the West unanimously condemned the Munich murders, the Russian press referred to them only as a "tragic incident."[13] The Russians also denounced the Israeli attacks on Palestinian refugee camps (which often housed guerrilla bases) and underlined their concern for the Palestinian cause at this crucial time by airlifting medical supplies to Lebanon. Furthermore, the guerrillas acknowledged that the U.S.S.R. was now shipping them arms directly.[14]

The Soviet Union also began to improve its relations with the Sadat regime in Egypt. Despite Soviet predictions, Egypt was not hit by any Israeli retaliatory strikes (possibly to avert Egyptian recall of the Russian advisers), yet Sadat was clearly discomfited by the events in Munich. With his diplomatic turn to the West temporarily stalled, and condemned both at home and throughout the Arab world for failing to protect Syria and Lebanon from Israeli attacks, Sadat decided to try to stabilize Egypt's relations with the U.S.S.R.

Consequently, on 28 September 1972, the second anniversary of Nasser's death, Sadat delivered a major policy address. This statement he called for the

establishment of a Palestinian government in exile which would end the disastrous infighting within the movement; officially rejected the interim proposal offered by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers at the U.N. by stating that "There will be no partial settlement and no direct negotiations . . . ," and perhaps most important of all, changed his tone toward the Russians. The Egyptian leader declared that he had sent a letter to Brezhnev that was "friendly and cordial in spirit."[15] It was revealed only 2 days after Sadat's speech that Egyptian Premier Aziz Sidky would undertake a trip to the Soviet Union on 16 October.[16]

However, the Russians were now in a much stronger bargaining position, and there appear to have been real limits on the accomplishments of Sidky's trip to Moscow. In the first place, unlike his earlier trip in July, the Egyptian Premier did not get to see Brezhnev but had to be satisfied with meeting Kosygin and Podgorny. Secondly, there was no mention of continued Soviet aid, either military or economic. The final communique described the talks as having taken place "in an atmosphere of frankness and mutual understanding."[17]

Following the limited success of Sidky's trip, a general debate began in the top ranks of the Egyptian leadership about the proper relationship toward the U.S.S.R. On 23 October 1972, Sidky delivered his report to a mixed Arab Socialist Union-Government meeting in which he stated that the Russians had promised to resume aid to Egypt, although he did not mention precise quantities. Sadat responded by replying that if Egypt should choose continued cooperation with the Soviet Union, its scope would never return to the pre-18 July situation.[18]

The Egyptian leadership apparently decided on continued cooperation with the Russians because, on the very next day, the strongly anti-Russian Defense Minister Sadek either was fired or resigned from his position. Whatever the actual reason for Sadek's resignation, the Russians were clearly happy to witness the departure of the most outspokenly anti-Soviet leader in the Egyptian hierarchy. While *Pravda* reported his ouster in a brief two-column story of 28 October 1972 under the title "Resignation Accepted," the Soviet Party newspaper gave much more space to a speech by his successor, Ahmed Ismail, 4 days later. The new Egyptian Defense Minister spoke warmly of Soviet economic and military aid to Egypt and stated that the U.S.S.R. had fulfilled all the obligations it had pledged to Egypt. In addition, Ismail strongly attacked the United States for its aid to Israel and asserted that "nothing good" could be expected from the United States. Ismail also echoed the Soviet line on the goals of American policy in the Middle East: "The goal of American policy is to isolate the Arabs from the USSR and keep the Soviet Union as far as possible from the Middle East. The United States is also seeking to prevent unity in the ranks of the Arabs."[19]

Thus, thanks to the Munich massacre and the sharp upsurge in fighting between Israel and the Arabs which followed it, the Soviet position in the region was markedly improved. Indeed, the Soviet position had improved so much as a result of the post-Munich developments that on 26 October 1972 Sudanese President Ja'afar Nimeri, who had clashed so bitterly with the Russians the year before over the Communist-supported coup d'etat, announced that the Sudan would restore full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union by the end of the year.[20]

While the Russians had clearly improved their position in the Middle East by the end of October, they still faced significant problems. North Yemen (the Yemeni Arab Republic) and South Yemen (the Peoples Democratic

Republic of Yemen) were on the verge of full-scale war. The South Yemeni Premier Ali Nasser stated in an interview with the Beirut newspaper *L'Orient Le Jour* on 6 October that "the Soviet Union will not stand with folded arms in the event of an invasion of South Yemen."[21] Relations were scarcely better between Iran and Iraq, and serious clashes between the Kurds and Iraqi Government forces made the situation at the top of the Persian Gulf even more difficult for Soviet policymakers.

In an effort to settle the Yemeni conflict, the U.S.S.R. pursued their long-sought goal of a union between the two Yemens. This would enable the Russians to avoid being dragged into a war between them while maintaining influence at the Bab-el-Mandab Strait, the geographically strategic area which controls the entrance to the Red Sea. In fact, talks designed to halt the fighting between the Yemens were postponed in mid-November so that South Yemeni President Salem Ali Rubaya could visit Moscow at the end of the month.[22] A joint communique published at the conclusion of the visit on 26 November stated that the Soviet side "greeted with satisfaction" South Yemeni measures to end military operations on the border with North Yemen and "supported PDRY efforts for the normalization of relations between the two Yemens."[23] The Soviet leadership was, consequently, more than satisfied when, only 2 days later, the two Yemens signed an agreement to unite.

If the Soviet leaders proved able to score a moderate success in calming tensions between North and South Yemen, they faced a much more difficult task in the Iran-Iraq conflict. Following a Moscow visit in September by Iraqi President Hassan Al-Bakr, a joint communique released stated that the Soviet Union and Iraq had reached agreement "on concrete measures for the further strengthening of the defense capability of the Republic of Iraq with a view to increasing the combat readiness of the latter's armed forces."[24] This Soviet decision was viewed with deep suspicion in Iran, and when the Shah and his wife (who had visited Peking the previous summer) came to Moscow in October, there was no tangible progress toward an Iranian-Iraqi agreement, although the Soviet Union and Iran did agree to a 15-year economic treaty.[25] In arranging this treaty, the Russian leadership perhaps hoped to compensate Iran with economic aid in view of Soviet military assistance to Iraq.

Events in February and March 1973 forced the Russians to quicken their diplomatic efforts to keep the Iran-Iraq conflict under control. On 10 February both Iraq and the U.S.S.R. were publicly embarrassed by the discovery of 300 Soviet-made machine guns and 60,000 rounds of ammunition in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan.[26] The weapons were evidently destined for the Baluchistani Liberation Front which demands an independent Baluchistan to be made up of Baluchistani-populated territories now controlled by both Iran and Pakistan.

Less than 2 weeks later came the announcement that Iran had concluded the largest single military sales agreement ever arranged by the U.S. Defense Department—a $2 billion dollar order for U.S. weaponry consisting of helicopter gunships, supersonic interceptors, Phantom jet bombers, and C-130 cargo planes along with other military equipment.[27] The arms race in the Persian Gulf was now on with a vengeance. It was perhaps in an effort to slow down this arms race—and avoid new arms requests from Iraq—that Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, in a visit to Iran to celebrate the opening of the Soviet-built Isfahan steel works pointedly stated:

> . . . We are pleased that good relations have developed between our countries and we intend to do everything in our power to make

> Soviet-Iranian relations even firmer in the future. . . . But if we want the security of the states to be based not on an arms race—no genuine security can be built on such a foundation—but on the continuing relaxation of tensions and the strengthening of mutual trust among countries, then the efforts of each party concerned are required. Conversely, the militant policy of any one country will inevitably inflame the situation in an entire region, and often throughout the world, forcing its neighbors to take some kind of measures to defend their national interests . . .[28]

No sooner had Kosygin returned to Moscow, however, then it was Iraq's turn to inflame the Persian Gulf conflict. On 20 March, Iraqi troops crossed into Kuwaiti territory and seized two Kuwaiti border posts. The lack of Soviet enthusiasm for the Iraqi move can be seen by the *New Times* comment on this episode. Citing "Arab capitals" (a usual Soviet technique to indirectly express displeasure) the *New Times* article stated:

> The dispute has caused anxiety in Arab capitals, inasmuch as Zionist and imperialist quarters have seized upon it to sow dissension in the Arab world and to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression. The leaders of a number of Arab countries have urged the Iraqi President and the Emir of Kuwait to make every effort to resolve the conflict without delay.[29]

Although no definitive agreement was reached, the Iraqi troops eventually pulled out of Kuwait, and the Shah made it quite clear that Iran would go to Kuwait's aid if she requested future assistance. In addition, in an interview with the *Christian Science Monitor*, the Shah called for a NATO-like pact for the gulf's riparian states and announced that Pakistani and Iranian army chiefs of staff had begun consultations in Tehran.[30]

Thus, as the second Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting neared, the escalating conflict between Iran and Iraq posed significant roadblocks for the Soviet program of "anti-imperialist Arab unity."

While the conflicts between North and South Yemen and between Iran and Iraq were serious, the central problem for Soviet policymakers dealing with the Middle East was American influence. To avoid the threat that United States and Egypt might yet work out a Middle Eastern arrangement contrary to Soviet interests, Soviet leaders stepped up their efforts to unite the Arabs against Israel. Kremlin planners seemed to feel that in an Arab union the moderately pro-Russian regimes of Syria and Iraq, together with the Palestinian Liberation organization whose leader Yasir Arafat was echoing the Soviet line in return for Soviet economic and military support, would prevent any anti-Russian policy from being adopted. Once again, events of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict helped facilitate their policy. Israel, bearing a terrorist attack, shot down a Libyan airliner which had strayed over the Israeli-occupied Sinai and appeared to be heading for Tel Aviv in February, and raided the Beirut headquarters of the PLO in April. Secondly, Egypt was also following a policy of Arab unity although Sadat's willingness to work closely first with Libyan leader Mu'ammar Kaddafi and subsequently with Saudi Arabia's King Faisal was not particularly to the liking of the Russians—Arab unity on an Egyptian-Libyan or Egyptian-Saudi Arabian axis would fall far short of the Arab unity on a "progressive, anti-imperialist" basis, for which the Soviets had so long worked.

Indeed, in one of the first major Soviet policy statements following their expulsion from Egypt, the Russians had

been concerned about just such a development:

> . . . The reactionary elements and certain nationalist elements seek to compromise the very idea of Arab-Soviet friendship and to counterpose appeals for "reliance on Arab forces alone" to the slogan of strengthening the united Arab front and militant solidarity with all the forces of progress on an anti-imperialist basis . . .
>
> A fact well worth noting is that Arab reaction's anti-Soviet sallies have been accompanied by the weaving of plots against progressive Arab regimes—plotting that is supported by Saudi Arabia, which is performing the role of promoter of imperialist policies in the Arab East . . .
>
> The Arab peoples realize the necessity of strengthening national and pan-Arab unity, however as the Lebanese newspaper Al Shaab points out, in present day conditions such a consolidation can be effected only on an anti-imperialist and progressive social basis and not at the expense of Arab-Soviet friendship.[31]

In September, during Hassan Al-Bakr's visit to the U.S.S.R., Podgorny developed this theme of "progressive Arab unity" further by asserting that there was a close relationship between Arab unity on an "anti-imperialist basis" and the unity of the "progressive forces" (i.e., the Arab communist parties) within each Arab State.[32]

The Russians consequently continued their pan-Arabian efforts throughout the November-January period when a number of conferences were convened by Egypt in an effort to build a united Arab front against Israel. Having first sought Soviet and then American support against Israel and having failed in both quests, Sadat, under great domestic and foreign pressure to go to war, decided that the only solution for Egypt was to mobilize the capabilities of the Arab world—including its oil power—against Israel and its supporters.[33] In a major policy speech on 28 December, Sadat stated that Egypt "realized the limits of Soviet aid" and that Egypt would take "new initiatives to make the battle a pan-Arab one."[34]

The Soviet press not only commented favorably on Sadat's pan-Arab battle plan but used the opportunity to highlight American vulnerability to the oil pressure Sadat had recommended. In a *New Times* article in late January, Victor Kudryavtsev, one of the main Soviet commentators on the Middle East, stated:

> A coordinated Arab policy in this [the oil] sphere could be especially effective inasmuch as Israel's main backer, the United States, is displaying an increasing interest in the oil deposits of the Persian Gulf and in Libya. Reference is made in Cairo to a survey made by a U.S. Senate committee showing that in the coming years between 20 and 30 per cent of U.S. fuel requirements will be met with Middle East oil. The Egyptian plan, newspapers say, also envisages an increase in the financial contribution by the oil-rich Arab countries to the common struggle against the aggressor . . .[35]

However, Kudryavtsev warned the Arabs that "Experience has convinced the Arab peoples that they can achieve real unity only on a clearly expressed anti-imperialist basis and by promoting friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union . . ."[36]

Continuing the theme of oil diplomacy and its effect in the Middle East, the very next issue of *New Times* published an article by Dmitry Volsky which warned against Saudi Arabia's increasingly important role in the Arab world:

> The Saudi monarchy . . . is bent on becoming the bulwark of reaction throughout the Arab world generally. Year after year it spends dozens, even hundreds of millions of dollars on what it calls "Arab policy," the aim of which is to thwart social and economic reforms in other Arab states and subvert their cooperation with the socialist countries.[37]

Indeed, the Russians had good grounds for attacking Saudi Arabia on this point because in October, Sheikh Ahmed Yamani, the Royal Minister for Oil and Mineral Wealth, had come to the United States and said that Saudi Arabia would raise production from 6 to 20 million barrels of oil per day by 1980 in return for assured entry into the U.S. market.[38] Within a year, however, Saudi Arabia had joined in the 17-week oil embargo against the United States. Regardless of Russian pressure, the cause for this policy transformation may be found in the two Middle Eastern developments during this period: the steady escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the realignment of alliance relationships throughout the Arab world which saw a weakening in the developing Egyptian-Libyan union and the creation of an Egyptian-Saudi Arabian axis which, by October, was to emerge dominant.

On edge because of Palestinian guerrilla threats to hijack an airliner and crash it into an Israeli city, Israeli Air Force pilots shot down a Libyan jet liner en route from Tripoli to Cairo. The aircraft had strayed deep into the Israeli-occupied Sinai Desert and the pilot refused Israeli orders to land.[39] The Soviet Union seized upon this incident to link the United States to the Israeli action and to discredit the American role as mediator. As *New Times* columnist V. Katin stated:

> These new provocations were staged on the eve of Golda Meir's visit to the United States. By whipping up military tension, the Israeli government seeks to create a situation in which it will be easier to wrest aid from the backers of Zionism in other countries, particularly the United States.
>
> It is now perfectly obvious that the Israeli rulers patrons share the responsibility for their crimes . . .[40]

The Middle East situation heated up further at the beginning of March when two American diplomats were murdered by Palestinian Arab terrorists in the Saudi Arabian Embassy in the Sudan. A week after this event, and perhaps partially in response to it, the United States announced the sale of 24 Phantom and 24 Skyhawk bombers to Israel. Upon receiving word of this announcement, following as it did the futile visit of Security Adviser Hafez Izmail to Washington, Egyptian President Sadat fired Premier Aziz Sidky and assumed the Premiership himself along with the post of military governor. In his speech the Egyptian President mentioned that the war could not be delayed and that Egypt's relations with the U.S.S.R. had resumed a "correct friendly pattern."[41]

Indeed, at this point, the U.S.S.R. had apparently decided to resume large-scale arms shipments to Egypt because on 24 March, Abdel Kuddous, a newspaper editor close to Sadat—who had been in the forefront of the Egyptian media attack on the lack of Soviet support the previous summer—could report in an *Akhbar Al-Yom* column that Egypt had now secured "a steady flow of arms from the USSR."[42]

With Egypt now receiving a steady flow of Soviet arms, Sadat turned his attention toward Saudi Arabian King Faisal whose oil leverage over the United States was a critical factor in any Egyptian strategy against Israel. Faisal's willingness to use the oil weapon may have been a reaction to the 9 April Israeli raid on Beirut which once again

stoked Arab-Israeli fires to the limit. The purpose of the successful attack was to kill the three Palestinian guerrilla leaders suspected of masterminding the terrorist campaign against Israeli citizens in Europe and the murder of the Israeli athletes in Munich. As might be expected, the Soviet Union seized upon this incident to further discredit the United States and to again urge the Arabs on to "anti-imperialist Arab unity." Writing in *New Times*, Dmitry Volsky asserted:

> . . . An examination of the Beirut provocation leads many observers to the conclusion that it was carried out with direct assistance from Western Secret Services. In its statement the Palestine Liberation Organization, for example, accused the CIA of complicity in the murders . . .
>
> The need to unite on an anti-imperialist basis is one of the main conclusions of the Beirut events [and] . . . concerted actions by the Arab peoples, with the support of their friends, can create an insurmountable barrier in the path of Tel-Aviv's encroachments . . .[43]

Whatever the cause, by the middle of April, Faisal threatened the United States that Saudi Arabia would not increase its oil production to meet American needs unless the United States modified its stand on Israel.[44] Following this warning, the United States, Britain, and France all scurried to sell Faisal modern weaponry, a development further underlining Saudi Arabia's growing importance in the Middle East and the West's growing vulnerability.

In his May Day speech, Sadat hailed the Saudi warning to the United States as further proof of growing Arab unity. Indeed, Sadat claimed that he now had Syrian, Kuwaiti, Algerian, Saudi, Moroccan, and even Iraqi support for the forthcoming battle with Israel. At the same time he pointedly reminded the Russians:

> Regarding a peaceful solution, our friends in the Soviet Union must know the true feeling of our people. From the first moment we believed that what was taken by force can only be regained by force. Our friends in the USSR must know that the peaceful solution which the US has been talking about is fictitious.[45]

At this point, however, although supplying arms and urging the Arabs to use their oil weapon against the United States, the Russians appeared not yet willing to back Egypt in a war against Israel. Instead, with the Brezhnev visit to Washington approaching, the Soviet leadership limited itself to further discrediting Israel and its U.S. supporters in the United Nations and other public forums.[46]

Thus by the time of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit, the Soviet position in the Middle East was a mixed one. On the one hand the United States position had deteriorated sharply due primarily to the willingness of Saudi Arabia to manipulate American dependence on Arab oil. On the other hand, Egyptian-Soviet relations, while improved, remained tense due to the Russians' lack of enthusiasm for another Arab-Israeli war. Furthermore, the escalation of the conflict between Iran and Iraq posed serious difficulties for the U.S.S.R. in the Persian Gulf region.

As in the 1972 summit, the leaders of the two superpowers appeared to pay little attention to the Middle East in their June 1973 meeting. Indeed, only 87 words out of a total of 3,200 in the final communique issued on 24 June dealt with the Middle East situation, and it appeared as if Nixon and Brezhnev wanted to deliberately downplay the conflict lest it interfere with their pursuit of détente.

As might be expected, the Egyptian reaction to the summit communique

was swift and bitter. On 25 June *Al Ahram's* managing editor Ali Hamadi el Gammal asserted in a column: "... Although we did not expect the [summit] talks between the two leaders to produce a specific position with regard to the crisis, we never thought that the problem would meet this strongly negative attitude on their part."[47]

The Arab reaction to the summit's treatment of the Arab-Israeli conflict was, in fact, so hostile that the Russians felt constrained to publish a special statement on Soviet policy toward the Middle East. Issued by TASS on 27 June, it reiterated the main tenets of Soviet policy, including the need for total withdrawal of Israeli troops to the 1967 borders, a "peaceful solution" based on U.N. Resolution #242, recognition of the "legitimate interests and rights of the Palestinians," and Soviet support for the Arab States affected by "Israeli aggression" in 1967.[48]

The Soviet leaders were also encountering difficulties trying to persuade the Egyptians that time was on the side of the Arabs. Through the judicious use of the oil weapon, they argued, the Israelis could be forced to withdraw because of pressure from the United States and that this process could be achieved without war. This rather intricate reasoning was most fully expressed by Dmitry Volsky, an associate editor of *New Times* in a major article in early August:

> ... The Arabs know the cost of bloodshed as well as anyone else. And the conditions in the world are increasingly favorable to paying no such price for the elimination of the consequences of Israel's aggression ...
>
> Many observers believe, for instance that the energy crisis in the West, notably the United States, whose interest in Arab oil is, in the general view, increasing, will affect American Middle East policy. But more important, ... The Progressive Fronts in Iraq, Syria and South Yemen have strengthened. The progressive Arab countries are building up their friendship and cooperation with the socialist states ... The attempts of Right nationalistic quarters parading pseudo-patriotic extremist slogans to impose their own conceptions on leading Arab countries and steer them into adventurist courses are meeting with no success ...[49]

The Egyptians, however, were neither convinced by these arguments nor by the Soviet decision to replace their "advisers" with North Koreans and North Vietnamese.[50] Indeed, Abdul Kouddous' newspaper *Akhbar al-Yom* attacked the entire concept of détente because it subordinated Arab interests to the interests of the superpowers. *Pravda*, taking this attack seriously, warned on 28 August:

> ... It looks as if the political line of this Cairo newspaper is acquiring a rather specific coloration. What purpose do the articles serve? The impression is being created that we are dealing with an attempt to sow distrust toward the Soviet Union among the Egyptian public and to distort the meaning of its support for the just cause of the Arab peoples who are struggling to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression.
>
> Such misinformation, of course, cannot harm the time-tested Soviet-Egyptian friendship. It is to be hoped that such attempts to sow seeds of distrust among our people will be properly rebuffed in Egypt itself.[51]

On the eve of the fourth conference of the heads of state of nonaligned countries in Algiers on 5 September, Volsky published yet another article in *New Times* describing the benefits to the "Third World" of Soviet-American détente. In it he pointed out that not

only had there been no "dangerous moves" against Iraq when it nationalized Iraq Petroleum but that the Popular Unity Government in Chile had been equally free of imperialist reaction.[52]

Volsky must have soon regretted these words because less than 1 week later the "Popular Unity" government of Salvador Allende in Chile was overthrown, and Allende, who, together with Brezhnev had been the recipient of the Lenin Peace Prize in May, was killed.

Two days after the coup, linked by the Soviet media directly to the United States,[53] a major air battle over Syria resulted in the Israelis shooting down 13 Syrian planes while losing only one of their own. This combination of events may have undercut the supporters of détente within the Soviet Politburo—perhaps to the point where they agreed to increase shipments of Soviet weaponry such as tanks and antiaircraft missiles to Syria and Egypt. Although the U.S.S.R. still denied the Arabs both fighter bombers and ground-to-ground missiles, these shipments were sufficient for the Egyptians—who used the antiaircraft missiles as a cover for the crossing of the canal and the tanks to spearhead the breakthrough—to make a final decision for war. The Russians evidently gave their tacit support for the Egyptian decision when they learned of it and consequently began to withdraw the nonessential technicians and other civilians from both Syria and Egypt well before the outbreak of the fighting on 6 October.

In taking these steps, the Soviet leaders may have been motivated by a number of considerations. First, it was conceivable that Sadat was again bluffing and needed the weapons primarily for domestic considerations. Secondly, should Sadat go to war and be defeated —the virtually unanimous feeling of the Western intelligence community and probably of a number of Russians as well—the Sadat regime would very likely fall, perhaps to be replaced by a more pro-Soviet Egyptian regime led by Ali Sabry. At the very minimum, war would inflame anti-American sentiment among the Arabs and weaken the U.S. position still further in the Middle East.[54] In any case, the Soviet leadership did not tell the Nixon administration about the forthcoming Egyptian-Syrian attack, despite the agreement reached at the 1972 summit, and despite the "détente" that was supposed to exist between the two superpowers.

As the war began, the Soviet leaders faced one overriding dilemma—to provide aid to the Arabs while at the same time not destroying their détente with the United States. The initial Soviet reaction to the war was rather restrained due, perhaps, to some serious doubts about the Syrian and Egyptian Armies.[55] Indeed, if we are to believe Sadat's account of the first day of the war, the Russians tried to get him to accept a cease-fire after only 6 hours of fighting by claiming that Syria had requested a cease-fire.[56] *Pravda*, during the first days of conflict, gave far more space to the events in Chile than to the Middle East.[57] On 9 October, when it appeared that the Arabs were in fact winning, Brezhnev moved to exploit the situation by sending a note to Algerian President Henri Boumadienne and other Arab leaders urging them to: "... use all means at their disposal and take all required steps with a view toward supporting Syria and Egypt in the difficult struggle ... Syria and Egypt must not be alone in the struggle."[58]

At the same time, the Russians began a massive airlift of weapons to Syria and Egypt, thereby demonstrating that while it was to be the Arabs (and not the Russians) who did the fighting, the U.S.S.R. would provide the necessary supplies.

Interestingly enough, while supplying the Syrians and Egyptians with increasing amounts of weaponry, the Russians made a number of moves to

appeal to the Jewish and liberal communities in the United States in an effort to keep the spirit of détente alive. Thus, instead of reducing or cutting off the flow of Soviet Jews to Israel during the war, the emigration actually increased.[59] In addition, Soviet radio broadcasts to the United States during the war emphasized that the Soviet Union was not against Israel as a state--"only against its conquests."[60]

By 12 October the tide of battle in Syria had switched to favor Israel, although the Israeli's remained on the defensive in the Sinai, and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger indicated that the Middle East war had the potential for involving the great powers. While thus far the United States was able to "tolerate" Soviet actions, he stated "if Soviet behavior became irresponsible, the United States would not hesitate to take a firm stand."[61] On 15 October the threat became fact. Announcing that the "massive airlift of Soviet weaponry to the Arabs threatened to upset the military balance against Israel," the United States began to airlift weapons to Israel.[62]

The Israeli crossing of the Suez Canal on 16 October and the subsequent enlargement of their salient on the west bank quickly changed the character of the conflict. Having his fears about the Arab military confirmed, Kosygin flew to Cairo and met for 3 days with Sadat.[63] On the same day, 11 Arab countries, meeting in Kuwait, unleashed the threatened oil weapon and announced that Arab oil exports to countries "unfriendly to the Arab cause" would be reduced each month by 5 percent until the Israelis withdrew to the 1967 prewar boundaries.[64] If this action or the visit of Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Umar al-Saqqam and other Arab diplomats to the White House was meant to deter the United States from granting further assistance to Israel, the attempt was a failure. On 19 October, Nixon asked Congress for $2.2 billion in aid for Israel. Seizing on this opportunity, Moscow Radio appealed to the Arabs to cut off the flow of oil to the West: "... Favorable conditions now exist for Arab use of oil as an economic and political weapon against capitalist states which are supporting Israeli aggression."[65] Libya announced it was cutting off all oil exports to the United States that day and Saudi Arabia, once the United States closest ally in the Arab world, followed suit the next day, with Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Dubai acting similarly on 21 October.

The rapidly deteriorating position of the Egyptian Army, however, led Henry Kissinger to the Soviet Union on 20 October at the Soviet leaders' "urgent request."[66] The end result of Kissinger's visit was a "cease-fire in place" agreement–a major retreat from the Russians' call for a return to the 1967 boundaries. Although agreed to by both combatants and approved by the Security Council on 23 October, both sides continued fighting to improve their positions. The Israelis got much the better of the fighting, however, and appeared ready to march on Cairo. By 24 October Sadat was forced to appeal to both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to send troops to police the cease-fire.[67] Seeking to pressure Israel and the United States into better cease-fire terms, the Soviets alerted several airborne divisions and dispatched transport planes to the airborne troops bases, while at the same time sending a stiff note to Nixon. The United States quickly reacted to the Soviet threat by calling a nuclear alert. It appeared that not only had détente died, but that the two superpowers were on the verge of a nuclear confrontation. Cooler heads prevailed, however, and the crisis was defused by the decision to establish a U.N. emergency force to police the cease-fire, although the two superpowers were later to wrangle about the composition of the U.N. force.[68]

As the war came to a close, Soviet policymakers, who had been hesitant about the war at the start, were able to total up a number of significant gains for the Soviet Union's position in the Middle East, although a number of these gains were to turn out to be transient ones. Perhaps the main Soviet gain was the creation of the "anti-imperialist" Arab unity they had advocated for so long and the concomitant apparent isolation of the United States from its erstwhile allies in the region. Not only had Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Kuwait, and Morocco actually employed their forces against Israel, but even such staunch one-time allies of the United States as the conservative regimes of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, in addition to sending troops to the front, had declared an oil embargo against the United States, while the tiny Gulf Sheikdom of Bahrain had ordered the United States to get out of the naval base it maintained there.[69]

Evaluating the lessons of the war 6 weeks later, Georgi Mirsky, perhaps the dean of Soviet commentators on the Middle East emphasized this theme:

> . . . The third myth dispelled [by the war] related to the alleged fragility and illusoriness of Arab solidarity. Today this solidarity, founded on the sense of Arab brotherhood and an awareness of facing a common enemy, is an incontestable fact, one that was confirmed in the course of the October fighting. Iraqi, Moroccan, Jordanian and Saudi troops fought side by side with the Syrian army; the Palestinians, and the Kuwaitis also saw action, and Algerian aircraft took part in the air war.
>
> But perhaps even more important is the solidarity of the oil-producing Arab states. Although the Arab press has spoken a great deal in recent months about the oil weapon, not everybody took it seriously and many were astounded when after the outbreak of hostilities in October even such countries as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait announced an oil boycott of countries supporting Israel (including a total embargo on oil exports to the United States) . . .[70]

In addition to the establishment of Arab unity on an anti-American basis and the consequent sharp deterioration of the U.S. position in the Middle East, the Soviet leaders could draw great satisfaction from the fact that their extensive aid to the Arabs and the conspicuous lack of anything except verbal support from the Chinese had greatly reinforced the Soviet position as champion of the cause of "national liberation." Indeed, the Russians claimed that by delaying the enactment of the cease-fire by the United Nations, the Chinese had actually hurt the Arab cause by enabling the Israeli Army to gain more territory. As an article in *New Times* put it:

> . . . The latest aggravation of the Middle East crisis once again showed the Arabs who their real friends are. No amount of demagogy will conceal the fact that at this critical hour for the Arab peoples Peking played into the hands of Israel. "The policy of the P.R.C.," the Beirut *Al Shaab* wrote on October 31 "does not accord with the interests of the Arab nation or the revolutionary concept of the national liberation struggle against world imperialism and Zionism." The efforts made by the Chinese leaders to undermine Arab-Soviet friendship, to weaken international solidarity with the struggle of the Arabs to liquidate the consequences of the Israeli aggression, are condemned by public opinion in the Arab countries. "Our people," the Syrian Al Thawrah wrote "are

> well aware of the purpose of these efforts. They know that the object is to shake the Arabs' faith in their own strength and in our friends in order to impel us towards compromise and capitulation." The Lebanese press has stressed that Maoist slander cannot discredit the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Arab peoples who have seen for themselves that "Phantoms were shot down with weapons supplied to Egypt and Syria by the U.S.S.R. and not with Chinese verbiage." . . . [71]

Yet another important benefit for the Soviet Union from the war was the reconciliation between Iran and Iraq. On 8 October Iraq announced its desire to restore diplomatic relations with Iran, and the Iraqi Government asked Iran to accept this gesture so that Iraqi troops could be moved from the border with Iran to Syria to join the fighting against Israel. Iran acceded to this request, perhaps in the hope of gaining Arab support to raise oil prices later.

On the strategic level, the Soviet world position was greatly enhanced. NATO faced its biggest crisis since the Suez war of 1956 because of West European opposition to the supplying of Israel from U.S. bases in Europe. Differences over policy and unilateral concessions made to ease the oil embargo exacerbated the strains within the alliance still further. Meanwhile, the Common Market was rent asunder by the failure of Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany to come to the aid of fellow EEC member Holland, hit by a total and relatively lengthy oil embargo. While the Russians welcomed the conflicts within NATO and the EEC, they nonetheless expressed some concern that West Europe might yet adopt a "go it alone" strategy and establish its own defensive alliance. [72]

Thus the Soviet Union had scored a number of gains as a result of the war, although it had also suffered some losses. Soviet-American détente had suffered a serious blow—so serious that Nixon, long a leading advocate of most-favored-nation status for trade with the U.S.S.R. , thought it necessary in early November to postpone consideration of an administration bill to that effect. [73] Indeed, following the war the Soviet leaders faced the choice of either trying to capitalize on the serious rifts in the Atlantic alliance and the EEC to further undermine the United States position in the world or trying to rebuild détente by cooperating on a satisfactory peace settlement in the Middle East.

They chose to pursue both simultaneously. On the one hand, they called for continued détente and claimed that it had helped prevent a nuclear war during the Middle East crisis. On the other hand, the Soviet media urged the Arabs to maintain their oil embargo against the United States and emphasized the U.S. military threat against the Arabs. The main effect of this "dual" policy in the United States, however, was to shake the credibility of the Soviet détente posture. As a *New York Times* editorial on 16 March stated: "The propaganda campaign by Radio Moscow in Arabic urging the Arabs to continue their oil embargo against the United States . . . has been a useful reminder of the Kremlin's double standard on détente. [74]

Unfortunately for the Soviet leaders, the Arab unity they had so warmly welcomed and hoped to foster through maintenance of the oil embargo began to disintegrate almost as soon as the war ended. The Ba'athist regime in Iraq, despite the presence of the Iraqi Communists in a national front, rejected the Soviet-supported cease-fire agreement as being "against the will of the Arab masses," much as it had rejected the Soviet-supported U.N. Resolution 242. [75] The Al-Bakr regime was, in fact, so opposed to the cease-fire that it refused to attend the Algiers summit conference of Arab leaders which took

place in late November. Similarly opposed to the cease-fire was Libyan leader Mu'ammar Kaddafi who characterized it as "a time bomb offered by the United States and Soviet Union."[76] By December frontier clashes had renewed between Iraq and Iran which soon escalated into such severe battles that the Russians had to publicly admonish the Iraqis in a *New Times* report of the clashes.[77] Thus Iraq, whose isolation in both the Arab world and in the region as a whole had impelled the Al-Bakr regime to request an alliance with the Russians in the first place, was, for all intents and purposes, again isolated except for its still tenuous relationship with Syria and its tie to the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). This Palestinian guerrilla organization, led by Naif Hawatmeh, had also rejected the cease-fire and with it the possibility of peace with Israel. This refusal undermined the work of Soviet leaders toward convincing Yasir Arafat and other Palestinian leaders that the time was ripe to settle with Israel. The Russians had pushed hard for the establishment of a Palestinian state not only to defuse the Arab-Israeli conflict (if this was their aim at all) but also to secure another area in the Middle East where they could exercise influence, along with South Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and, to a lesser degree, Egypt. Furthermore, the emplacement of a pro-Soviet regime in the midst of such pro-Western states as Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon would serve to further weaken the position of the United States in the region while strengthening that of the U.S.S.R.

As the time for the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East approached, the Russians seemed to grow even more emphatic as to the need to include the Palestinians on any Middle East peace settlement. The reason for this may have been because their influence in Egypt—partially restored by massive shipments of military equipment including, at the end of the war, SCUD ground-to-ground missiles[78]—had again begun to erode.

The Geneva Conference opened on 22 December with the Soviet Union again acting as champion of the Arab cause. Gromyko made a point of stating, however, that "the Soviet Union has no hostility to the state of Israel as such."[79] After several days of meetings, the Geneva Conference adjourned for the Israeli elections, but in the interim period, meetings of the Arab oil producing countries and the Persian Gulf oil producing countries more than doubled the "posted price" per barrel of crude oil, in effect, therefore, quadrupling the price they charged for it. This move was certain to aggravate the balance of payments problems of the West European states and hamper both Common Market and NATO unity. In fact, it appeared that the Western nations might have to engage in a trade war to pay for their oil imports. The Russians also profited from the fact that, as a net exporter of oil, their hard currency income would rise with the market price of the oil they sold to West European nations. The decision of the Arab oil producers to extend their oil embargo against the United States was also warmly welcomed, although the *Izvestia* article discussing these developments urged the Arabs to go one step further and nationalize the holdings of the Western oil companies, much as Iraq had done.[80]

However, Soviet leaders were apparently caught by surprise by the Kissinger arranged Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement on 18 January, and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy had to make a hurried visit to Moscow to explain the Egyptian position. Perhaps fearing their exclusion from a peace settlement, the Russians put into *Pravda*'s description of the talks the assertion:

> . . . It was stressed that an important factor in the struggle for a just settlement in the Near East is the close coordination of the actions of the Soviet Union and Egypt at all stages of this struggle including the work of the Near East Peace Conference and all the working groups which come out of it . . . [81]

The fact that following the disengagement agreement Sadat began to urge the lifting of the embargo was a further blow to the Russians. *Pravda*, in a feature article by "commentator" on 30 January warned that:

> . . . It should be emphasized that the agreement on troop disengagement can be a positive step only if it is followed by other fundamental measures aimed at ensuring the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories and guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Without the solution of these problems, which are cardinal to a Near East settlement, a lasting peace cannot be achieved, and the possibility of new military outbreaks, fraught with serious international convulsions, cannot be ruled out. It can be said that the positive significance of the concluded agreement depends to a decisive extent on its linkage with other fundamental questions of a settlement . . . [82]

Even the decision by the United States to host a conference of energy consuming nations did not serve to arrest the slow splintering of the facade of Arab unity. While the Russians hailed the decision of the mid-February Arab minisummit not to lift the embargo, an article in *New Times* about the minisummit clearly recognized the dilemma:

> . . . In this intricate situation, the Arab press believes joint Arab action and co-ordinated Arab policies are of the utmost importance. All the more so since the Israeli militarists, who still count on being able to avoid withdrawing from occupied Arab territories, are trying to set the Arab countries at loggerheads with one another . . . Further, the fomenting of Arab differences has a definite place in the designs of the Western oil monopolies, who are out to use the present energy crisis to preserve and even multiply the profits derived from Middle East oil . . . [83]

By this time, however, it appeared to be only a matter of time until the embargo was lifted since now Sheikh Yamani as well as Sadat spoke openly about lifting it. Kissinger, making use of the atmosphere of conciliation, made yet another journey to the Middle East, this time shuttling back and forth between Damascus and Jerusalem and procuring from the Syrian leaders the list of Israeli POW's the Israelis had demanded as a precondition for talks with Syria. It appeared that once again Kissinger would be able to pull off a diplomatic coup. However, having seen the United States replace the U.S.S.R. as the leading foreign influence in Egypt—however temporarily—the Russian leaders had no desire to see the process repeat itself in Syria. Consequently, Gromyko followed Kissinger to Damascus and worked out a highly bellicose communique with the Syrian leaders which threatened renewed war if Syrian demands were not met.[84] Strengthened by new shipments of Soviet arms and encouraged by Soviet support, the Syrian regime of Hafez Assad, less willing (or able) to make peace with Israel than Egypt, adopted a very hard bargaining position and, upon Gromyko's departure, began a war of attrition against Israel which involved daily artillery and tank battles.

Despite the action on the Golan Heights and pleas from Syria and the U.S.S.R. for "Arab unity," the

oil-producing states, under Egyptian and Saudi pressure, agreed to end the oil embargo against the United States on 19 March. As a sop to the Syrians, Algeria stated that it would reexamine its embargo policy on 1 June. Arab unity on the oil-embargo issue was clearly broken, as Libya and Syria refused to abide by the majority decision to lift the embargo.

At this point Soviet-Egyptian relations began to deteriorate rapidly. Just as in 1971 when Sadat refused to support Soviet policy in the Sudan, he again was strongly opposing a major Soviet policy—despite all the economic and military aid the Soviet Union had given Egypt. The Soviet leaders retaliated by branding Sadat a traitor to Nasser's "legacy," while Sadat attacked the U.S.S.R. for lying to him on the first day of the war.[85]

Events continued in this pattern in April and May, with Sadat openly appealing for arms from the United States and the Soviet leadership further castigating Sadat's policies while continuing to supply large quantities of arms to Syria and giving Syrian President Hafiz Al-Assad a warm welcome during his visit to Moscow in mid-April. Additionally, in an effort to compensate for Sadat's move toward the United States, the Soviet leadership moved to improve relations with the volatile Libyan Government, whose leader, Mu'ammar Kaddafi, shared the Soviet distaste for Sadat's rapprochement with the United States. Finally, the Soviet leadership deepened its ties with the Iraqi Government by pledging full Soviet support for an all-out Iraqi offensive against the Kurds.

Meanwhile, however, Kissinger was painstakingly working out a disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. Despite two bloody Palestinian terrorist attacks on the Israeli settlements of Kiryat Shemoneh and Maalot—the latter resulting in the death of 24 schoolchildren—and severe Israeli retaliatory attacks on guerrilla bases in Lebanon, Kissinger was ultimately successful in his task and disengagement agreement was signed between Israel and Syria at the end of May. The agreement gave Syria back all the land it had lost in the 1973 war and the city of Kuneitra, which it had lost to the Israelis in the 1967 war.

Following the disengagement agreement, which the Soviet leadership tried to belittle, U.S. President Richard Nixon toured the Middle East, receiving a hero's welcome in Egypt, and a very warm welcome in Syria as well, where an announcement was made restoring diplomatic relations between the two countries. With American influence clearly on the upswing in the Middle East—however temporarily—the Soviet leadership sought to counter this most unwelcome trend by embracing one of the most anti-Western forces in the Middle East, the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO's leader, Yasir Arafat, was invited to Moscow at the end of July and this visit received extensive coverage in the Soviet press. Arafat was rewarded for his strong anti-Western pronouncements with pledges of increased Soviet support and permission to open a PLO office in Moscow.

Nonetheless, despite such moves as improved relations with Libya, Iraq, and the PLO, the Soviet position in the Middle East had clearly deteriorated as it appeared that the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian axis, backed by the United States, had become the dominant force in Arab politics. This was indeed an ironic development, given the extensive Soviet military and diplomatic support to the Arabs during the October war and U.S. support for Israel. It serves as yet another example of the Arab leaders' ability to exploit the superpowers to achieve their goals in the region.

Given the volatility of the Middle East, the possibility of another Arab-Israeli war, Arab-Western conflict over

oil prices, and the still unresolved issue of the Palestinian Arabs, it is far too early to see the trends mentioned above as permanent or even long-lasting ones. Indeed it is still quite possible to foresee the Soviet leadership exploiting yet another outbreak of war between Israel and Egypt in an attempt to rebuild the Soviet position in the region.

Assuming these trends *do* continue, however, the U.S.S.R. would be in a position where the best policy would simply be one of "watchful waiting." A Middle East peace agreement that established a Palestinian Arab State would well suit Soviet leaders by giving them another government over which they could expect to exercise some influence. They may also reason that the conservative monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates will eventually be replaced by radical regimes of the Iraqi or South Yemeni type that would call on the U.S.S.R. for support. Furthermore, such a policy would allow the Soviet Union to rebuild its détente relationship with the United States, and judging from the extent to which American investment has been sought, this is an important consideration.

Whatever the Soviet move in the Middle East, whatever its immediate objective may be, one cannot forget the overall goal: to strengthen the position of the U.S.S.R. in the region while destroying that of the West. Kremlin leaders have made a basic decision on the importance of the Middle East to Soviet ambitions, and far too much has been invested to expect them to abandon the project now.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Professor Robert O. Freedman did his undergraduate work at the University of Pennsylvania and earned both his M.A. and Ph.D. in international relations and Soviet studies from Columbia University. He has traveled in the Soviet Union and in the Middle East, authored *Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc* (Praeger), and in the spring this same publisher is scheduled to publish his forthcoming book, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since Nasser*. Dr. Freedman was a line officer in the U.S. Army, served on the social sciences faculty of the U.S. Military Academy, and is currently on the faculty of Marquette University.

NOTES

1. For a detailed description of Soviet policy toward Egypt in the first 2 years of Sadat's rule, see Robert O. Freedman, "Soviet Policy Toward Sadat's Egypt," in the *Naval War College Review*, November-December 1973, pp. 63-79.

2. Text of statement in "Summary of Sadat Talk on Soviet Ties," *The New York Times*, 19 July 1972, p. 15:1.

3. The Egyptians were reportedly looking for British fighter bombers.

4. *Pravda*, 23 July 1972.

5. Sadat to the Egyptian Peoples Council, 19 August 1972.

6. Cited in report by John K. Cooley, "Soviet Arabs Play Out Shadowy Drama in Secret," *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 August 1972, p. 3:1.

7. Cited in report by John K. Cooley, "Cairo's Anti-Soviet Ire Heats Up," *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 August 1972, p. 1:2.

8. Cited in report by Flora Lewis, "Ouster Move Long in Making, Sadat Says," *The New York Times*, 22 August 1972, p. 3:1.

9. See the report by John Allen May, "Fatal Bomb Package Shocks Britons," *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 September 1972, p. 3:3. According to an AP report from London cited in the 15 September 1972 issue of the *Jerusalem Post*, Egypt was seeking $220 million in arms from England.

10. "Egypt and Libya Agree on Cairo as Joint Capital," *The New York Times*, 19 September 1972, p. 10:3.

11. "Crimes of the Israeli Aggressors," *New Times*, No. 38, September 1972, p. 1.

12. V. Rumyanstev, "Syria on the Alert," *New Times*, No. 40, October 1972, p. 8. For an examination of the "Nile to Euphrates" myth, see Mervyn Harris, "From Nile to Euphrates: the Evolution of a Myth," *New Middle East*, March-April 1972, pp. 46-48.

13. *Pravda*, 7 September 1972.

14. Cited in the report by Eric Pace, "Soviet Union Reported to Ship Only Small Arms to Al Fatah," *The New York Times*, 22 September 1972, p. 6:1.

15. Cited in the report by Henry Tanner, "Sadat Rejects Rogers Suggestion of Interim Suez Canal Accord," *The New York Times*, 29 September 1972, p. 18:3.

16. Cited in the report by Henry Tanner "Egypt and Soviet Seek Better Tie." *The New York Times*, 2 October 1972, p. 9:1.

17. *Pravda*, 19 October 1972.

18. Cited in the report hy Henry Tanner published by the *Jerusalem Post* on 27 October 1972.

19. *Pravda*, 1 November 1972.

20. "Sudanese-Soviet Ties," *The New York Times*, 27 October 1972, p. 3:2.

21. Cited in Juan de Onis, "Southern Yemen Cites Soviet Support," *The New York Times*, 7 October 1972, p. 12:3.

22. Cited in "Yemen Talks to Go On," *The New York Times*, 12 November 1972, p. 68:5.

23. *Pravda*, 26 November 1972. The communique is translated in "South Yemen Delegation Visits U.S.S.R.," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 20 December 1972, p. 14.

24. Both Al-Bakr's speech and the final communique are translated in "Iraq's President Al-Bakr Visits Moscow," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 18 October 1972, pp. 22-24.

25. Text of the communique in *Pravda*, 22 October 1972.

26. This incident is described in *Middle East Monitor*, vol. III, No. 5, p. 1.

27. John W. Finney, "Iran Will Buy $2-Billion in U.S. Arms Over the Next Several Years," *The New York Times*, 22 February 1973, p. 2:3.

28. *Pravda*, 16 March 1973. Speech translated in "Near and Middle East: A.N. Kosygin's Stay in Iran," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 11 April 1973, p. 25.

29. *New Times*, No. 14, 1973, p. 7.

30. Cited in report by John K. Cooley, "U.S. Expands Scope into Persian Gulf," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 May 1973, p. 1:1.

31. L. Medyenko, "Subversive Activity of Imperialism and Reaction Against the Arab States National Interests," *Pravda*, 19 August 1972. (Translated in "Near and Middle East: Vain Efforts," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 13 September 1972, p. 17.)

32. *Pravda*, 15 September 1972. Tbe speech is translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 18 October 1972, p. 22.

33. There had been serious unrest in the Egyptian Armed Forces and it had spread to the normally docile Egyptian Parliament as well as to the universities and to the media.

34. Cited in Reuters report, "Sadat Urges Egypt to Gird for Fighting," *The New York Times*, 29 December 1972, p. 8:2.

35. Victor Kudryavtsev, "On the Arab Diplomatic Front," *New Times*, No. 4, 1974, p. 12. The Russians had long been urging the Arabs to use their oil weapon. For an early theoretical treatment of the possible effects of oil pressure, see I. Bronin, "Arabskaia Neft—SschΛ-Zapadnaia Evropa" (Arab oil-USA-West Europe), *Mirovaia Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnaia Otnosheniia*, No. 2, February 1972, pp. 31-42.

36. Kudryavtsev, p. 13.

37. Dmitry Volsky, "King Faisal's 'Holy War,'" *New Times*, No. 5, 1973, pp. 26-27.

38. Cited in report by John K. Cooley, "Arabian Peninsula: Much at Stake," *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 October 1972, p. 3:3.

39. The best treatment of this tragic incident is found in Herbert J. Coleman, "Travel Normalizes After Sinai Incident," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 5 March 1973, pp. 26-28.

40. V. Katin, "Tel-Aviv's Atrocious Crime," *New Times*, No. 9, 1973, pp. 20-21.

41. Cited in *Washington Post*, 27 March 1973.

42. Cited in *Brief: Middle East Highlights* (Tel Aviv) Hereafter (BRIEF), No. 54, p. 3.

43. Dmitry Volsky, "The Beirut Crime," *New Times*, No. 16, 1973, pp. 12-13.

44. See report in *Washington Post*, 18 April 1973 and in *Jerusalem Post* (AP report) on 20 April 1973.

45. Cairo Radio, 1 May 1973, reprinted in *Middle East Monitor*, vol. III, No. 10, pp. 3-4.

46. Cf. The International Conference for Peace and Justice in the Middle East, Bologna, Italy, 13 May 1973. For a description of the results of this conference see *New Times*, No. 21, 1973, pp. 16-17.

47. Cited in "A Cairo Newspaper Criticizes Mideast Policy at Summit," *The New York Times*, 26 June 1973, p. 20:3.

48. Reprinted in *Middle East Monitor*, vol. III, No. 14, p. 1.

49. Dmitry Volsky, "New Opportunities and Old Obstacles," *New Times*, No. 32, 1973, p. 15.

50. Cited in "Israeli Forces Say North Koreans Pilot Some Egyptian Jets," *The New York Times*, 16 August 1973, p. 13:1.

51. Translated in "Near and Middle East: Egypt," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 26 September 1973, p. 18.

52. Dmitry Volsky, "Soviet-American Relations and the Third World," *New Times*, No. 36, 1973, pp. 4-6.

53. See, for example, Radio Moscow Domestic Service, 13 and 14 September 1973.

54. For a different view of the Soviet position on the eve of the war see Uri Ra'anan, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East 1969-73," in *Midstream*, December 1973, pp. 23-45; and the article by Jon Kimhe, "The Soviet-Arab Scenario" in the same journal, pp. 9-22.

55. For an example of the Israeli leaders' lack of mental preparedness for the war, see Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's lecture to the Israeli Command and Staff College on 9 August. (Reprinted in BRIEF, No. 63, pp. 3-4.)

56. Henry Tanner, "Sadat Says Soviet Misinformed Him on Syrian Stand Early in Mideast War," *The New York Times*, 30 March 1974, p. 9:1.

57. See *Pravda*, 7-9 October and the coverage on Moscow Radio for the same dates.

58. Text of the message is printed in Radio Paris Domestic Service, 9 October 1973.

59. Cited in UPI report from Moscow, "Emigration Figures Reported," *The New York Times*, 2 November 1973, p. 5:1. See also Hedrick Smith, "Flow of Soviet Jews Is Undiminished," *The New York Times*, 19 October 1973, p. 17:3.

60. Cf. Radio Moscow in English to North America, 15 October 1973.

61. Cited in report of Bernard Gwertzman, "Kissinger Says U.S. and Soviet Union Acted to Keep War Restricted to Mideast," *The New York Times*, 16 October 1973, p. 1:8.

62. Cited in report by Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Resupplying Israel's Arms to Offset Airlift from Soviet: Moscow Offers Arabs Full Aid," *The New York Times*, 16 October 1973, p. 1:8.

63. *Pravda*, 20 October 1973.

64. Cited in *Middle East Monitor*, vol. III, No. 20, p. 3.

65. Cited in report by Murray Marder in the 20 October 1973 issue of *Washington Post*.

66. Cited in report by Bernard Gwertzman, "President Sent Another Message to Brezhnev as Kissinger Left for Moscow Talks," *The New York Times*, 21 October 1973, p. 26:1.

67. Cited in *Middle East Monitor*, vol. III, No. 20, p. 5.

68. The American alert and the nature of both the Soviet message to Nixon and the exact nature of Soviet moves are not yet clear. For Kissinger's statement about the alert at a press conference and a description of the alert, see Bernard Gwertzman, "Kissinger Speaks at a News Parley," *The New York Times*, 26 October 1973, p. 1:1, 19:1.

69. For a detailed description of the actions of the Arab States during the war, see *Middle East Monitor*, vol. III, Nos. 19 and 20.

70. Georgi Mirsky, "The Middle East: New Factors" in *New Times*, No. 18, 1973, pp. 18-19. The other "myths" which Mirsky claimed were dispelled by the war were: (a) Israel would always enjoy military superiority, (b) Arab weaponry was inferior to that of Israel, and (c) détente had no value (Mirsky said that, thanks to détente, a worse "flare-up" was avoided.)

71. G. Apalin, "Peking Provocations," *New Times*, Nos. 45-46, 1973, pp. 29-30. Apalin also claimed, as did much of the Soviet media, that the Chinese attempted to use the Middle East war "to provide a confrontation" between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

72. See *Pravda*, 21 November 1973 and 9 December 1973.

73. Theodore Shabad, "Impact of U.S. Trade Tie on Russians Is Debated," *The New York Times*, 5 November 1973, p. 61:1.

74. "Limits of Détente," *The New York Times*, 16 March 1974, p. 30:1.

75. Cited in BRIEF, No. 68, p. 2.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

77. *Middle East Monitor*, vol. III, No. 22, p. 5; "Scanning the News: Crisis Abates," *New Times*, No. 8, February 1974, p. 13. For a Soviet view of the Kurdish-Arab problem in Iraq, see Vladimir Shmarov, "The Baghdad Dialogue," *New Times*, No. 5, February 1974, p. 10.

78. See AP report cited in BRIEF, No. 69, p. 3.

79. Gromyko's speech is translated in "Gromyko Speaks at Geneva Peace Talks," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 16 January 1974, pp. 1-4.

80. *Izvestia*, 30 December 1972. (Translated in "Foreign Affairs: World Economy," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 23 January 1974, p. 11.)

81. *Pravda*, 25 January 1974 (Translated in "Near and Middle East: Egypt," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 20 February 1974, p. 25.)

82. Translated in "Reviewing the Middle East Situation," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 27 February 1974, pp. 11-12.

83. "Four Nation Conference," *New Times*, February 1974, p. 16.

84. Text of communique in *Pravda*, 8 March 1974.

85. See reports in Hedrick Smith, "Cairo Under Soviet Attack for Drift from Socialism," *The New York Times*, 26 March 1974, p. 1:2; Tanner, "Sadat Says Egypt Misinformed Him."

That a vital interest of both the United States and the industrial West lies in free access to the Middle Eastern oil supply has been made abundantly clear by the embargo and subsequent increases in the price of oil. Threats to this vital interest range from Soviet adventurism to the inherent domestic instabilities of the region. A firm and mutually profitable relationship with Iran, perhaps the most militarily potent and politically stable state in the region, seems to be the best policy against realization of these threats.

IRAN AND AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

An article prepared
by
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Introduction. In October 1973 the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) sent shock waves through the industrialized world when it decreased the overall production of oil and embargoed the United States, Portugal, South Africa, and the Netherlands. The impact of these developments and a subsequent quantum rise in oil prices for the Western states and Japan was immediate and far reaching. On both sides of the Atlantic and in Tokyo there were fears of recession and even depression, the possibility of millions unemployed, and of massive deficits in the balance of payments.

Although in the ensuing months the experts debated the magnitude of the cutback, the behavior of the industrialized states suggested that they considered the threats both real and serious. Besides turning their attention to conservation measures and the development of domestic oil and other energy resources, the developed nations began a search for long-term external petroleum supplies at reasonable prices. In their scramble to obtain Middle Eastern oil, the European countries and Japan moved quickly to endorse the Arab demand that the Israelis withdraw from all of the territories occupied in the June 1967 Middle Eastern war, actions which reflected the extreme dependency of Japan (over 90 percent) and Europe (over 70 percent) on external sources of oil. Such a course of action was judged unacceptable by the United States which instead stressed active and intensive diplomacy as the best means to deal with the oil problem. The more moderate reaction on Washington's part was, of course, related to the fact that America was far less dependent on

Middle Eastern oil than its allies. Yet, in spite of the fact that the United States did not find itself in a state of extreme dependency at the time of the embargo, it could not afford to be overly confident about the future for the embargo had dramatized a situation that had become increasingly obvious prior to the October war, namely, that by the 1980's the United States itself would become dependent on the Middle East for some 30 to 40 percent of its oil.[1] Although in the wake of the embargo the President and his advisers called for development of domestic energy sources and continued conservation efforts in order to achieve self-sufficiency in the 1980's, by the spring of 1974 Americans were reverting to normal consumption patterns and progress on internal energy development remained uneven.

Given the uncertainty of the future, policymakers could ill afford to ignore developments in the Middle East, especially those in the oil-rich Persian Gulf.[2] Indeed, the United States had acquired a vital interest in securing the flow of oil from the states in that area—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi—for both itself and its allies. The security policy that the United States has adopted to serve this interest is the main consideration of this article. Essentially, we are concerned with four dimensions of this issue:

- potential threats to the free flow of oil;
- domestic and international constraints on policymakers;
- the emergence of an American-Iranian partnership; and
- the gains, costs and risks of this relationship.

Threat Perceptions. While the suggestion that American policymakers are showing more concern with the security of the Persian Gulf implies that there are conceivable threats to the U.S. interests in the area, the exact nature of such threats must be spelled out. In our view, both American and Iranian decisionmakers seem most concerned with the possibility that radical Arab elements might launch attacks on established regimes through clandestine actions, insurgencies, or conventional engagements by regular armed forces. Guerrillas, for example, could be used to sabotage oil installations or to interfere with oil shipments by attacking oil tankers or by blocking chokepoints such as the 24-mile wide Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the gulf. Alternatively, radical elements could replace existing governments in the conservative oil producing states, and such radical regimes could sacrifice oil income on behalf of the confrontation with Israel or some other issue. Former Secretary of State William Rogers, during a June 1973 visit to Tehran, commented that "as the threat of major nuclear confrontation declines, subversion continues to be the way to spread an ideology." He then added his view that "this is a danger against which the countries of this region [the Persian Gulf] must guard."[3]

For its part, Iran has been in confrontation with Iraq both along their mountainous central and northern frontier and in the province of Khuzestan in southwestern Iran. In Oman, Baghdad has encouraged the rebels in western Dhofar Province, while Iran and Britain have countered this by aiding the Omani Sultan. In Pakistan and southeastern Iran the Iraqis have extended support to dissident tribesmen attempting to carve out an independent Baluchistan.[4] This has led the Shah of Iran to publicly support the territorial integrity of Pakistan.

In addition to clandestine and insurgent activities involving Iraq, there are Palestinian groups and a variety of organizations, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), and the territorial dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, which led to skirmishes by conventional forces in 1961 and again in

1973, that provide considerable cause for concern.

Further complicating the situation is the role played by the Soviet Union. Given the present state of détente with the West, any Soviet involvement seems likely to remain modest. Nevertheless, Moscow appears to have replaced Peking as a supporter of the Dhofar rebellion in Oman. Soviet aid to radical movements in opposition to conservative anti-Soviet regimes such as Saudi Arabia could serve a number of purposes. In the first place, such support provides substance to Moscow's claim that it, rather than Peking, is the leader of international revolutionary forces. A second factor is the increased leverage Moscow gains in the more radical Arab States, notably in Iraq where the local Communist Party has joined the ruling Ba'th Party in a National Front. Indeed, Baghdad has allowed Soviet naval ships to put in at Umm Qasr and could conceivably make these gulf port facilities available on a more permanent basis. Such a prospect is hardly pleasing to Iran. For its part, the United States has had a small naval facility in Bahrain since 1949, the status of which is not entirely clear at the present time.[5]

From the Shah's perspective, Moscow's interest in the gulf must be related to the czarist dream for a warm water port there. In any event, most analysts would concede that the Soviets view the Persian Gulf as linked with their broader objective of establishing an Indian Ocean presence. Moscow's involvement in the Indian Ocean is seen as related to her desire to assert influence in regional politics. Washington's interest in maintaining port facilities in the Persian Gulf and in building up an Indian Ocean island facility at Diego Garcia is, in part, a counter to the increased Soviet naval activity in the area.[6] Thus far, Washington has shown no real concern that Moscow might attempt to use its new position of greater influence by injecting oil considerations into bargaining situations with the West in order to gain concessions elsewhere, and there has been no indication that Moscow intends to use her position in the Indian Ocean to impede or otherwise thwart movements of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf.

Restraints on American Policy. In designing and implementing a security policy to deal with perceived threats in the Persian Gulf, policymakers have been constrained by domestic political considerations. In the first place, it seems quite clear that the U.S. Congress and the American people are inclined to take a jaundiced view of military intervention abroad, due in large part to the experience and costs of the Southeast Asia conflict. The merit of this political reality is not at issue here. Nevertheless, the constraints placed on our executive branch to support U.S. foreign policy with military force is a reality that our strategists must consider.

In our view only two situations would result in popular and congressional support for direct U.S. military involvement abroad: an extraordinary deprivation at home or a direct, dramatic challenge to a vital U.S. interest. By contrast, it is probably safe to say that neither Congress nor the American public would be likely to sanction military intervention in cases where the threat is perceived as being small or indirect and the benefits to be derived unclear.

The prevailing congressional and public attitudes therefore place significant constraints on policymakers who must evaluate alternative responses to insurgent or low-level conventional threats to American interests in the Persian Gulf. In order to resolve this dilemma, the United States has turned increasingly to its principal ally in the gulf, Iran, a policy facilitated by the fact that the Iranian monarch shares the American interest in preventing both an interruption in the flow of oil and the

expansion of Soviet influence on the region. Both factors represent a common foundation for a United States-Iranian partnership.

The Iranian Partnership. The American-Iranian partnership began to take form in the late 1940's when it became apparent that both parties share a common objective of restricting Moscow's influence in Iran. Even prior to World War II, Iran had come to view the Soviet Union as a threat to its security and had sought support from Europe. Since Iran had trouble obtaining the desired guarantees she continuously played off Britain, also perceived as a threat, against Moscow. This policy worked only when the two powers were at odds, and luckily for Iran it was the normal state of affairs—the only exception being a limited entente with Moscow in 1907.[7]

During World War II the U.S.S.R. and Britain both occupied sections of Iran, thus effectively blocking the country from assisting any of the Axis Powers. The current Shah's father was deposed for his alleged complicity with the Hitler regime, and the occupation of Iran had a profound effect upon the new Shah. Following the war, Britain withdrew her forces, but the Soviet troops remained. Soviet support was given to separatist movements in northwestern Iran, and pressure was applied for oil concessions. Perceiving Soviet actions as a threat to the free world, the Truman administration responded with stern warnings to the Kremlin. The Soviets withdrew their troops, and Washington found that it had established a firm basis for friendly relations with Tehran.[8]

By 1955 Iran's links with the West were formalized through its membership in the Baghdad Pact. Iran remains a member of the successor to the Baghdad Pact, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Although the organization is weak, continued Iranian membership in CENTO and participation in annual military exercises held under CENTO auspices is, at least, a symbolic demonstration of the Shah's continuing concern with the colossus to his north. The suspicion of Moscow's motives engendered by the machinations of the 1940's have been reinforced by the Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and in Czechoslovakia (1968). These events merely added fuel to Iranian fears that Moscow might yet seek to realize the czarist dream of land access to a warm water port on the Persian Gulf.

Recognizing that Iran would have little hope acting alone against Soviet military forces, the Shah has been quite pragmatic in dealing with Soviet leaders. Since the late 1960's Iran has exported natural gas to the Soviet Union in exchange for military equipment, including armored personnel carriers and antiaircraft guns. The Soviets have also contributed to the industrial development of Iran by building a steel mill and various public works projects. Should this strategy fail and for some reason the Soviets become aggressive in the area, the Shah is well aware that he will have to rely heavily upon the United States for Iran's physical security. Therefore, the Shah has refrained from openly criticizing the presence of U.S. naval vessels in the area. Moreover, it is not surprising that Iran has been careful to avoid any dependency on Moscow for the more complex military hardware—aircraft, tanks, and ships. Fixed wing military aircraft purchased by Iran are almost exclusively of U.S. origin, and it appears that the Shah has used the U.S. Air Force as a blueprint for developing his own air arm. By contrast, the Iranian Army, Navy and Gendarmerie have procured tanks, helicopters, and ships from the United States, Britain, and other Western countries.

Consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, the United States has fully supported Iran's military development plans by

authorizing sales of the most advanced U.S. manufactured weapons systems and by providing associated training for Iranian personnel. Although the U.S. policy in support of Iran is seen as a key to maintaining peace, stability, and continued flow of Persian Gulf oil, continued Iranian purchases of expensive military equipment will also help offset the heavy, adverse balance of payments stemming from extensive U.S. oil purchases from Iran and elsewhere.

Although the focus of U.S. security policy in the Persian Gulf has been the development of Iranian military forces, Washington has also supported Saudi Arabia and other regional states in strengthening their positions through cooperation and military development. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco made this point clear in June 1973 when he summarized Washington's policy as follows:

> . . . Support for indigenous regional collective security efforts to provide stability and to foster orderly development without outside interference. We believe Iranian and Saudi Arabian cooperation, *inter alia*, is of key importance as a major element of stability in this area. We also welcome the fact that Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and North Yemen are each in their own way seeking to strengthen their defensive capacities.[9]

As part of this policy, the United States and Saudi Arabia agreed in the spring of 1974 to closer cooperation in economic and security matters.

In order to deal with the possible threats mentioned above, Iran is currently engaged in an extensive military and naval development program.[10*]

In assessing its security needs, it is apparent that the Shah's defense planners have been greatly influenced by Iran's geography and have thus made provisions for the strongest navy in the gulf with 3 destroyers, 4 frigates or destroyer escorts, and more than 30 smaller surface combatants, including British-built hovercraft. In addition to having a long coastline and excellent ports, Iranians see themselves as having greater maritime interests than either Iraq or Saudi Arabia. As the predominate indigenous naval force in the area, the gulf has not only become subjected to greater Persian rather than Arab naval influence, but the destroyers and escorts augmented by helicopters and antisubmarine aircraft could also form the nucleus for Iranian deployments into the Indian Ocean. Granted, Iranian naval presence in that sphere today would be no match for Soviet or American presence;[11] but nevertheless, efforts to build a major port at Chah Bahar on the Indian Ocean suggest that the Indian Ocean is part of the Shah's grand design for extending Persian influence.[12]

The recent Iranian Navy buildup began as Britain conducted her withdrawal from the gulf. Iran stands prepared unilaterally to maintain freedom of navigation there, particularly for the export of oil by tanker. In addition to its sea force capabilities, Iran also possesses the transport and landing craft to mount amphibious operations with its sea ranger commando battalion. These commandoes could deal with insurgent bands bent on threatening commercial shipping and could also, in a matter of hours, intervene against insurgents operating in the Arab sheikhdoms.

Of all the Persian Gulf armies, Iran's is the best equipped, best trained, and best maintained. With 160,000 men, the

*Although the Shah is sharply criticized by some who would prefer less emphasis on defense, he is quick to point to extensive domestic development programs that accompanied his bloodless or "white" revolution of the early 1960's. Consistent with this program, industrial, agricultural, and socio-economic development spending is also being increased. For details, see De Onis, "Modernizing Iran Seeks Role."

IRANIAN ARMED FORCES

Description	MAJOR EQUIPMENT TYPES* Current Inventory (Estimate)	1975-80 Inventory (Estimate)
Medium Tanks	900-1000	1600-1700
Helicopters	150-200	650-750
Destroyers	3	3
Frigates (Destroyer Escorts)	4	4
Hovercraft	10	14
F-4 Fighter Aircraft	60-75	130-140
F-5 Fighter Aircraft	80-100	135-145
Advanced Fighter Aircraft (F-14)	-	50-75
Aerial Refuelers	-	6
C-130 Transport Aircraft	30-40	50-60
Heavy Transports (C-5/747)	-	not known

IMPERIAL IRANIAN AIR FORCE

Major Units	UNIT EXPANSION PROGRAM* Currently Forming or Operational (Estimate)	Operational 1975-80 (Estimate)
F-4D/E Fighter Squadrons	4-6	8
F-5 Fighter Squadrons	6	8
Advanced Fighter Squadrons (F-14/15)	0	2-4
RF-4 Reconnaissance Squadrons	1	1
RF-5 Reconnaissance Squadrons	1	1
RT-33 Reconnaissance Squadrons	1	0-1
707-320C Tanker Refueling Squadrons	0-1	1
C-130 Medium Transport Squadrons	2-4	5-7

*Estimates based on data in IISS, *The Military Balance: 1973-74* and *International Defense Review*, December 1973.

army consists of three armored divisions, two infantry divisions, and four independent brigades—all deployed around the capital and in the western part of the country near Iraq. With 860 U.S.-built medium tanks already in inventory, Iran has recently acquired the first of 800 "Chieftain" medium tanks on order from the United Kingdom. There have also been reports of Iranian interest in the German-built "Leopard" tank.[13] These tanks, coupled with C-130 transport support from the Iranian Air Force, armored personnel carriers of American and Soviet origin, and a large number of light aircraft and helicopters give the Army good mobility.

Already well equipped with artillery, the Army has additional guns and howitzers on order, and while its air defense relies heavily upon a large number of antiaircraft guns, it has been augmented by U.S.-manufactured "Hawk" surface-to-air missiles. Also, the "TOW" wire-guided antitank missile has been added to its inventory of French SS-11 and SS-12 missiles that had previously provided the nucleus of the army's antitank defense.

While the Iranian Army can not provide full protection vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R., these ground forces are certainly capable of dealing with potential enemies in the gulf, notably Iraq. Relations with Iraq have been tempered by two moderating factors. First, both sides would stand to lose should a large-scale conflict disrupt mutually profitable oil operations, particularly in the southern sector of the frontier. Accordingly, most skirmishes have occurred in the central and northern sectors—mountain engagements involving police forces and Kurdish irregulars. The second factor, which inhibits Iran from fulfilling dreams to "regain lost Persian territories" in Iraq or elsewhere, is the reality of Soviet intervention. Thus, Iran's army is confined largely to a defensive role vis-a-vis the Iraqis and is unlikely to initiate large-scale hostilities. On the other hand, if threatened by Baghdad, Tehran will not hesitate to protect what it sees as vital national interests. In short, Iran is more than capable of dealing with conventional threats posed by all of its neighbors except the U.S.S.R.

The army can also contribute directly to internal security missions that are the responsibility of the 70,000 man National Gendarmerie and SAVAK, the country's security and intelligence organization. Light aircraft, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers are at the disposal of gendarmerie and regular army elements for use in maintaining domestic order and in countering insurgents sponsored either by radical elements in Iran or neighboring Arab States. Critics of the Shah have pointed to his somewhat heavyhanded use of these forces against "domestic" opponents—members of the illegal, Communist-oriented Tudeh Party, the Confederation of Iranian Students, and other antiregime groups who are periodically tried by military tribunal and occasionally executed by firing squad.[14]

While improvements in the Iranian Navy, Army, and paramilitary forces have been considerable, the most dramatic changes have taken place in the air force. With an estimated 64 F-4 and 80 F-5 U.S.-manufactured fighter aircraft on hand, Tehran has 70 additional F-4's and 140 F-5's on order. The Iranian Government has also recently agreed to purchase F-14's in order to have the capability to intercept the highest flying, fastest Soviet aircraft.[15] American manufactured "Sidewinder" and "Sparrow" air-to-air missiles also contribute to fighter-interceptor capabilities. Moreover, Iranian fighter-bomber and reconnaissance capabilities will be enhanced through acquisition of six tanker aircraft which extend the combat radius of Iranian F-4's from about 300 miles (depending on bomb

load, altitudes, and speeds flown) to about 500 miles with just one refueling. Operations over the Indian Ocean will be greatly facilitated through the acquisition of these tankers. "Maverick" air-to-surface missiles are also available for use on the F-4 and will contribute significantly to fighter-bomber capabilities. Given the Shah's interest in modernizing his air defenses and general strike capabilities, it seems reasonable to assume that he may have or be considering both the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and laser-guided weapons.

With respect to transports, the air force is equipped with 35 C-130 "Hercules" and has 20 more on order. Interest has also been expressed in purchase of either the Lockheed C-5 or the Boeing 747.[16] The Shah was very favorably impressed by demonstration of C-5 airlift capabilities during the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. In addition to these proposed purchases, more light transports and close to 300 helicopters are on order.

As in any military buildup, the key factor is training personnel not only to operate, but equally important, to maintain complex, sophisticated military hardware. The United States has agreed to station more than 500 military men in Iran as technical assistance field teams to develop and conduct military training programs.[17] The effort is organized into a set of "field advisory teams" attached to the respective armed services including the National Gendarmerie. Aside from mechanical skills associated with operation and maintenance of complex military weapons systems, tactics of employment and command and control are undoubtedly addressed as well.

U.S.-owned multinational corporations are also involved. Northrop, for example, owns 49 percent of Iran Aircraft Industries, which operates from Mehrabad Airport at Tehran and provides training and maintenance support to the air force.[18] Technicians from Westinghouse are also available as consultants for "avionics, electronics, and weapons systems overhaul."[19]

Relying largely on its oil revenues, Iran is developing combat-ready units which will be responsive to its security needs. The Shah has already committed ground forces and helicopter units to the conflict in Oman where the PFLO is actively trying to separate western Dhofar Province from Oman and topple the conservative Sultan because of the threat posed to the narrow Strait of Hormuz and to shipping from the Persian Gulf.[20] Furthermore, the Shah sees Oman as the "soft underbelly" of the Persian Gulf from which radicals can work against the conservative Arab sheikhdoms and, for that matter, against Saudi Arabia. Involvement in support of the Omani Sultan is tangible evidence of Iran's commitment to the status quo and active opposition to any forces which would threaten the Iranian position in the gulf.

Gains, Costs and Risks. Since Iran has decided to maintain the security of oil shipments and to oppose radical movements in the Persian Gulf, the United States stands to benefit from its current relationship with Iran. In short, the United States has been able to ensure vital gulf oil exports at a political price that has been palatable so far. Such a situation, however, is not completely devoid of costs and a degree of risk.

In terms of foreign policy costs, the only states which seem to be significantly alienated by current U.S. policy are Iraq and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), a burden with which Washington has been able to cope. While the other Arab States and Sheikhdoms of the gulf were not happy about Iran's seizure of three small islands, the Tunbs, and Abu Musa in 1971 and are probably concerned about the present Iranian military

buildup, there would appear to exist no major divisive issues that could lead to immediate trouble between them and Iran. Indeed, if anything, the differences and concerns just noted are mitigated by a substantial congruence of interests.

For one thing, both Iran on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the sheikhdoms on the other hand have similar political systems which stress monarchical principles. During a period in which revolutionary groups threaten all of these regimes, it is in their interest to be mutually supportive (e.g., Iran's support of Oman). A second convergent interest is, of course, the common and vital aim of securing the free flow of oil from the gulf. Therefore, it would seem that the close ties between the United States and Iran should not adversely affect American relations with its Arab friends in the gulf, provided Iran maintains its present defensive orientation.

There is little reason to believe that the Iranian partnership will have any significant impact on American relations with other Middle Eastern states since the latter are not directly threatened by Iran. The same holds true for U.S. relations with Peking and Moscow.

For its part, Tehran, rather than seeking to antagonize the Soviet Union, has undertaken an effort to improve economic and political relations with the Kremlin. As long as Iran refrains from striking a belligerent or aggressive stance vis-a-vis Iraq, the Russians can largely overlook United States-Iranian ties and instead focus their attention on areas they view as far more important such as Europe and the Far East.[21]

In the case of China, there has been a warming of relations with Iran, perhaps motivated by a Chinese desire to outflank rival India. Recent reports also suggest that Peking has all but eliminated its support for PFLO's operations in Oman and has quietly sanctioned the American decision to expand the military facilities on Diego Garcia, mostly because it would like to see the United States counterbalance Soviet power in the Indian Ocean area.[22]

On the U.S. domestic level, the only cost, other than the one associated with military assistance, stems from small groups which resent American support for the Shah's style of governing. Given the current lack of enthusiasm for a crusade to "democratize" the world, such groups would seem to have little chance of mobilizing substantial backing from either Congress or the mass public. Indeed, if anything, the concern of both Congress and the public with adequate oil supplies through the mid-1980's seems to militate strongly against any suggestions that the United States should confront Iran over the latter's internal policies.

The major risk that the United States faces as a result of its strong link with Iran is that the Shah might be overthrown by domestic insurgents. Although the present revolutionary groups in Iran are generally isolated and impotent, it is generally agreed that as modernization proceeds it will expand the ranks of key functional groups (technocrats, a larger working class, etcetera) which will demand more participation in politics. Should the Shah fail to accommodate legitimate demands by opposing the development of political institutions, frustrations may arise that could strengthen insurgent organizations—a development which is not unfamiliar in 20th century politics.[23]

In our view, this scenario is unlikely to unfold in Iran for a number of reasons. For one thing, Iran, in contradistinction to many Third World states, has committed a good portion of its resources to economic and social development. If the present growth rate continues, it is probable that the regime will have supplemented its present traditional and personal bases for legitimacy by adding an instrumental dimension, something that many developing countries have been unable or unwilling to do.[24] Should the regime gain further

popular support in the manner just suggested, the opportunities for successful revolutionary warfare would be severely undercut.

One possibility which cannot be easily dismissed, however, would be a change in existing authorities.[25] Should the Shah's rule be suddenly terminated because of a physical infirmity or untimely death, it is possible that the military might assume power either by itself or in conjunction with the Crown Prince or Regent, the Empress Farah (the Shah's wife). Unlike a revolutionary situation, however, there would probably be little change as far as Iran's domestic and international policies are concerned.

Aside from its traditional orientations, the military has been a primary beneficiary of the Shah's current policies. Moreover, as the preceding discussion suggests, the Iranian military forces are heavily dependent on the West, particularly the United States for major weapons systems, training, and spare parts. Indeed, if the Iranian military were to turn away from the West, it would be undermining its own capabilities.

In summary, the strong American relationship with Iran is not without its risks. Yet, since those risks are largely related to a change of authorities rather than of the system itself, they would seem to be acceptable, especially when related to the obvious gains and minimal costs associated with the current United States-Iranian relationship.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Maj. Bard E. O'Neill, U.S. Air Force, earned his Ph.D. in international relations from the Graduate School of International Studies, Denver University. His major fields of interest are the Middle East, Africa, and comparative politics and political theory; he has written and lectured widely to both civilian and military groups on these topics. Major O'Neill is currently serving on the faculty of the U.S. Air Force Academy, has published a number of articles in scholarly journals, and is co-author of and contributor to two forthcoming books—*Political Violence and Insurgency: a Comparative Approach* and *The Energy Crisis and U.S. Foreign Policy*.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Capt. Paul R. Viotti, U.S. Air Force, is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and holds a master of arts degree in political science from Georgetown University and a master of science in administration in international commerce from George Washington University. His operational specialty has been intelligence; he has served as the current intelligence desk officer at the 7th Air Force Headquarters, Tan Son Nhut AB, Republic of Vietnam (1968-69) and more recently covered the Iranian and Syrian desks for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Captain Viotti is serving on the faculty of the U.S. Air Force Academy.

NOTES

1. James Akins, "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf Is Here," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1973, pp. 462-468; R.M. Burrell, "Producers and Consumers of the World Unite!" *New Middle East*, September 1972, pp. 32-33. For alternative perspectives on oil, see M.A. Adelman, "Is the Oil Shortage Real?" *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1972-73, pp. 69-107; and Stephen D. Krasner, "The Great Oil Sheikdown," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1973-74, pp. 123-148.

2. Akins, p. 466.

3. See Juan de Onis, "Rogers Terms U.S. Arms Sales to Persian Gulf 'Stabilizing,'" *The New York Times*, 12 June 1973, p. 10:3.

4. Iraqi machinations in the Baluchistan area are probably less publicized than their conventional operations against Kuwait and their subversive activities directed against Oman and Iran. Besides allowing the Baluchistan "liberationists" an office in Baghdad, thus tacitly supporting efforts to unite Baluchis from Iran and Pakistan into a single nation, Iraq was caught funneling arms into Pakistan via diplomatic bags on 10 February 1973. On this and other aspects of Iraqi subversive activities, see Alvin J. Cottrell, "From Iraq with Love," *Near East Report*, 21 March 1973, p. 48; "Viewing the News," *Near East Report*, vol. XVII, No. 8, pp. 29 and 32; "Under the Velvet Glove," *Time*, 5 March 1973, pp. 24-25; Interview of the Shah by Girilal Jain, *The Times of India*, 29 June 1973; Bernard Weintraub, "Pakistani Leader Ends Stay in Iran," *The New York Times*, 15 May 1973, p. 7:1; Juan de Onis, "Modernizing Iran Seeks Dominant Role in Region," 4 July 1973, p. 3:1.

5. See "The U.S. Navy Stakes Out the Indian Ocean," *Business Week*, 27 March 1971, p. 66.

6. Walter Laqueur argues that "while there is U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Persian Gulf, there are also common interests." See Laqueur, "Détente: What's Left," *The New York Times Magazine*, 16 December 1973, p. 27. For a different perspective, see J. Tim Tennell, "Soviet Ambitions in the Mideast," *The Alternative Magazine*, January 1974.

7. Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 120.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121; and David S. McLellan, "Who Fathered Containment," *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1973, pp. 210-215.

9. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco Before the House Near East Subcommittee, *Press*, Department of State No. 197, 6 June 1973, p. 3.

10. For an excellent treatment, see R.D.M. Furlong, "Iran—a Power To Be Reckoned With," *International Defense Review*, December 1973, pp. 719-729; cf. International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance: 1973-74* (London: 1973), p. 32; Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Colossus of the Oil Lanes," *Newsweek*, 21 May 1973, pp. 40-44; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Iran Spending Billions for Defense," *Washington Post*, 7 November 1973.

11. The Soviet Navy has made ship visits to the gulf and reportedly has used facilities at the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. The U.S. Navy's force in the gulf until recently consisted of two destroyers and a limited number of auxiliaries which use the port at Bahrain. These units are commanded by a rear admiral—an attempt to substitute exaggerated influence for lack of actual naval power. Of course, the presence of a rear admiral is suggestive of the United States signaling its intention to step up the size of its forces, if provoked by the U.S.S.R. See "If Suez Canal Is Opened," *U.S. News & World Report*, 24 December 1973, pp. 27-28.

12. See De Onis, "Modernizing Iran Seeks Role."

13. See *Baltimore Sun*, 14 January 1974.

14. For information concerning dissident groups, see De Onis, "Modernizing Iran Seeks Role." Criticism of the Shah's internal policies has been voiced by a number of scholars and observers. See, for example, the remarks of Marvin Zonis in U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia, *New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1973), pp. 65-68.

15. The order is for about 30 F-14's at a $900 million total cost. See *Washington Post*, 31 January 1974.

16. See "A Boon from Iran," *Newsweek*, 19 November 1973, p. 33.

17. See John W. Finney, "Iran Will Buy $2-Billion in U.S. Arms Over the Next Several Years," *The New York Times*, 22 February 1973, p. 2:3; Bernard Weintraub, "U.S. Quietly Sending Servicemen to Iran," *The New York Times*, 20 May 1973, p. 3:1.

18. See Herbert J. Coleman, "Iran Seeks International Aircraft Role," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 21 May 1973, pp. 60-61; ef. Furlong, p. 726.

19. Furlong, p. 729.

20. The Omani Sultan also has support from conservative Arab states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. See De Onis, "Modernizing Iran Seeks Role"; and *Washington Post*, 10 February 1972.

21. Most experts on Soviet foreign policy point out that Moscow views Europe, especially Eastern Europe, as vital to its security, an outlook which stems from the fact that major invasions of Russia have in the past come from Europe (e.g., Napoleon and Hitler). At present the Soviet concern for Europe is clearly manifested in its attempts to get the Conference on European Security and Cooperation to sanction the post-World War II division of Europe. The Soviet concern with its eastern borders is also well known and is currently reflected in its extensive troop deployments in the Far East. The priority which Europe and China have in Soviet foreign policy calculations may be one reason why Moscow has supported a settlement of the

Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, the Soviet desire to strengthen détente with the United States in order to have access to American technology and cybernetics would seem to militate against making the Iranian military buildup a *cause celebre*. Such a Soviet policy is based on the assumption that Iran will not use its superior military capabilities for expansionist purposes. That the Iranians are aware of this is suggested by the restraint they exhibited during the border clashes with Iraq in late 1973 and early 1974.

22. According to "A Nod from Peking," *Newsweek*, 4 March 1974, p. 15, a Chinese diplomat in Europe has revealed that Washington secured Peking's tacit approval for the expansion of the military facilities on Diego Garcia. It seems likely that China's main motivation would be to counter Soviet influence in the area by relying on the United States during a period in which Peking is unable to project its own naval power.

23. Whether the Shah or his successor will encourage political institutionalization is an open question. One possibility here is for the monarchy to recede into the background while still retaining its respect and appeal. The role of the Thai King is instructive here. Given the present outlook of the Shah, however, such a development seems unlikely in the immediate future.

24. For a discussion of the types of legitimacy, see Charles F. Andrain, *Political Life and Social Change* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Press, 1970), pp. 140-144. Instrumental legitimacy has two facets: acceptance of the regime's moral right to rule because of a respect for the expertise of the individuals in positions of power or because the material outputs of the system are satisfactory.

25. The regime refers to the norms and structures of the political system whereas "authorities" refers to specific individuals in power. Given elites may lose their legitimacy without the regime losing its moral acceptance. On this distinction, see David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 190-219; cf. Andrain, p. 138.



INFORMATION COST AWARENESS

The fact that management has virtually chosen to ignore the cost of information highlights the need for an awareness of informational practices and their respective costs. Such an awareness can lead to culling out "might need, nice to have" information and is essential to combat the development of those internal and external power bases that are detrimental to both the economic and general health of the organizational whole.

A research paper prepared in the
Defense Economics and Decisionmaking Course
at the Naval War College
by
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Although the seed for this paper was sown early in the Defense Economics and Decisionmaking course taught at the Naval War College, it could have as easily been planted in any management curriculum where the need for information is repeatedly stressed. Lectures on decisionmaking procedures, courses in analytical methods, and case study discussions all drive one point home: information is invaluable. It is required to observe trends, develop statistical bases, conduct day-to-day operations, and reduce the uncertainty from plans. However, a curious thing develops during such courses: there is virtually no mention of the cost of information. It is as if information were a free and readily attainable commodity, available for the asking. Traditional economic theories on supply and demand, production, et cetera, evidently are not applicable to information. Similarly, although information is an essential element in a cost/benefit analysis, managers have apparently found it convenient to give the problem less than full attention.

Nevertheless, the collection, transmission, storage, processing, and distribution of information obviously do have a hard dollar cost. In a personal sense this can be observed in outlays for newspapers, books, magazines, television sets, telephones, and education. Organizational activities rapidly extend this list by additional outlays for sophisticated communication and electronic processing equipment, special forms and reports, and staffs devoted to various aspects of the information process. The epitome of the situation probably rests with our bureaucratic Government where countless number of forms and reports alone cost the Nation billions of

dollars annually to procure, prepare, and process.[1]

There can be little doubt that information costs. Why then are these costs so frequently ignored by the managers who levy the requirement? What are some of the effects of this inattention? Is the situation uncontrollable? This paper is an attempt to highlight such issues in order that they may be put in proper perspective with the need for and value of information. To constrain the subject area, emphasis will be placed on automated information processing as used in the decisionmaking centers of a bureaucratic environment. Such a constraint focuses attention on visible, high cost information handling techniques while emphasizing the peculiarities of the problem in a nonprofit motivated organization. It is suggested, however, that many of these same considerations are applicable wherever and however information is gathered to fulfill a given requirement. For the most part this paper is based on Marine Corps data processing experiences, observations of similar activities in other branches of the government, and the referenced literature.

Despite attempts by Congress and Government budget personnel to obtain a fix on at least a portion of the costs associated with information, particularly the automating of it, it seems fair to say that for the most part such considerations are ignored by the majority of bureaucratic managers at all levels. The reasons for this are undoubtedly many and varied, but five appear to dominate any list.

- Lack of definition of what information is.
- Imbalance of the emphasis on information in management education.
- Organizational philosophies and budgeting procedures.
- Bureaucratic expertise.
- Costing difficulties.

Information is a phenomenon everyone is aware of, but one that cannot be precisely defined. What is information to one person may not be information to another. What is valuable in one environment may be worthless in different circumstances. Information is often described "as that which removes uncertainty,"[2] but if this premise is pursued, it can also be seen that information is "knowledge . . . unorganized or unrelated facts or data."[3] Curiously, if the argument is developed far enough, it can realistically be shown why by organizing and correlating these facts to remove uncertainty, "information is power."[4] None of these definitions or philosophies, however, remove the term "information" from the abstract into the world of tangible, measurable products upon which a price tag can be attached. They provide no precise description of the form information can take, establish no quality or quantity criteria, nor do they differentiate between useful and extraneous data. How do you determine the cost of a nebulous object? Clearly, one answer is "You don't, you ignore it." A more rational approach, however, is to develop some other economic criteria (i.e., value) or measurement technique.

The second reason given for ignoring information costs has already been implied in the introduction to this paper; management education too often stresses the requirement for information to the exclusion, or minimization, of what it costs. To a similar extent, the value of information is emphasized out of proportion to the theory of information and its proper role in the organization. Yet an understanding of the functional and dysfunctional aspects of information in an organization, particularly a bureaucracy, is tantamount to understanding information costs and why they are continually increasing. An awareness of information practices and their costs is essential to combat the development of those internal and external power bases that are detrimental to both the economic and general health

of the organizational whole. Such awareness can also lead to culling out at almost any managerial level that "might need, nice to have" information which is not essential to the decisionmaking process at that level. It might lead to an appreciation and acceptance of the fact that "I don't know, but will find out" can be an honest, economical answer. A rapid, detailed response to a rare question, on the other hand, might well be an indication of too much up-to-the-minute information residing at the wrong level. Information cost awareness is a function of management education and the emphasis placed on the various aspects of this important phenomenon.

A study of bureaucratic organizations and some information-related budgeting procedures indicates why in many instances the academic shortcomings mentioned above are perpetuated and spread throughout all levels of management. The problem develops when a central activity is organized and tasked to provide certain support (i.e., communications, data processing) for multiple functional users. Equipment acquisition and rental charges, information system study and development costs, and all operating expenses are then budgeted for and charged to that single agency. There are definite advantages and economies in such an arrangement; however, as accumulative figures are reported to a higher authority, the average customer is not aware of either the incremental or total cost of the information services provided him. He does not have to plan or budget for such services or evaluate alternative approaches, including "do without." In the absence of these controls or at least periodic cost reminders, information and information services rapidly become viewed as "free." Two distinct effects occur which contribute to the continuation of this attitude and rising information costs.

For the information user/functional manager, a tendency develops not only to ask for more information, but to ask for it more frequently. Each "no charge" response reinforces the notion of freeness and continues the cycle. Concurrently, the manager's data inputs to his own system become less accurate (the machine will weed out problem areas) and his information requests less precisely defined (the process can always be repeated if the desired results are not obtained the first time). In addition, without a cost criterion his own managerial techniques and procedures begin to suffer from a lack of directed attention. Why not get a monthly update (several cases of paper) of all items in the supply inventory or a 167,000-page computer printout for wide distribution?[5] It's free! In essence, without some type of control, costs and information requirements enter into an endless escalating spiral.

The situation within the service agency is equally as interesting. In addition to a moral, and probably sincere, desire to provide support, the service manager must not only maintain the good name of his activity, but must also somehow economically justify his aggregated expenses. In an automated environment, a frequently used way to indicate a reasonable rate of return on investment is to show high machine utilization: a favorable ratio of the hours of computer usage to the hours of computer availability. As the majority of costs are relatively fixed, there is a tendency therefore to take on all work within the limits of the service center capability, to saturate the machine and the other resources of the activity. Although this might be some sort of measure of efficiency, it is not necessarily a measure of information system effectiveness. The "might as well use, it's available" philosophy not only increases variable costs, but also encourages the type of management reasoning noted previously. Without visible cost as a moderator, attempts to regulate such generous, "free" infor-

mation services can lead to real organizational disharmony. Once the pattern is established, it is difficult to provide anything less.

Expertise is one of the interesting phenomena of a bureaucracy, and its effect in the information process is no exception. The role of communicators, system analysts, and data processors are particularly interesting and provide some insight into why information costs are so frequently ignored. If, for instance, the data processing personnel working on an information system become too mesmerized by the capability of the computer, emphasis during the conception and development stage of the system may be placed on technical feasibility instead of economic desirability. New and sophisticated equipment will be suggested along with complex internal machine routines. If such an "expert" works in conjunction with a "why not, it's free" manager, a very elaborate system complete with all sorts of whistles, bells, and "nice to have/might need" information is likely to evolve. In short, computer technical feasibility and expertise and functional manager expertise can be made to reinforce and complement each other.

A variation of this phenomenon is also possible by pursuing the computer utilization situation previously discussed. At some point in time the computer will, in fact, become saturated. What happens then when a new legitimate information system is desired? Are other dissimilar and maybe ineffective applications discontinued? Rarely! After some bona fide attempts to really improve the computer efficiency, the hue is raised for a bigger and faster machine—one that costs more but can accommodate the old procedures, the new system, and still have some capacity for further expansion. The fact that it just happens to require additional expertise is probably coincidental. What better combination of events could be desired for ignoring individual information costs in a bureaucracy?

Perhaps the dominant reason information costing is ignored, however, is because to do it realistically and accurately is extremely difficult, if not impossible. It is not like a production process where certain raw materials or parts are consumed by predetermined, constant processes to produce a specified output. Decisionmaking information may take many forms and be a function of a variable number of different parts and processes. Although theories on measuring the amount of information transmitted[6] and programs which define unique units of information[7] provide a valuable insight into the components of information and how they might be measured and identified, they offer no quick solution to the costing dilemma. Units of information, the parts, are too versatile, indestructible. They can have a very short lifespan or be stored indefinitely without loss of value. They can flow in many directions at once and be used simultaneously by different people for different purposes. They can be valuable and valueless concurrently, depending on the environment. In some cases they can be combined and mathematically manipulated; in other cases they cannot. Most importantly, they can be used and reused; they are not consumed in the information production process. How do you develop, control, or trace the cost of such parts?

A good philosophical case can be made for the premise that the units of information (parts) are themselves free and that all information costs are due to the processes involved in collecting and communicating the parts and the producing of the end product. A deliberation on the various processes that might be used in producing information reveals that such a premise does not really relieve the overall costing problem.

There is no set pattern as to what extent any given process can be used or to the frequency with which it is

required. The search or collection process, for example, may require little or no effort or be a deliberate, organized, resource-consuming endeavor. Similarly, preparing data for transmission may vary from writing a simple report to filling in prepared forms or punching cards. Communication of the data may be by voice, mail, or electronic impulses. Storage and processing may be manual or automated and may vary from answering a simple question with a given set of data to using it in a complex simulation. Although these examples are by no means all inclusive of the various information processes and techniques, they should impart a feeling for the inconsistency of the production process and a notion of resource expenditures.

How do you discount the costs of the various processes? Who do you bill? Should charges be prorated among every unit of information handled or levied against the end product? When it is recalled that data from many sources flow in many directions, that data may be shared by multiple users for multiple purposes, and that there is no predeterminable way to know how, when, or with what frequency the data will be used, it becomes readily evident why traditional means of determining costs are difficult when applied to information.

However, it would be a mistake at this point to assume that the accumulative costs of information processes are not significant or that because unit information costing is difficult that nothing can be done about such expenditures.

Total information cost figures are neither completely available nor segregated according to the purpose of the information or types of activities supported. However, some figures and a reflection by the reader on his or her personal experiences will indicate the magnitude of total information costs. For example, in 1967 alone, $6 billion worth of computers and related equipment were shipped in the United States, an expenditure which represented approximately 10 percent of the Nation's total new plant and equipment investment.[8] This outlay was a tenfold increase over 1960, and even further increases are projected for the 1970's. In 1972 the Government alone had 6,000 computers costing $2.4 billion annually.[9] These figures address solely equipment costs and not the personnel, supplies, and other expenditures normally associated with such activities. More significantly, they represent expenditures for only one process within the information production cycle and only one technique within that process. Driven by time and personnel expenses, the accumulative cost of the search/collection process must likewise be enormous. Similarly, one cannot help but wonder what it costs the Government in dollars and manpower to print forms and routinely fill out innumerable reports at every organizational level. In the article referenced in the introduction to this paper, a $36 billion estimate was given for but one sector of the Government.

Information transmission costs are also a major process expenditure, particularly since it might be argued that all communications are related to information flow and therefore all equipment, personnel, and other related costs should be considered information expenses. It has been estimated that in the Department of Defense "more than $9 billion has been invested in communication systems and equipment and that annual expenditures for communications support exceeds $5 billion."[10] These are especially frightening figures when it is noted that a major market research study[11] estimates that the growth in communication transaction volume will increase 1,650 percent between 1970 and 1980 and that information services will be among the top three fastest growing segments of the economy.

It is appreciated that not all this growth and stated or implied expenditures can be directly attributed to either bureaucratic organizations or to what has loosely been referred to as decision-making information. However, if the trends are fair indicators of what is occurring in our society, the total effect of minute dispersed costs appears staggering. It is readily apparent that no organization, Government or commercial, can long overlook such expenditures. Since it seems unrealistic to assume that our modern-day personal and organizational thirst for information will be voluntarily abated, some constraint must be put on the demand in order to maintain economic sanity. If, because of the monopolistic character of bureaucratic information service centers or for some other reason, unit or marginal cost is a difficult or impractical regulator of the system, then some other principle must be used. Intuitively there appears to be one appraoch to the problem; external management control. The purpose of this paper was not to develop a lengthy dissertation on management techniques; however, the material presented does suggest several ways that might be useful in regulating information costs.

If one considers the additive costs of information units as they flow through the various processes, it becomes readily apparent that appreciable savings might be realized by reducing the volume of flow. This seems so obvious as to be hardly worth mentioning; yet it is a principle frequently disregarded and shunned by both managers and computer experts alike. Programs such as the DOD data standardization effort have not gained grassroots support, although they are essential for reducing data redundancy. Studies at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, for instance, indicated that approximately 40-60 percent of the data residing in three major management information systems (logistics, fiscal, and personnel) was redundant. That is not to say that each manager did not have a legitimate need for the data, but it was an indication that little effort had been made to coordinate requirements or to share information. Data reduction efforts in other organizations indicate similar findings. In a Western Electric project, 30,000 different configurations of information were refined and standardized into 2,500 unique units of decision-making information.[12] In another study, 34 expressions in various weapons accounting systems were found to mean the same thing.[13] When considering the recurring costs of collecting, transmitting, and storing this type of redundancy, it becomes apparent why information costs are high and rising. Without unique data words with definitive meaning, one also has to wonder how managers communicate outside the sphere of their own information systems or resolve issues when data contradictions arise. Data redundancy is a very real problem in the information process and one that, if uncontrolled, can greatly inflate costs.

A second means of controlling escalating information costs is through an honest periodic reassessment of what information is actually required for decisionmaking at any given management level. It is to reexamine not what is available or presently provided, but to critically evaluate what is needed, in what form, and with what frequency. The aim should be to cut through the quagmire of information flowing upward; to eliminate the unessential, the uncontrollable, and the routine. By concentrating on essential, summary, and exception data, the emphasis on information can be redirected from status and power symbols to that required for decisionmaking. Any reduction in information flow can only result in a corresponding immediate reduction in variable process costs and a longer term decrease in fixed (semifixed) expenditures. Unfortunately, the multicase

report and 167,000-page printout incidents previously referenced, although extreme, are only too typical of current practices. Similar horror stories abound about "required" reports that are never picked up by the manager or are not missed when intentionally discontinued by the computer installation staff. Such examples have to be an indicator of the information luxury we enjoy. The question is, though, how long can it be afforded?

Improving the efficiency and/or effectiveness of the various processes in the information system is a third possible approach to curbing costs. The potential of this can be illustrated by looking at but a few figures from a recent survey of 89 commercial computer installations.[14] The study pointed out that the computers in the activities surveyed were used only 64 percent of the time that the equipment was operationally ready and that only 75 percent of that time was the use productive. If such conditions exist in the commercial marketplace, it is not hard to extrapolate and visualize why the Department of Defense "spends at least $500 million per year more for computer and ADP support than necessary" and "derives less benefit for its ADP dollar" than comparable major industrial users.[15] It is also not hard to realize why both business and Government activities are extremely interested in new tools and procedures for closely monitoring machine utilization in these major costs centers. Similar inefficiencies in other segments of the overall information system (i.e., data retransmission rates) can only further add to unnecessary system costs. As an aside, it should also be apparent from the two study findings given why a computer service center manager is under pressure to accept additional work, regardless of its ultimate information utility.

Inherent in this problem is the need to develop realistic measures of efficiency and effectiveness for the entire information system as well as for each of its components. The effects of bad criteria (machine utilization) have been mentioned previously, and it appears realistic to assume that equally poor standards exist in the other information processes. Available literature,[16] does emphasize differing approaches to measuring levels of efficiency and effectiveness within an information system. In the end an organization undoubtedly has to develop its own measures in accordance with its particular objectives. The critical point is that such measures be established, and established concurrently, by management and the information subsystem specialists.

A fourth factor to consider for controlling information expenditures is cost visibility. Accumulative totals cannot remain hidden at the highest level apart from the many users of an information system. If direct, precise, total information costing is not currently practical, and it appears it is not, then, at a minimum, techniques must be used which dispel the notion of "free" information. Estimated and statistical charges are feasible approaches. In this regard, much work has been done in recent years by both Government and commercial agencies to determine the cost of any given computer run. Due to technical complexities of the latest computers, these figures are, in many cases, only a rough approximation. However, the efforts represent a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, in no known case do such endeavors attempt to look beyond the computer center in order to include the other information process costs previously mentioned. Similarly, no attempt is made to include all administrative overhead costs or to discount information system development and maintenance expenditures. As a matter of principle, it seems that all such expenditures are independently evaluated against some other criteria without integrating them into any total information costing algorithim. Re-

gardless of the procedure used, efforts are required to make information related costs highly visible.

No matter what techniques are used to control costs or to improve information system efficiency and effectiveness, in the final analysis it boils down to one crucial factor: management awareness. This paper has been an attempt to stimulate that awareness as it is believed that information costs can no longer be ignored, especially in a bureaucracy. It is appreciated that information is necessary and that it has definite value and benefits. It is also appreciated that the economics of information are in their infancy and that there are many problems involved. It is suggested, however, that due to the already high and continuously rising costs of information, management cannot wait for definitive solutions. Awareness of information costs and the factors contributing to their escalation may be sufficient to force a more economical balance between expenditures and benefits. Such awareness starts with education, and it is in this arena that all information considerations must be put into proper perspective.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. Col. Donald R. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps, did undergraduate work in engineering at the University of Wisconsin (1951), is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (1955), and holds a master's degree in science in management data processing from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (1967). Besides being a graduate of the Army Engineering School and serving in various "field" engineering billets—including Engineering Plans Officer for Headquarters, 3d Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam—he has had duty as a systems analyst in Headquarters, Marine Corps, and served as the Plans and Support Officer for the Computer Science School at Quantico, Va. Lieutenant Colonel Miller is a recent graduate of the College of Naval Warfare and is currently assigned to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF Pacific.

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9. J.J. McFaull, "Managerial Accounting for Data Automation," *The Air Force Comptroller*, October 1972, p. 14.

10. "Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications, Phase 1; Extract of," *Selected Readings in Tactics* (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College, 1974), vol. I-1, p. 5.

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

THE BAROMETER

(Ashok Kapur, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, comments on Lt. Comdr. K.R. McGruther's "The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," September-October issue.)

I agree with the focus on perceptions in naval diplomacy, but I believe if lessons are to be drawn from American naval-diplomatic behavior in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan crisis, the lessons must be correct ones.

I am not convinced that from the outset that American strategy (e.g., Nixon/Kissinger approach) was based on the certainty of Indian military victory over Pakistan as is stated on page 7. Until Indian forces reached Dacca and Indian forces had overcome amphibious obstacles, it was not clear that India had the military capability to isolate Pakistan's forces and obtain a surrender. Hence there was a possibility that Indian forces could get bogged down, and then the psychological effect of the *Enterprise* would/could have been more telling. In this connection it should be noted that the Indian Government was under tremendous pressure from the Soviets to finish the military campaign within a week or 10 days because the diplomatic pressure in the United Nations was strong. In this case, the U.S. strategy was probably to play on Indian military uncertainties. If anything, the talk about the arrival of the *Enterprise* goaded the Indian military into quicker and decisive action. To say that the United States is the "winner" implies that this is what it wanted. But is this what the author wants to say?

The foregoing directs attention to the effect of the American signal(s) on India. The second point directs attention to the element of uncertainty in Nixon-Kissinger thinking. Here the hypothesis is that instead of America being able to create uncertainty in the other side's thinking by raising a question of American unpredictability (page 12), Americans are taken in (according to this hypothesis) by exaggerating their ability to confuse others with their so-called unpredictability. I am not sure if the 1971 crisis should be treated along with the Cuban crisis of 1962 and the Middle East crisis of 1973. There is need for more evidence to demonstrate that the *Enterprise* mission into the Bay of Bengal snatched the initiative from enemy hands (Indian? Soviet?). Neither militarily nor politically does such an inference seem warranted. The history of the crisis from March-October-December 1971 has yet to be written, but it seems that the framework of Indian decisionmaking was actually laid out in March 1971, and the rest was the implementation of a game plan which assumed Nixon's tilt against India and Moscow's preference for a peaceful and political solution.

We should note that if ambiguous signals produce uncertainty in the enemy's mind they also produce confusion for one's allies and potential allies. There is some evidence, albeit unconfirmed, that until the last day or so, Chinese forces did not move in the

Himalayas but both Yahya Khan and China started some moves when the *Enterprise* appeared to be committed to tip the balance in the East. In this case, American naval diplomacy may have created an impression of parallelism, even of Sino-American "collusion" which Nixon and Kissinger may not really have wanted to convey. The Shanghai communique of February 1972 revealed such parallelism, but it is interesting that the Chinese insisted on talking about the subcontinent more than the Americans did. Subsequently, the American side has had to backtrack with the Indians, to emphasize that the idea of parallelism and collusion is "fanciful." Yet it was the naval expedition which started talk about parallelism and collusion in the first place. Thus, there is a case for selecting one's signals carefully, bearing in mind the values and attitudinal prisms of the adversary or enemy.

Finally, I think a general proposition should be made. To convey commitments it is not simply enough to send a task force. To convey commitments one needs to convey one's certainties and to hide one's uncertainties or to offer "if-then" propositions, to offer rewards and punishment. Furthermore, for a great power like the United States, why should it always be necessary to make tangible commitments. Surely its reputation, its word, should carry some conviction.

Ψ

(Maj. John D. Whitehouse, USA—a former British subject—comments on Comdr. Maria Higgins' "Winston S. Churchill's Legacy to the Royal Navy, 1911-1915," November-December 1974.)

Unfortunately, as is so often the case among great men whose genius, dynamism, and tenacity are legendary, historical fact becomes confused with mythology and a sense of veneration which ultimately clouds the final judgment of what the great man *intended* to achieve. In this regard it would seem that Commander Higgins' article on Winston Churchill and his legacy to the Royal Navy is no exception.

The article in question seems to overstate the accomplishments of Churchill while begging the question of the anticipated achievement of the Royal Navy in World War I. Assuming that the purpose for which the navy had been built was to inflict complete, unquestionable defeat on the Imperial German Navy, the effort was a failure. When the opportunity arose at Jutland, instead of a clear and smashing victory in the expected style of Nelson, the British Fleet was found wanting and the battle itself inconclusive both tactically and strategically. Jutland made clear the fact that British technology was in an advanced state of decay, that command and staff procedures were, to be charitable, faulty, and that damage control procedures had been sadly neglected. British gunnery was less effective by far than that of German ships, and the one British aircraft carrier, which could have had value to the British in a reconnaissance role (*Campania*) was ordered back to port as she tried to rendezvous with the fleet. The circumstances and events at Jutland certainly seem to disprove Commander Higgins' thesis that when war came the British Fleet was ready.

Much of the credit and/or blame for what was achieved in expanding and improving the Royal Navy between 1904 and 1914 should also go to Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fisher, who was First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910. Nevertheless, even Fisher, whose dynamic personality was similar to that of Churchill's, did not prevent the inclusion of significant design faults into such ships as Dreadnought, Iron Duke, and Queen Elizabeth class and the battle-cruiser Tiger. High numbers of ships were out of commission at any one time. As the Commander in Chief of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, wrote in 1914: ". . . wholesale

breakdowns caused me uneasiness . . ."

Assessed in bureaucratic terms, Churchill's legacy to the Royal Navy, 1911-1915, does seem to be enormous. The truth appears to be closer to the fact that, despite all his efforts, the Royal Navy had not been aroused from a sense of complacency that had descended on the Empire. Indeed, in view of the steady industrial and technological decline of Great Britain starting in the 1870's, no one and nothing could have reversed the inevitable effects of years of decay, neglect, and inefficiency, hidden though they were under a veneer of polish and ritual. For all the reforms instigated by Churchill, the British Fleet at Jutland remained Victorian in outlook and technologically incapable of fulfilling its desired mission, i.e., decisively defeating the German Fleet. For the true believer, this analysis may be hard to swallow, but history bears out its accuracy.

A final lesson can be learned from Commander Higgins' article that one must never lose sight of—the fact that an armed force must be capable of performing well, indeed decisively, in combat. Imaginative pay and social reforms are meaningless if combat efficiency does not increase proportionately. This is perhaps an area where we can improve today. We have the technology, but we appear to pay less attention than we should to the military virtues of courage, honor, and discipline.

The genius of Churchill lay best in his vision and was exemplified by his efforts to prepare for and fight two wars. The fact that his successes are fewer, than would at first appear to be the case, cannot be blamed on him. The catastrophic and unbelievably fast decline of British power might have occurred differently had it not been for Churchill, but it would have happened all the same. To prevent a similar occurrence on our side of the Atlantic, we must realistically appraise the past by putting cause and effect in their correct perspective. Then, unlike the British, as Barnett observed, we would be studying history and not merely copying it.

Ψ



PROFESSIONAL READING

Bauer, K. Jack. *The Mexican War, 1846-1848.* New York: Macmillan, 1974. 399p.

Mr. Bauer's new book is a credible addition to the Macmillan "Wars of the United States" series under the general editorship of Louis Morton. It finds itself in good company among the several excellent volumes already published and adds to the luster of that series with merits of its own. But it has the quality, not unique in this series, of being a clear product of the Vietnam era.

In discussing his own splendid volume on *The American Way of War,* Russell Weigley has admitted that the experience of American involvement in Vietnam helped remold his attitude toward writing about Americans at war. Likewise, Mr. Bauer writes in the present volume that "The story of the application of . . . force by James K. Polk, like that of America's recent experience in Vietnam, depicts the dangers inherent in the application of graduated force." And "As in Vietnam, much of the diplomatic story of the conflict swirls around failure of the efforts of the American government to initiate negotiations to bring the war to a close."

The analogies thus implied between American involvement in Mexico and American involvement in Vietnam are at least partly the product of the oft repeated homily that each generation writes its own history and sees the past through eyes made newly aware of the meaning of that past by its own experiences. For Bauer, Vietnam provided the background against which the events of 1846-48 assumed new clarity. The analogies are compelling.

For example, Mr. Bauer scores President Polk because he refused to take seriously Mexican sensibilities. When Mexican authorities explicitly asked that a Commissioner be sent to negotiate the border dispute, Polk sent instead a Minister, John Slidell, a terminological distinction which implied that normal diplomatic relations had resumed. Polk and Slidell could not understand the importance of the distinction and assumed that Mexican suggestions for a clarification were nothing more than stall tactics. The administration, in short, underestimated and misunderstood the potential enemy. The relationship of this attitude to American actions in Vietnam is unmistakable.

The author also criticizes Polk for listening principally to advice that he wanted to hear, that is, which confirmed opinions he already held, while rejecting unwanted advice. Both consul John Black and Minister John Slidell optimistically reported to Washington that the Mexicans could be convinced to conclude an agreement short of war. But while the Mexicans wanted to avoid war if possible, the national pride of the Mexican people would not tolerate any administration which appeared to surrender to the gringos. Neither Polk nor Slidell had any sympathy for the domestic political problems of the Mexican Government and assumed bad faith when the negotiations failed to

materialize. As in Vietnam, the advisers can be blamed for not being more direct with the administration, and the administration can be criticized for not encouraging a more objective and realistic appraisal.

The most interesting analogy, however, is in Bauer's description of how Polk led the United States into war in the first place. Polk ordered the Texas occupation army of Gen. Zachary Taylor to the northern bank of the Rio Grande ostensibly to protect Texas against a possible invasion from Mexico. But the land between the Rio Grande and the Nueces, some hundred miles to the north, was disputed territory—no man's land. In fact, John Slidell had been sent to Mexico City precisely to discuss a possible settlement of the disputed boundary. Mexicans in Matamoros considered Taylor to be belligerent and mounted an effort to drive him back. The attempt was unsuccessful, but it gave the Polk administration the *cause celebre* it needed. Declaring that American blood had been shed on American soil, Polk asked for a declaration of war. Cleverly, he tied the declaration to the appropriations bill for the support of Taylor's little army. Antiwar Congressmen were caught on the dilemma of either refusing to support Americans already in the field or voting for war. They voted for war. They were fully aware, however, that they had been duped. Bauer quotes one Whig Congressman who said,

> . . . we have been brought into this war by the weakness or wickedness of our prest. and his cabinet, and while we must all stand by the country right or wrong it is grievous to know that when we pray "God defend the right" our prayers are not for our own country.

Finally, the Polk administration was guilty of entering upon war without a clear strategy. The President "expected to win the desired peace without a major military effort." When that expectation proved unrealistic, Polk ordered that the military effort be increased until finally, unexpectedly, the United States found itself in a full-fledged war. Again the reflection of Vietnam is implicit in Bauer's analysis.

Despite the omnipresence of these analogies, Bauer's new book is more than an editorial on Vietnam. It is a fully documented and comprehensive study of the Mexican War. But the quality which gives this history its unique character is its perspective, a perspective grounded firmly in Southeast Asia.

PROFESSOR CRAIG SYMONDS
Naval War College

Doumani, George A. *Ocean Wealth: Policy and Potential.* Rochelle Park, N.J.: Hayden, 1973. 285p.

The Law of the Sea Conference that met in Caracas this past summer gained considerable notoriety at its adjournment if only because, after 10 weeks of deliberations, the 5,000 delegates produced but one concrete result: to hold a subsequent meeting in 1975. What appeared to be massive inaction was in reality only the tip of a huge iceberg involving some of the knottiest and most difficult political, legal, institutional, and ecological problems compounded by burgeoning technology and world population, political and social aspirations, uncertain economic prospects, and certain economic rivalries.

For years the sea was the preserve of the navies and merchant marines of the world, valued primarily as a means of communication. This was more or less valid until about 1945 when the United States began a policy of asserting claim to oil deposits on the Continental Shelf. Since that time national claims over the surface and the seabed have been extended significantly.

Much of the literature relevant to changing conditions of the sea and the seabed is either too technical for the

intelligent but nonspecialist reader, or it is widely scattered in a variety of journals. George Doumani of the Congressional Research Service in the Library of Congress, however, has produced a handbook which contains succint but thorough presentations of the relevant data as well as political problems and policy considerations. The thrust of the book is decidedly interdisciplinary, which, along with its compilations, is perhaps its greatest virtue.

After discussing the geography and legal concepts of the Continental Shelf, Mr. Doumani shows how the seas and the seabed are now intrinsically valuable. He describes deposits on the seabed, what they are (building materials, phosphorite, manganese nodules, among others), and where they are (nearly ubiquitous). He also describes subsurface deposits of petroleum, sulphur, coal, salt, and potash.

In addition to mineral resources, the sea has always been a source of food. While he mentions fisheries as an important source of food, Mr. Doumani neglects to mention that unregulated overfishing can produce temporary if not permanent harm to the entire fish stock, and if fish prices on the New England coast are any indication, that time may be approaching, if it is not already here.

Technology has given mankind the means to use the resources of the seas and the seabed and economics has made it feasible. The problems of creating institutions, political processes, and legal norms remain. Mr. Doumani has skillfully shown a path through the political scientist's thickets of international nongovernmental organizations (the International Council of Scientific Unions), international intergovernmental organizations (UNESCO's Office of Oceanography, among others), and the United Nations activities. In this latter category he provides a good sketch of the General Assembly's actions, including establishment of the U.N. Seabed Committee and the Malta Proposals for a seabed regime based on the concept that resources of the ocean deep should be used for the common heritage of mankind.

In the past few years the United States has taken a great interest in these questions, not only because they are important by themselves, but also because they are closely linked to our interest in freedom of navigation. Mr. Doumani in crisp prose and by useful wiring diagrams describes the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, which is chaired by the Vice President of the United States, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), an independent Federal agency. Significant congressional concern, as well as the imaginative proposals of Senator Claiborne Pell, are also described clearly and concisely. Finally, he summarizes President Nixon's 1970 proposals for a seabed regime.

The handbook itself takes only 115 pages. The balance of *Ocean Wealth,* another 162 pages, consists of useful and relevant appendixes, containing the texts of U.S. Public Laws, Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders, U.N. Draft Resolutions, the Seabed Disarmament Treaty, in addition to useful tables of data.

Ocean Wealth provides the factual background necessary for a basic understanding of this enormously complex and novel series of problems presented by modern technology and aggravated by economics and politics.

B.M. SIMPSON, III
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Ellis, James E. and Moore, Robert M. *School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms.* New York: Oxford Press, 1974. 291p.

Avoiding the extremes of either diatribe or acclaim commonly employed by its critics and supporters, the authors have written a balanced and scholarly

study of the U.S. Military Academy. When reduced to its essence, it is a study of many internal conflicts masked from public view by the military tactic of "presenting a common front"—hiding much, as cadet life is masked by the imposing barracks walls.

The conflict takes many forms, ranging from the inner turmoil of the new cadet laboring under the intense pressures of the Beast Barracks (surely the most intensive institutional socialization process of any American college) to the several generations-old pedagogical conflict between the proponents and opponents of academic change. The authors skillfully interweave the dialog of tenured professor/colonels who resist change—insisting that the proven methods of over 160 years are valid today—and the transient generals, majors, and captains who desire to see West Point "stay abreast of the times." Through it all, however, the reader will find an unreal but pervasive sense that the Academy's destiny is being guided by something that transcends the lives of the individuals involved, something to which these many conflicts are but fleeting things. The young man's agonies of adjustment will pass, as will those of his successor and his successor's successor. In like manner the debaters of change will pass, as will their successors. Through it all the institution alone will prevail. This impression is enhanced by the authors' frequent personification of the institution. "West Point has come to regard itself as both an undergraduate college with an academic program and as a professional school for Army officers with an essentially military mission." The winds of academic controversy barely ripple the ivy growing on the grey stone walls.

This pervading sense of institutional domination is the source, however, of another conflict, a conflict permeating the entire book, a conflict which, if not resolved, must surely weaken the mortar of those ancient walls. This is the conflict of ideals, the anguish of which is plainly evident in every chapter. Duty, Honor, Country were very real ideals, clearly understood and totally accepted by such as Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, USMA, class of 1917. In the aftermath of Vietnam they are neither so clearly understood nor accepted by cadets and recent graduates.

In 1962 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur told the Corps "... that in war there is no substitute for victory; that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed; that the very obsession of your public services must be DUTY-HONOR-COUNTRY." *School for Soldiers* examines both the development of this obsession and the education of the men who must possess it. Some of its pages will make you smile and swell your heart with pride; others will have you sadly shaking your head, troubled by what is said; all will make you think.

E.L. WEBB
Major, U.S. Army

George, Alexander L., and Smoke, Richard. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. 666p.

Few books of political science or history will possess more of importance for professional military men than this volume on the American theory and practice of deterrence. The book, in fact, combines the techniques of both political science and history to make deterrence theory more relevant to the practical problems of security in the nuclear age. Composed of three sections, the opening portion of the book describes the present state of deterrence theory with an emphasis on its deficiencies in limited conflict situations. A second section contains historical case studies of important attempts to employ deterrence from the Berlin blockade of 1948 to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962; and a

third section extends deterrence theory on the basis of historical evidence and inductive logic.

The authors point to the fact that the real problems—and failures—of deterrence in American foreign relations since the end of World War II have come not in the realm of strategic nuclear confrontation, but in conflicts considerably lower on the scale. One problem is that traditional deterrence theory does not provide internal guides to application when the use of deterrence is appropriate and likely to produce desirable results. As a result, American leaders have often depended on deterrence in situations in which there was never any real possibility that it would work as, for instance, in the Middle East and to a certain extent in Indochina. Furthermore, showing its heavy debt to political science approaches, deterrence theory has been deductive and prescriptive, rather than inductive and explanatory, with the paradoxical result that it has been less, rather than more useful to policymakers. The authors, therefore, in section three of the volume have suggested a new emphasis, understanding the intentions and calculations of the state or power which initiates a conflict situation rather than concentrating on the behavior that is necessary for a defender to deter a potential initiator of change or confrontation.

It is difficult in a short review to convey the depth of thought, the breadth of coverage, or the quality of material contained in this large book. The historical case studies alone are worthy of careful reading, and the chapters on theory as it stands and theory as it should be will indeed repay the effort invested in a reflective perusal. The book addresses one of the most fundamental issues of national strategy and policy, and it behooves every military professional to educate himself in the complexities and the advances of this subject. There is no better way to begin than to read this book.

PROFESSOR THOMAS H. ETZOLD
Naval War College

Kohler, Foy D., *et al. Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence.* Miami: University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973. 241p.

American public opinion in recent years has tended to vacillate between believing that the Government of the Soviet Union is bent on hostility and that détente has become a firm and lasting reality. The purpose of the present volume is to demonstrate that regardless of the current trend in public opinion, the Russian leadership from Stalin down to Brezhnev and Kosygin has been unswervingly hostile to the United States, an unpopular task in many circles, official and private. Assuming the general outlook of Americans at the present time, many reviewers will contend that the authors of *Soviet Strategy for the Seventies* are only interested in perpetuating the cold war. Yet, the hopes of the American people for peaceful coexistence with the U.S.S.R. have never borne fruit in the past, and one must at least be cautious about the present. (Back in the 1930's, a similar spirit of détente prompted the president of the Daughters of the American Revolution to visit the Soviet Embassy in Washington to participate in a fete of friendship, and the time must have come when Mrs. William D. Becker was sorry for her effervescent opinions.)

The authors of this volume believe that "peaceful coexistence" is just a meaningless phrase to the Soviet leadership and its in-house philosophers of Marxism, and surely the quotations gathered by the authors support their contention. The Soviets exclude from their calculations of "peaceful" wars of

liberation virtually all conventional wars, and some of the military leaders evidently believe that the protection of the socialist camp might be necessary by preventive atomic war. During the era of Khrushchev—that attractive though contentious and sometimes downright dangerous antagonist, the man who refused to be a nonperson and whose two-volume memoir is now receiving the closest attention from Sovietologists—the Soviet Union clearly was backing away from the use of force, either in large or small wars. Then came the reversion to the traditional precepts of Marxism, and the leaders of today have not hesitated to announce in the most formal manner where they are going and how. To them the only purpose of peaceful coexistence apparently is to buy enough time to get hold of Western technology, especially computer technology—all the while they continue the arms race. Eventually the Soviet Union will attain such a position of power that as Brezhnev said in 1970, "no question of any importance in the world can be solved without our participation."

About half of this volume is text, although even that half is heavy with quotation. The other half is comprised of various documents keyed to the text. A great deal of work has gone into this book, and it deserves close reading, after which the reader may be forced to rethink his position on détente and the overall sincerity of Soviet good will.

PROFESSOR ROBERT H. FERRELL
Naval War College

Luttwak, Edward N. *The Political Uses of Sea Power*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1974. 79p.

With the publication of this brief analytic study, Mr. Luttwak has once again proven the wisdom of the adage that "good things come in small packages." Demanding no more than an hour and a half of concentrated reading, this book contains a treasury of the core concepts necessary for either professional or interested lay observers who wish to develop an appreciation for the political worth of modern navies.

Using examples or analogies drawn from both the historic past and recent international experience, Luttwak skillfully outlines and supports the view that naval forces in the modern era play a psychological and political role in the peacetime interactions of nations which is both unique and little appreciated. In laying the theoretical basis for his premise, the author correctly notes that "The familiar attributes of an ocean navy—inherent mobility, tactical flexibility, and a wide geographic reach—render it peculiarly useful as an instrument of policy even in the absence of hostilities," and that "the focus of Great Power naval strategy has been shifting to missions that are 'political' in the sense that their workings rely on the reactions of others, . . ." Luttwak further takes into account that much of the terminology associated with this unique characteristic of naval power is often ambiguous or marred by previously acquired and often misleading connotations. In his effort to avoid such misunderstanding, he brings into the jargon a new term—"suasion"—which he suggests is more neutral in its commonly understood meaning than the more frequently used terms, "naval presence" or "gunboat diplomacy."

In outlining his "theory of suasion," Luttwak casts the influence of naval power on the political decisions of other nations as but one form of the general peacetime influence of overall military power. Luttwak points out that

> Any instrument of military power that can be used to inflict damage upon an adversary, physically limit his freedom of action, or reveal his intentions may also affect his conduct, *and that of any interested third parties*, even if force is never actually used. The necessary . . . condition is that the

> parties concerned perceive . . . the capabilities deployed, thus allowing these capabilities to intrude on their view of the policy environment and so affect their decisions. (emphasis added)

The reference to third party reactions is of interest here since this vital aspect of peacetime naval diplomacy is too often overlooked by those who are most concerned with the interactions of the major actors in world affairs. Particularly for the United States, the perceptions of third parties--allied, adversary, or neutral--are of major importance. During the past quarter-century, this Nation has developed an international security system on a foundation of economic interdependence and mutual security support. Our principal possible adversaries, on the other hand, are much less dependent on the freely arrived at political decisions of their own client-states or trading partners. In effect, the security of the United States and its partners today is the result of freely held views of common vital interest cemented by the individual perceptions of the *reality* of U.S. power held by the political leadership of each nation so linked to us.

It is in this context that the special role of naval power in modern international affairs seen by Mr. Luttwak is of greatest significance. In his discussion of the impact on the policy decisions of other nations resulting from the use of "the symbolic warship," Luttwak emphasizes that the "symbolic warship can play its role only *before*, in order to *prevent*, a confrontation. Its effect on the *local* balance of power may be insignificant, but its purpose is to affirm a commitment of national power, local and strategic, naval or otherwise." He had previously pointed out that

> Land-based forces . . . can also be deployed in a manner to encourage friends and coerce enemies, but only within the narrow constraints of insertion feasibility, and with inherently greater risks, since the land nexus can convert any significant deployment into a (possibly unwanted) *political* commitment, with all the rigidities that this implies.

Since the United States stands as the focus of a worldwide *maritime* alliance system, its ability to fulfill overseas mutual security commitments remains credible to allies and adversaries alike only so long as its naval power is perceived to be adequate to the task. Thus, our adversaries must pursue a course of naval expansion activity calculated to undermine this perception by our allies, while we must not only maintain our existing superiority but, equally, make plain to both allies and neutrals that our forces are sufficient to the challenge.

Pursuing this point, Luttwak makes the cogent observation that "Whatever the imperatives of self-denigration imposed by the Congressional appropriations process, it is obvious that this official stance by the U.S. Navy (of decline in American naval power) must intrude on third-party perceptions of the (naval) balance of power." As a result of this "public relations" approach, Luttwak properly fears that "America's friends and clients are discouraged and intimidated by the presumed adverse trend in the balance of naval power; her enemies, on the other hand, are encouraged to believe that they may harm American interests with impunity."

There is much more which could be said in favor of the Luttwak study--it is that kind of paper--but, to do so would diminish the net impact of his work. There is also a real need for amplification of the seminal concepts which he has so concisely outlined.

On balance, the greatest asset of Mr. Luttwak's work is its combination of brevity and substance--its greatest weaknesses stem solely from the fact that so little analytical thinking has previously

been done along the same lines. I strongly commend this short but pithy and provocative work to all who would pretend to competence in the area of understanding the role of military–and particulary, naval–power in the "age of détente."

JAMES F. McNULTY
Captain, U.S. Navy

Wheeler, Gerald E. *Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: a Sailor's Life*. Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy. 1974. 456p.

We shall never know whether William Veazie Pratt would have made a great wartime admiral for he reached flag rank and rose to the top of the Navy during the peacetime years between 1921 and 1933. We do know that Admiral Pratt's role at the London Naval Conference in 1930 and his bad luck to head his service as the depression forced drastic cuts in the Navy meant that most naval officers did not regret his retirement in 1933.

While Professor Gerald Wheeler's admiration for this intelligent, humane, and extraordinarily professional naval officer is abundantly clear throughout his new biography, he concludes that Pratt's distinctive contributions to the Navy were rather modest. I would disagree. I believe that the evidence in Professor Wheeler's careful and detailed biography reveals Admiral Pratt as one of the outstanding figures of the modern American Navy. In his long career Pratt's two greatest contributions to the Navy and the Nation were his crucial role as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations in the conduct of World War I; and his courageous part in breaking the Anglo-American deadlock over cruiser limitations which made possible the London Naval Treaty of 1930.

As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations in World War I, Pratt managed, almost miraculously, to keep the stolid and anglophobic CNO, Adm. William S. Benson, working effectively with the commander of the Navy's European forces, the brilliant but contentious anglophile Adm. William S. Sims. The eruption in 1919 of bitter charges and countercharges between Admiral Sims on the one side and Admiral Benson and Secretary of the Navy Daniels on the other convinces me that without Pratt in Washington, Sims' pent-up anger would have exploded during the war with disastrous consequences for the entire American war effort.

With the end of hostilities, the now Rear Admiral Pratt served as naval adviser to the American delegation of the Washington Conference in 1921-1922, but it was not until the London Conference of 1930 that his most important and controversial contribution to the limitation of naval armaments was made. Pratt was at that time called from his command of the U.S Fleet to serve as naval adviser to the American delegation. The same quarrel between the United States and Great Britain over cruiser types and quotas that had caused the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference to fail seemed to once again doom the cause of disarmament. Pratt, however, had the courage to produce a compromise, in the conviction that since the Navy was well below the limits of the treaty, any agreement, no matter how imperfect, would serve the Navy well by providing long-term levels to build up to.

In his final evaluation of Pratt's career, Professor Wheeler cites Pratt's support for the 1930 London Treaty as one of the two issues "of transcendent importance to the Navy" on which Pratt was wrong. Perhaps this is because in the short run, during the Hoover administration, there was indeed no building up to treaty limits, and the Navy suffered continuous reductions which unquestionably damaged Pratt's prestige as CNO. Once Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933, Pratt's "treaty Navy"

concept became, as one author has written, a magic formula for securing ever-increasing naval appropriations. For the Nation and the Navy, Admiral Pratt made the right decision in pressing for a compromise and a treaty in 1930.

In Professor Wheeler's judgment, Admiral Pratt's second great error was his willingness to trust Japan and his eagerness for friendship with Great Britain. Pratt had supported both the 1922 Washington naval treaty and the 1930 London naval treaty in the belief that if America and Great Britain could avoid rivalry between themselves, the two together could probably pressure Japan into limiting her navy as well. Pratt's willingness to trust Japan therefore depended upon the success of American cooperation with Great Britain. Moreover, it seems clear that Admiral Pratt never doubted that Japan was America's most likely future enemy, even if he refused to accept that war with Japan was inevitable.

Professor Wheeler, a distinguished historian of the U.S. Navy in the interwar period, is especially well qualified to write this biography—the first ever—of Admiral Pratt. The book is based on wide research, most notably in Admiral Pratt's own extensive papers which fortuitously became available for research at the Naval War College while Professor Wheeler held the King Chair of Maritime History there in 1968-1969. Professor Wheeler's scholarly yet eminently readable account of Admiral Pratt's life is valuable not only as the story of an individual's development but also as a case study in the sociology of the naval officer corps in this period. "Ticket-punching" careerism, cliques around rising admirals, and inexplicable flag selections are not innovations peculiar to the Navy of our generation. The author quotes generously from Pratt's fitness reports, and this art form has not advanced at all from the 1890's to the present. Beyond all this, Professor Wheeler's narrative of Pratt's role in the formation of American naval policy in World War I, at the Washington Conference, and from the 1930 London Conference to the end of the Republican era in 1933 is full of insights for our own struggles with strategic arms limitation and the fate of defense spending in times of national economic decline. Our defense establishment is now vastly larger and our management techniques more sophisticated, but I am not sure that we have nothing to learn from the experience of Admiral Pratt and his colleagues of 40 or 50 years ago.

JAMES K. McDONALD
Research Associate, Naval War College

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Professor R.M. Lloyd	Captain D.W. Whelan, SC, USN
Commander R.D. Longman, USN	Captain J.E. Wilson, USN
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